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Abstract 
In 2007, 13 South African cities embarked on implementing Integrated Public Transport Networks 
(IPTN’s) guided by the Public Transport Strategy and Action Plan (PTSAP) published by the National 
Department of Transport (NDoT). The PTSAP sought to reform public transport industries across 
South Africa by 2020 to ward off increasing congestion, passenger dissatisfaction with overcrowding, 
long travel times, high travel costs, and safety concerns. Of the 13 cities, Nelson Mandela Bay 
Metropolitan Municipality (NMBM), City of Tshwane (CoT), City of Johannesburg (CoJ), City of 
Cape Town (CoCT), and George Local Municipality (GLM) had progressed the furthest by the end of 
2017. However, all five Cities had experienced delays in achieving their IPTN project objectives. This 
dissertation investigates the underlying factors causing the delays.  
The research was guided by a framework of analysis developed by three core questions – the 
impact of the minibus-taxi industry negotiations, the impact of government’s capacity to implement, 
and the impact of South Africa’s urban form.  
The literature review begins with the fundamentals of reform of the three dimensions of the 
public transport industry: service characteristics, operator business structure, and competition. It then 
continues with a review of the history of attempts at reform in the minibus-taxi industry and bus 
industry, and a breakdown of the PTSAP. The literature review concludes with the fundamentals of 
mass transit use with an emphasis on the influence of urban form. 
Data were collected from media sources, government and academic publications, and 
qualitative semi-structured face-to-face interviews. The data were used to evaluate each IPTN system’s 
outcome and develop a chronology of each project’s implementation.  
In NMBM, Libhongolethu was delayed due to the strained relationship between the local 
minibus-taxi industry and the NMBM, and the alleged mismanagement of resources. It was concluded 
that a lack of political will and a lack of capacity-to-implement were the underlying factors. 
In CoT, A Re Yeng was delayed due to difficulty in developing adequate IPTN plans, and lack 
of foresight on the long-term impact of political decisions. It was concluded that weak planning capacity 
and poor political decision making were the underlying factors.  
In CoJ, Rea Vaya benefitted from the external pressure of hosting the World Cup, as well as 
strong political leadership in the minibus-taxi industry and CoJ during Phase 1A. However, the project 
still grappled with animosity between local minibus-taxi associations, the influence of national mother-
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bodies on local associations, distrust of government within the minibus-taxi industry, industry 
transformation compensation benchmarking, and uncertainty following the 2016 local government 
elections. Therefore, it was concluded that politics within the minibus-taxi industry and government 
were the underlying factors. 
In CoCT, MyCiTi was delayed due to the inappropriate nature of BRT for Cape Town’s 
spatial form, higher than expected industry transition costs, budgetary cycles of government financial 
planning, and the moderation of services to improve financial sustainability.  Therefore, it was 
concluded that an overall inappropriate solution to the public transport problem, prudent political 
leadership and adequate capacity-to-implement within the CoCT were the underlying factors. 
In GLM, GoGeorge was delayed because of inappropriate design restrictions imposed by the 
NDoT and changes in political leadership in quick succession at a vital stage of the project. Therefore, 
it was concluded that a lack of capacity within the NDoT and leadership instability were the underlying 
factors. 
In conclusion, all three core questions were found to be determinants of success or delay, while 
in addition, political will was also found to be a fundamental factor to success or delay. Analysis of the 
case-specific causes of delay found that all cases were ultimately delayed due to five fundamental factors: 
an inappropriately ambitious implementation timeframe, the incongruency between gold-standard 
BRT design and South African urban form, the difficulty of overcoming the complexity of trust 
between the minibus-taxi industry and government, political will, and government’s lack of capacity to 
implement a reform programme as complex as the PTSAP.
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“I understood very clearly that the most important topic of our time, more so in our country, was the 
urban topic. Everything else was temporary. Cities, the way they were made or not made, would 
determine behaviour in a fundamental way. Because people, to a large extent, behave according to the 
surrounding environment. Therefore, public spaces such as sidewalks, bike-paths and mass transit 
systems are examples of the egalitarian society for which we should strive,  
because in them, we all meet as equals.” 
 
Enrique Penalosa, Mayor of Bogota, Colombia 1998 – 2001; 2016 - 2019
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1 Introduction 
1.1. Background 
South African cities have been pursuing the transformation of their public transport industries, 
through the implementation of Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) for the last eleven years. This dissertation 
considers the ten years between 2007 and 2017, of that period. Project outcomes have varied between 
the 13 cities who pursued this objective. In some instances, the cities have not progressed beyond the 
development of preliminary planning documents. In other cases, cities have managed to begin 
construction, but bus operations have not materialised. While, in the instances with the most progress, 
cities have managed to complete whole phases and have been operating since 2009.  
This dissertation analyses five of the cities that have been working to reform their public 
transport industries and have managed to launch services. The analysis seeks to uncover the underlying 
factors that have caused the project outcomes in the reform attempts being implemented in each of the 
five cities. The five cities are Nelson Mandela Bay, Tshwane, Johannesburg, Cape Town and George.  
This research dissertation hopes to build on stakeholders’ understanding of the nuances in the 
complexity of public transport reform projects.  Academic interest in BRT in Sub-Saharan African has 
grown over the last 15 years as African governments have pursued public transport reform using this 
mode. However, research outputs have been dominated by critical analysis of the risks, challenges and 
potential successes of BRT, with a focus on the pre-implementation period. A gap exists in analysing 
BRT reform projects in hindsight post implementation.   
An assessment of mobility and access academic literature on Sub-Saharan Africa found at least 
50 publications that related to BRT services (Behrens et al, 2015: 13). The bulk of these were published 
between 2008 and 2014, focussing on supply and demand, reform discourse, contextual constraints, 
and operational and infrastructure requirements around BRT services. Limited literature was found 
around organisational arrangements relating to BRT (Behrens et al, 2015: 13). There is a growing interest 
in the influence of political and soci0-economic factors on the outcome of public transport reform 
projects. In the Sub-Saharan Africa assessment, some literature was found on the inclusion of 
marginalised stakeholders in decision making (Behrens et al, 2015: 16), but none looking specifically at 
interactions between mini-bus taxi operators in South Africa and BRT authorities.  
This dissertation seeks to contribute to filling the gap in academic literature on post-
implementation BRT reform projects. The five cities selected for this case have, at least on paper, had 
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the opportunity to mature and adapt to the lessons learned from their attempt to implement BRT over 
the last ten years.  
1.2. Research questions 
The dissertation seeks to unpack the underlying factors that have caused the project outcomes in the 
reform attempts being implemented in each of the five cities. Projects are influenced by a range of 
factors. The factors do not exercise influence to equal degrees and therefore, some factors may have a 
more dominant role in determining the outcome of projects, than others. The factors influencing the 
IPTN projects under investigation in this dissertation are people and relationships, legal and financial 
constraints, organisational capacity within the construction industry, government and public transport 
operating sectors. The success of a project is determined by how effectively the implementing agents are 
able to wield the above factors to achieve a desired outcome.  
Therefore, throughout the research process the following questions were used to analyse the 
data to determine the underlying factors that has caused the status-quo of the IPTN projects. The 
questions are as follows: 
1. What impact did the industry engagements and negotiations have on the outcomes of 
the IPTN projects, and why did this occur; 
2. What impact did stakeholder capacity to implement have on the outcomes of the IPTN 
projects, and why did this occur; and 
3. What impact did the original PTSAP, in relation to South African city spatial form, 
have on the outcomes of the IPTN projects, and why did this occur? 
1.3. Document layout 
Chapter one begins by providing the rationale for this research and concludes with the detailing the 
research questions and the rationale used to determine the research questions. 
Chapter two unpacks the case study method. It begins with demonstrating its suitability to this 
research question by considering the method’s advantages and risks. This is followed by details of the 
research design, which aimed to effectively use the advantages of the case study method while guarding 
against its shortcomings. The chapter concludes with an explanation of the step-by-step method that 
was followed in the research process.  
Chapter three reviews academic literature to develop a knowledge base for the research. The 
review begins with the theory of public transport reform, which is followed by the history of public 
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transport reform in South Africa with a specific interest in the minibus-taxi and conventional bus 
industries. The review unpacks the 2007 Public Transport Strategy and Action Plan that formed the 
basis for the IPTN projects in South Africa. This is followed by a consideration of the nexus between 
urban form and transit use. The chapter concludes with brief considerations of the urban form of two 
South American cities that influenced the South African governments adoption of BRT, as well as a 
look at the urban form of South African cities.  
Chapters four to eight provide the findings of the research. Each chapter begins with an 
introduction to the case study city, the state of its transport, and the institutional arrangements of the 
local public transport sector. This is followed with an evaluation of the ‘achieved outcomes’ against the 
‘intended outcomes’ of the respective IPTN project. The system outcomes evaluation is followed by a 
chronology of events and decisions between the project inception and the end of 2017. Thereafter, each 
chapter concludes with an analysis of the findings to determine the factors that caused the project 
outcomes at the end of 2017. 
Chapter nine begins with comparing the system outcomes evaluations of each IPTN project 
to determine if there are similarities in the outcomes achieved or those in delay. The chapter ends with 
determining similarities in the factors from each case study analysis. This process of deeper analysis is 
carried out to establish whether there are factors that caused the outcomes of IPTN projects, that are 
fundamental to all five case studies.  
Chapter ten concludes the research process by determining whether the research questions were 
answered and concludes by reflecting on additional propositions and recommendations for further 
study towards reform of the public transport industry in South Africa.  
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2 Research methodology 
2.1. Introduction  
In this chapter on the research method employed in this research project, the suitability of the multi-
case study strategy is considered. Following the argument supported by Flyvbjerg (2006), Schalekamp 
(2015) and Yin (2014), the chapter covers the design of the research process, including the rationale 
behind the case selection. Lastly, chapter two concludes with a rigorous description of the method 
followed for data collection, data analysis and proposition development. 
2.2. Research strategy motivation 
The aim of this research project is to build an in-depth understanding of why the much-lauded and 
well-funded IPTN plans did not produce the hoped-for results. Bent Flyvbjerg (2006) in his attempt to 
debunk case study research myths, argues strongly for the ability of case study research to understand 
complex issues, embedded deep in the context of cases.  Flyvbjerg argues that ‘context-dependent’ 
knowledge is ideal for building the practical understanding that enables expert knowledge (Flyvberg, 
2006: 303). An objective of this dissertation is to build on the stakeholder’s understanding of the public 
transport sector. Therefore, building a bank of ‘context-dependent’ knowledge through this research 
project would be invaluable to the ongoing progress of the public transport sector.  
Flyvbjerg (2006) demonstrates the ability of case study research to unearth the interaction 
between complex deep-rooted power structures in the City of Aalborg and plans to reform their 
transport sector. His findings have an interesting bearing on this dissertation’s attempt to understand 
the true underlying factors behind the IPTN project’s reasons for success or delay. Flyvbjerg (2006) 
argues that, in a democracy, the ultimate outcome of a project is not determined by the rationality of 
the plan but rather by the wielding of power that the different stakeholders possess. This finding makes 
a case study research method a compelling selection with which to investigate the research question of 
this dissertation.  
Schalekamp (2015) too founds his doctoral thesis research design upon the arguments of 
Flyvbjerg’s (2006) assertion for ‘context-dependent’ knowledge. Again, similar to this dissertation, 
Schalekamp uses the criteria set-out by Yin (2014) to guide his research design. Although Flyvbjerg and 
Schalekamp provide compelling arguments for the use of case study to investigate social phenomena, 
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the selection of case study as the research method ultimately fell to the detailed framework that Yin 
provides (Yin, 2014). 
Yin defines case study as an empirical enquiry that “investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
in-depth and within its real-world context”, where the boundaries between phenomenon and context 
may not be clear (Yin, 2014: 16).  
The dissertation researches contemporary cases during the 10 years between 2007 and end-
2017. The IPTN projects, all of which remain active, started shortly after the promulgation of the 2007 
PTSAP and in some cases before its promulgation. 
Yin defines a range of research strategies, which allow for varying degrees of control on context 
and isolation of phenomena. In this, he allows for a deliberate consideration of contextual conditions 
(Yin, 2014: 13). The PTSAP sought to have “maximum inclusion of existing operators” (Department of 
Transport, 2007: 8). This has exposed the IPTN programmes to the historically strained relationship 
between existing paratransit operators and government. Making it inevitable that the governing 
authorities have to navigate the associated political complexities. Therefore, the research process should 
deliberately include the contextual conditions of surrounding the implementation of the IPTN 
programmes.  
Beyond the importance of allowing context to feature in the research, the researcher in this 
study had little or no control over the events. The IPTN programmes in each case are products of 
extensive engagements, that have been ongoing for years, between the national and local governments.  
The researcher is likely to only have brief contact with a select number of stakeholders. Contact between 
the researcher and stakeholders is insufficient to influence the outcome of the IPTN programmes.  
Yin(2014) also looks to the type of questions that are being asked in the research. Flyvberg asked 
“why” and “how” questions in his case study of the Aalborg Project, as did Schalekamp in his analysis 
of paratransit operator involvement in the MyCiTi project.  Similarly, the research aim of this 
dissertation is to understand “how” the five cases reached their disparities between the intended 
outcomes and the actual outcomes of the National Public Transport Strategy. Following this is an 
(implicit) “why” question, as the research attempts to delve deeper into the detail behind each case 
study.  
Given that this dissertation is a contemporary case, with the case study being highly context 
dependent, while the researcher has little or no control over the events, and that the dissertation asks 
“how” and “why” research questions, Yin (2014) leads us to select case study as the research strategy.  
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The case study approach has two weaknesses, pointed out by Yin (2014): the difficulty of 
differentiating between phenomena and context; and the possibility for the researcher to manipulate 
the data derived from systematic interviewing. To guard against both weaknesses, Yin states that case 
study “relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion.” 
(Yin, 2014: 13). Triangulation in this context requires the interview data to be corroborated by other 
sources. This convergence of information allows for the accurate analysis of phenomena and context to 
be distilled in the large volumes of information obtained from the various sources. This dissertation 
relied on published academic papers, news articles, government reports and plans, and face-to-face 
interviews.  
2.3. Research design 
The dissertation researches the IPTN programmes in Cape Town, Johannesburg, Tshwane, Nelson 
Mandela Bay and George. Each case provides a rich understanding of the IPTN programme. Four of 
the cities sought to employ BRT operations as their reform agenda, while George sought to reform its 
public transport industry using conventional bus operations. In all five cases, ten years after the project 
initiation in 2007, the actual outcomes are different to the intended outcomes of the projects.  
Early on in the IPTN programme Johannesburg, Cape Town, Tshwane and Nelson Mandela 
Bay had made the most progress (Van Ryneveld, 2008: 53). All four cities set out to reform their public 
transport services into BRT systems. Over the course of the 10-year period, the four cities have had 
varied progress providing for interesting individual case studies. Johannesburg and Cape Town have 
seen the most operational progress in comparison to Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay.  Tshwane has 
been plagued by planning delays and has struggled to realise operational outcomes, while having 
managed to operate an interim service. Nelson Mandela Bay made considerable strides initially, in 
planning and construction of their BRT system, but besides a one-year pilot programme in 2013, they 
have failed to operate any buses.  
George was selected as a case because, although a public transport reform programme like the 
other four cities, it is unique as it did not seek to implement a BRT system. George was included as a 
13th city to the PTSAP programme after its initiation because of the considerable progress the GLM had 
made independent of the national government PTSAP. Since its inclusion, the George system has made 
considerable implementation and operational progress. The case stands out as a comparative success 
story in the PTSAP. However, the case has not been without delays in their operational and 
implementation performance, which is expected to be for similar reasons as the other four cases.  
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Collectively, the five cases under investigation lends itself to a multiple case study research 
design.  The nature of the PTSAP programme provided the opportunity for literal replication (Yin, 
2014: 46). Literal replication occurs when case studies ‘predict similar results’. Despite the different 
operational and implementation outcomes among the five cases and the uniqueness of the case in 
George, it is predicted that the IPTN programmes in each case is not achieving the intended outcomes 
for similar underlying factors.  
A deeper understanding of the factors behind the successes or delays of the IPTN programme 
can be understood by considering each City as individual case studies. Therefore, each case will be 
investigated as an individual unit of analysis. This allowed for each case to be analyzed based on the 
definition of success and timeline set out by each City. It also allowed the factors of success and delay 
to be distilled relevant to the context in each City. Lastly, it was decided that treating each case study as 
an individual unit of analysis allowed for the South African context to be best portrayed in the research. 
The five case studies will be analyzed to determine the differences and similarities between the projects. 
This allowed for more accurate propositions as to the underlying factors of success and delay for IPTN 
implementation in South Africa as a whole.  
2.4. Research method 
The research method followed six procedures, beginning with a literature review, which informed an 
evaluation of the IPTN outcomes. Timeline and thematic analyses were carried out in an iterative 
fashion as the qualitative interview procedure influenced the data analysis. Lastly, the research method 
concludes with the development of propositions.  
2.4.1. Literature review 
The research process began with a review of academic literature. The limited amount of academic 
research that related to BRT in Sub-Saharan Africa, as described in the introduction, necessitated the 
sourcing of literature from media articles, in addition. Academic literature was sourced through key-
word searches on the Google Scholar search engine, using the University of Cape Town’s Library ‘off-
campus log-in’ feature. This allowed for journal articles, published books and chapters, presentations, 
theses and websites to be accessed. Media articles were sourced through key-word searches using 
Google’s main search engine. Literature was also sourced from my academic supervisor, A/Prof Roger 
Behrens. 
Government plans that related to the IPTN projects were sourced through key-word searches 
on Google’s main search engine. Where plans were not accessible via internet searches, plans were 
sourced from the relevant local government departments. Then National Department of Transport’s 
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(NDoT) PTSAP documents were accessed from Google. Cape Town’s IRPTN plans were sourced 
from the City’s Transport and Urban Development Authority’s (TDA) website, from A/Prof Roger 
Behrens and other academic department colleagues. The City of Cape Town (CoCT) published 
updated business plans every two years, all of which was considered in the research process. The scoping 
plan and phase-related business plans for the City of Johannesburg’s (CoJ) IRPTN plans were sourced 
from the City’s Transport Department and Google.  Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan’s (NMBM) 
Comprehensive Integrated Public Transport Network Plan and IRPTN scoping plans were sourced 
from Google. Scoping plans, preliminary designs and phase related business plans for the City of 
Tshwane’s IRPTN project were sourced from Google and the City’s Transport Department. CoT 
Council resolutions relating to the IPTN project was also sourced from Google and the CoT’s official 
website. The business plan for the George Local Municipality’s (GLM) IPTN project was sourced from 
Google searches.  
2.4.2. Iterative thematic analysis  
Thematic coding was used to analyze the literature. Coding is the process of separating data from their 
original context and labelled, using a theme, enabling the data to be retrieved and analyzed further in 
the context of data with the same theme (Ayres, 2012). The thematic analysis had two objectives: to 
enable an evaluation of the IPTN project outcomes and to enable a timeline analysis that can unearth 
the underlying reasons for the outcomes found in the system evaluations. The thematic analysis was 
carried out using Microsoft Excel. Direct quotes were pulled from the literature and coded into themes 
that related to planning, construction, funding, political complexities, BRT infrastructure and design, 
industry transformation, public participation, system performance and propositions for delay. Where 
possible, a timestamp with as much detail as was available, was given to each quote. An example of the 
thematic analysis process can be found in Appendix A.  
2.4.3. System outcomes evaluation 
The thematic analysis explained above was used to determine the categories and criteria by which to 
evaluate the IPTN projects. The PTSAP drafted by the NDoT was used to determine the categories 
and criteria by which to evaluate each IPTN project. The categories are as follows: accessibility, service 
quality, infrastructure and operations. The detailed criteria that fall under each category can be found 
in each case study - chapters four to eight. In addition to categorizing each IPTN project into the 
definition determined by the NDoT, each IPTN project was evaluated against the ‘intended outcomes’ 
set by each City. Thereby, the state of success, delay or failure for each IPTN project in the case study 
cities was determined by evaluating the ‘achieved outcome’ against the ‘intended outcome’ within the 
criteria set by the NDoT. Success, delay and failure are defined as follows: 
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Success is an IPTN project that has achieved the ‘intended outcomes’, within the ‘intended 
time frames’ which the City had planned in their initial planning documents.  
Delay is an IPTN project that has not achieved the ‘intended outcomes’, within the ‘intended 
time frames’ that the City had planned in their initial planning documents, but the City continues to 
pursue the implementation of the IPTN project. Delay is also defined as an IPTN project that has 
achieved the ‘intended outcomes’ in ‘longer-than-intended time frames’ than that which the City had 
planned in their initial planning documents. 
Failure is an IPTN project that has not achieved the ‘intended outcomes’, within the ‘intended 
time frames’ that the City had planned in their planning documents, and the City is no longer pursuing 
the implementation of the IPTN project.  
Throughout the research process the system outcomes evaluation was carried out on an 
iterative basis until the accurate record of the ‘achieved outcomes’ were determined.  
2.4.4. Iterative timeline analysis 
The timestamps associated with the thematic analysis, described above, was used to construct a timeline 
of key events and decisions over the ten-year period for each case study. The strength of this type of 
timeline analysis is its ability to identify a variety of variables in potential causal events. The 
chronological sequencing allowed the impact of individual events and decisions on the status of the 
IPTN projects, to be understood. This enabled a preliminary narrative to develop to unearth the 
underlying factors that caused success, delay or failure of the IPTN projects. The preliminary narrative 
formed the foundation of the interviews held with IPTN stakeholders. The data collected from the 
interviews, in turn, were used to verify or invalidate the preliminary narratives developed. This led to 
further investigation both through interviewing more stakeholders and reviewing more literature.  
2.4.5. Qualitative semi-structured interviews 
Qualitative semi-structured interviews were conducted with 22 stakeholders of the five IPTN case 
studies. The stakeholders included project consultants, former and current local government officials, 
transport specialists and local mini-bus taxi industry representatives. The interview process gained 
ethics approval from the UCT Ethics Committee, a copy of which can be found in Appendix E. The 
research was deemed to be of medium risk due to the potential impact that the researcher could have 
on the processes of the IPTN projects. However, the risks were deemed to be adequately mitigated 
through the cautions undertaken in the research design, detailed in the Informed Consent Form, an 
example of which can be found in Appendix D.  
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Interviews were conducted face-to-face in the respective cities under study, as far as possible. 
The thematic analysis, system outcomes evaluation and timeline analysis informed the interview 
questions. The interview questions, draft timeline of events and the informed consent form were shared 
with the interviewees prior to the interview. The aim of the interview process was to check the accuracy 
of the data gleaned from the literature sources, while also filling any gaps in the gathered data. The 
interviews were voice recorded and transcribed. The transcriptions underwent thematic analysis.  
The interview questions acted as guidelines for the interview. The interviewee was given the 
freedom to speak as their thoughts guided them, while I loosely directed the interview to ensure that 
the areas of interest were covered. This method increases the level of comfort of the interviewee and 
therefore increases the likelihood that the interviewees will speak more candidly about sensitive topics. 
The tensions between government and the existing mini-bus taxi industry was identified as an area of 
interest. Corruption allegations (Olver, 2017) was also identified as an area of interest. Given that these 
are two potentially sensitive topics, where reliable information would most likely be gathered from a 
candid interview, it became important to structure the interview to encourage this.  
Comfort, in the interview, is a result of trust between the interviewee and the interviewer. 
Trust is best established through a face-to-face interaction. A face-to-face interview allows the 
interviewer the opportunity to garner non-verbal information which would assist in assessing whether 
information is being candidly shared. Face-to-face interviews enabled the interviewer to maintain the 
trust of the interviewee for the full duration of the interview, as it removed the possible break-down of 
trust through the possible miscommunication as is sometimes the case through telephone calls.   
2.4.6. Proposition development 
The propositions were developed upon conclusion of the research process. The combination of the 
literature review and the interview data comprised the final timelines per case study.  The iterative 
timeline analysis considered the events and decisions along the case study timelines that had causal links 
to the overall delays in the implementation. These causal links were compared to the results of the 
thematic analysis, which together aimed at developing an understanding of the underlying factors that 
resulted in the events and decisions identified in the timeline analysis. This process allowed the 
development of propositions on the factors contributing to success or delay of the IPTN programmes.  
2.5. Conclusion 
This chapter argues that case study is a suitable research strategy to unearth the underlying factors to 
have caused success or delay of the five IPTN projects in question. It does so by showing that case study 
is able to understand complex ‘context-dependent’ reasons for an outcome. It further argues that the 
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broader purpose of this dissertation is served through case study because it creates the type of knowledge 
that assists professionals build on their knowledge. It draws heavily on three regularly cited academics 
– Bent Flyvbjerg, Herrie Schalekamp and Robert Yin, to conduct assess the suitability of case study for 
the research questions of this dissertation. The chapter expounds on the opportunity for ‘literal 
replication’ among the cases selected, as well as providing a justification for their selection. Each case is 
considered as an individual unit of analysis because of the opportunity for a deeper unravelling of the 
answer to the research question. The chapter concludes with a description of the literature review, the 
thematic and timeline analyses, the evaluation of each public transport system, the qualitative semi-
structured face-to-face interviews and the development of propositions.   
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3 Literature review  
3.1. Introduction 
Fundamentally, the outcome of a government programme comes down to two factors: first, the ability 
of the government to implement the programme, and second, the appropriateness of the programme 
for a given context. This chapter, firstly, seeks to place South Africa’s attempt to reform its public 
transport industry through the PTSAP, within the existing academic literature related to the matter.  
While, secondly, this chapter begins to build the narrative that will frame the understanding of the 
underlying factors that have caused the delay or success of the five IPTN projects under question.  
The literature review begins to unpack the first of the two fundamental factors that influence 
the outcome of a government programme, mentioned above, through a dissection of the theory of 
reform. This is followed by a chronological review of public transport reform attempts in South Africa 
dating back to 1985. Attention is given to the reform of the minibus-taxi industry and the conventional 
bus industry. This is followed by a review of the Public Transport Strategy and Action Plan, which is 
the centre of this dissertation and is the latest public transport reform attempt by government. The 
final section unpacks the appropriateness of the PTSAP for the South African context, given the urban 
form of the PTSAP’s inspiration – South America, and given the urban form of the South African city.  
3.2. The theory of reform  
To reform is to intentionally make a change. ‘A transition by design’ as Schalekamp (2015) put it in his 
doctoral dissertation. Public transport can be deduced to consist of three dimensions, shown in figure 
1, below: competition regulation, service characteristics and operator business structure (Schalekamp, 
2015: 31). Reform in the public transport arena would require change in one or more of these 
dimensions. This chapter will detail these dimensions in an attempt to place the 2007 PTSAP in the 
body of academic literature on public transport reform. By this we will be able to better understand 
what the fundamental reasons are for the success or delay of the five IPTN programmes. The theory 
will be dissected by starting with reform by competition, then progressing onto the service dimension 
and concluding with reform of business structure. 
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Where two or more entities exist with the same or similar objective/s, competition will exist. 
Competition can be beneficial to an environment; in the case of public transport it can drive down fares, 
improve customer experience and encourage technological developments. However, competition, 
unregulated, can also be detrimental to an environment; in the case of public transport it can lead to 
low density services and reckless driving. Public transport is viewed as a public good by many governing 
authorities. Therefore, in the interest of the public it is desirable to utilise the benefits of competition 
while controlling the negative consequences.  
There are various forms of competition in urban public transport. Competition can be both 
indirect and direct. Competition that influences urban public transport but is not directly related to its 
operation can include: support services and supply procurement, competition from private transport 
and competition between operators for status.  
Direct competition can take place in two arenas: service providers can compete for the market 
or they can compete in the market. There are a range of types of competition, which overlap at times. 
These are public monopoly, gross cost service contract, net cost service contract, management contract, 
franchise, concession, quantity license, quality license and open market. 
There are benefits and draw-backs for allowing service providers to compete for the market vs 
in the market.  Some of the benefits for restricting competition to for the market are economies of scale 
which can be drawn from being the sole operator for a large area or removing the incentive to compete 
Figure 1: Three dimensions of public transport reform. Source: Schalekamp, 2015: 32. 
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for passengers. While some of the draw-backs are the potential for fare manipulation or a decrease in 
service quality. Benefits for restricting competition to in the market are that public transport users are 
able choose between a range of modes that would best suit their budget, operators are also pushed to 
provide a more attractive service than their competitors. While a drawback would be that competition 
in the market encourages reckless driving to collect passengers before competitors. It also could lead to 
inconsistent headway for services as operators hold back to allow for sufficient demand to build along 
a route.  
Given the benefits and potential negative consequences of competition in public transport, it 
is necessary for public transport to be regulated. Reform through regulation of competition is 
intrinsically intertwined with the service characteristics that the passenger experiences.  
Regulation can come in the form of regulating the type of competition that occurs between 
operators; these options are listed above. A part of the competition regulation could be setting service 
characteristics for scheduling, routes, vehicles etc. For example, a gross cost service contract would have 
the operator remunerated for driving a set number of kilometres on agreed routes at set headways. 
While a quality license would require that vehicles meet a certain standard before being allowed to 
operate on a route but would not set conditions for head way and kilometres travelled and the operator 
would be responsible for his/her own remuneration.  
In this way, it is possible for a government to reform public transport by changing the type of 
competition within which operators operate. At the same time, it is possible for a government to reform 
public transport by changing the service characteristics under which operators provide services. These 
service characteristics changes may come about by virtue of the principles of the new type of 
competition or by intentional changes by the government.    
Meakin (2004) introduces the consideration of the amount of work that the regulator would 
have to take on in order to effectively regulate the public transport industry. The composition of the 
industry and the scope and depth of regulation is considered. Schalekamp uses Meakin’s considerations 
to introduce a third dimension: operator business structure, that influences public transport reform 
(Schalekamp, 2015: 31).  Meakin states that it is necessary to understand whether the industry is made of 
public or private ownerships, the number of operators or vehicles and the interests/incentives which 
drive the industry. Schalekamp suggests that these business structure factors can be influenced by the 
public transport authority and therefore can be used as a tool for reform. Meakin uses the scope and 
depth of regulation to refer to the second dimension: Service characteristics, detailed above.  
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The greater the level of complexity of the reform programme, the greater the capacity 
requirements of the authority implementing the reform programme. Therefore, placing the 2007 
PTSAP along each dimension gives us a fundamental footing for the reasons for delay or success of the 
IPTN programmes in the case studies presented in this dissertation.  
3.3. The history of public transport reform in south Africa  
South Africa has had multiple attempts to reform various aspects of its public transport industry. This 
section will detail these attempts dating from the 1985 White Paper on National Transport Policy to the 
2009 National Land Transport Act.  
The 1985 White Paper on National Transport Policy (NTP) affirmed the 16-seater minibus to 
be operated in the passenger transport industry (Khosa, 1998: 23; Walters, 2013: 42). According to 
Khosa, the 1985 NTP sought to deregulate the passenger transport industry in response to the benefits 
found in deregulation trend in the USA and UK.  Prior to the 1985 NTP, the 1983 Welgemoed 
Commission sought to have minibus-taxis banned in favour of protecting the bus companies from the 
unfair competition from the minibus-taxi industry. The Welgemoed Commission was unable to 
pursued government policy makers and the passenger transport industry was instead deregulated. This 
allowed minibus-taxis to compete for passengers but it also allowed anyone to enter the minibus-taxi 
industry contingent on meeting roadworthy and safety requirements (Khosa, 1998: 23).  
The political landscape changed significantly in 1990 with the unbanning of anti-apartheid 
organisations and the initiation of constitutional negotiations to end the apartheid regime. The 
National Transport Policy Forum (NTPF), launched in 1992, signalled a departure from the previous 
policy formulation processes (Khosa, 1998: 26). The 1983 Welgemoed Commission was criticised on bias 
towards the bus industry and government monopoly interests. The 1982 National Transport Policy 
Study excluded black passenger interests. The 1992 NTPF sought to include interest groups that were 
previously excluded. The NTPF policy document was published in 1994. The NTPF described 
transport access as a basic human right, its policy document sought to be people centred and it 
recognized transport as an instrument for social transformation (Khosa, 1998: 26).  
Land transport responsibility was allocated to different spheres of government in the new 
South African Constitution. National government was to provide broad policy direction. Provinces 
legislated public transport and created transport policies that would guide local government transport 
authorities. Local governments were then responsible for transport planning, public transport services, 
traffic management and roads, all of which had to fall into the local government geographic boundaries 
(Khosa, 1998:28-29).  
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The Department of Transport (NDoT) set out to review and revise the national transport 
policy in 1995. Following a process of sectoral working groups and larger engagement meetings, the 1996 
White Paper on Transport Policy was adopted (Khosa, 1998: 27). The 1996 White Paper sought to 
transition all passenger transport operations to have a commercial orientation. It recommended 
regulated competition in bus operations, with a transition to tendered subsidised services, based on 
competition for the route (Khosa, 1998: 29; Walters, 2013: 35). The policy document “promised to offer 
financial and technical assistance to the minibus-taxi industry”. The passenger rail sector was to change 
from a “deficit financing system” to operations on a concessions basis (Khosa, 1998: 29).  
The 1996 White Paper was followed by the 1998 Moving South Africa Strategy which sought 
to build on the 1996 White Paper and emphasise multi-modal transport. The strategy introduced the 
focus on corridor densification, using tendering and concessions to create competition to improve 
operator performance. The conversation to formalise the taxi industry was initiated in this strategy 
(Walters, 2013: 36).  
The National Land Transport Transition Act (NLTTA) was passed in 2000. The NLTTA 
further defined the varies government responsibilities for transport functions, building on the 
Constitution. The act introduced the concept of transport authorities to manage transport functions 
and made integrated public transport plans a condition for operator contracts, which was later 
amended. Legislation was also laid out for competitive tendering however this was later put on hold in 
favour of negotiated tendering due to complaints raised by organised labour (Walters, 2013: 36).   
The taxi recapitalisation programme was initiated in 2006, followed by the 2007 PTSAP. 
These two reform attempts will be discussed in greater depth in the sections that follow.  
The National Land Transport Act (NLTA) was passed in 2009 to replace the NLTTA of 
2000. The NLTA placed an emphasis on the devolution of public transport responsibility to the lowest 
level of government, where appropriate capacity existed. New requirements for integrated public 
transport plans were outlined and provision was made for negotiated contracts following a tendered 
contract. This latter addition was not allowed under the NLTTA of 2000 (Walters, 2013: 37).  
Shortly before 1994, the attempts to reform the South African transport industry focused on 
changing the manner in which public transport modes competed with each other. There were attempts 
to protect the bus industry by regulating the minibus-taxi industry, however in the end the minibus-
taxi industry was deregulated in favour of competition which more closely resembled an open market. 
Since the political transition of the early 1990’s, the authorities have pursued broader reform attempts. 
Reform attempts have sought to move competition from on the route to for the route through 
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tendering processes. Attempts have been made to reform the business structure and vehicle standards 
of the minibus-taxi industry. Reform was also sought in transport planning, through an emphasis on 
integrated planning. The responsibility of transport functions has also been an area that the 
government has attempted to reform through improved outlines of roles and the introduction of 
devolution.   
The following two sections will take a more in-depth study of reform attempts within the 
minibus-taxi industry and the bus industry.  
Reform of the Minibus-taxi industry 
The minibus-taxi industry started in early 1980’s along with the formation of the South Africa Black 
Taxi Association (SABTA) (Khosa, 1998: 23; Walters, 2008: 105). Today it is the dominant mode of 
transport where 69 percent of households nationally used minibus-taxi in 2013 (Satistics South Africa, 
2013: 96). The industry grew rapidly when the 1985 White Paper on National Transport Policy affirmed 
the 16-seater vehicle and deregulated the industry to allow for open market competition (Walters, 2008: 
105). The industry did not respond favourably to the 1985 White Paper. SABTA believed that the 
government “betrayed the taxi industry and that operators should no longer trust the government” 
(Khosa, 1998: 24). SABTA warned the government that deregulation would lead to violence (Dugard, 
2001: 10; Schalekamp, 2015: 66), while it also believed that the government sought to give the “white 
man” an opportunity to enter an industry which was traditionally run by blacks (Khosa, 1998: 24). 
Regulation was weak following the legitimizing of the minibus-taxi industry leading to permits being 
issued with little need to demonstrate vehicle safety standards or passenger demand for a permit 
(Dugard, 2001: 11), hence the rapid industry growth.  
The industry saw the formation of local taxi associations formed by operators which were 
plying the same routes. The associations regulated loading practices and prices in response to the lack 
of government regulation (Dugard, 2001: 12). The associations used violence as a means to regulate the 
industry and to protect their interests; this has escalated into the taxi conflict that is still prevalent in the 
industry today (Dugard, 2001: 12). Hundreds of local taxi associations exist across South Africa, some 
of these local associations have transformed into ‘mother bodies’ or simply large taxi associations to 
which local taxi associations are aligned (Dugard, 2001: 24).  
The multitude of associations made it challenging for the government to engage with the 
industry (Walters, 2008: 105). In response to the engagement difficulties, the industry violence and the 
lack of vehicle and operational safety regulations, amongst other issues, the government formed the 
National Taxi Task Team (NTTT) in 1995. The NTTT, consisting of representatives from the 
minibus-taxi industry, government officials and specialist advisors, carried out public hearings across 
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the country. As solutions to the industry problems, the NTTT recommended the industry be 
remodelled into more formal cooperatives, increased regulation of the industry and economic 
assistance. Following the NTTT, provincial taxi offices were established in all nine provinces and 
appointed a taxi registrar (Khosa, 1998: 28). The regulation recommendations of the NTTT included a 
halt on new permits, the creation of a register of taxis operating legally and an allowance for illegal 
operators to obtain permits. These regulation attempts by the government was met with violence by 
some in the minibus-taxi industry as a process of formalisation would disrupt vested industry interests. 
The NTTT was eventually discontinued  in July 1998 once it had concluded its duty of outlining the 
parameters for re-regulation (Dugard, 2001: 21).  
Following what was considered to be a failed attempt to formalise the industry through re-
regulation recommendations of the NTTT. The government attempted to formalise the industry 
through a recapitalisation programme, announced in 1999, but set for implementation in early 2001 
(Dugard, 2001: 23; Ahmed, 2004: 6 ). The recapitalisation programme was to initiate a new taxi industry 
using 18 to 35 seater diesel vehicles, which was regulated from the beginning and using a new body to 
represent taxi operators – the South African National Taxi Council (SANTACO) (Dugard, 2001: 23).  
The industry had established SATACO in response to the government’s failure to resolve the 
industry violence through re-regulation. However, a rival national mother-body – the National Taxi 
Alliance (NTA) was formed soon after the official recognition of SATACO in 1999. The 
recapitalisation process was also opposed by the National Taxi Drivers’ Organisation (NATDO) 
through ‘highly publicised protest’ (Dugard, 2001: 24). To overcome these divisions, the government 
attempted to form a single national representative body for the minibus-taxi industry. To achieve this, 
it held a national consultative conference in September 2001 with seven hundred industry leaders and 
all provincial transport ministers and the national minister present. The South African National Taxi 
Council (SANTACO) was formed at this conference (Ahmed, 2004: 5; Walters, 2008: 105).  
The taxi recapitalisation programme was a slow and lengthy process due to industry opposition 
and national mother body rivalries. Following the creation of SANTACO and following a lengthy 
consultative process, the government signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with 
SANTCO, in 2004,  on the roll-out of the recapitalisation programme (Ahmed, 2004: 7). The 
programme was eventually launched in 2006 and by May 2007, 2500 taxis had been scrapped (Walters, 
2013: 106). The programme set South African Bureau of Standards safety requirements and passenger 
capacity requirements for the new vehicles. To qualify for the recapitalisation programme, operators 
had to change their radius-based permits to route-based licenses, ensure employees were paid minimum 
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wage, regulated driving hours and employee leave conditions, obtained passenger liability insurance as 
well as obtain a tax clearance certificate to gain the scrapping allowance (Walters, 2013: 44).     
The taxi recapitalisation programme was government’s attempt to reform the taxi industry’s 
service standards and business practices (Walters, 2008: 106), and thereby improving the quality of the 
service and make the service more formal.  
The taxi recapitalisation programme has been the most significant attempt at reform within 
the minibus-taxi industry. The government has shown intention to involve the taxi industry in the 
public transport tender system and to subsidise the taxi industry operations; however, both of these 
programmes have shown little fruition to date (Walters, 2013: 44). 
Reform of the conventional bus industry 
The conventional bus industry has its roots set in the first half of the 1900’s, however it was the Group 
Areas Act of 1950 that caused the growth of the bus industry into what we see today (Naude, 1999: 3). 
The long travel distances between work and home, the poor economic positions of the black working 
class during Apartheid and the reliance of the state on conventional bus services as the transport system 
to be used by non-whites, gave rise to the need for subsidization of the bus industry (Khosa, 1998: 20). 
The majority of operators had permits to operate indefinitely. Operators would claim their subsidies 
from the NDoT based on the number of tickets sold over a period of time (Walters, 2014: 2). Two 
criticisms of this period was that it was “extremely difficult” for new entrants to enter the market due 
to the indefinite permits (Naude, 1999: 167) and the ticket-based subsidy system lacked transparency 
and was open to abuse (Walters, 2014: 2).  
The 1986 White Paper introduced a significant shift in the bus industry: it introduced 
unregulated 16-seater minibus taxi’s and it prescribed that bus services had to be awarded based on 
competitive tender (Walters, 2014: 2). The attempts at reforming competition in the bus industry from 
indefinite permits to competitive tender was shelved towards the end of the 1980s, due to a lack of 
funding. A few ‘competitive tender’ demonstration projects were initiated in 1987 but these services 
ended in business failure soon afterwards because operators had bid too low in the tendering process. 
Government intervention was unable to solve the problems of competitive tendering, hence its 
conclusion in the 1980’s (Walters, 2014: 2). The bus industry began its decline following the effective 
deregulation of the minibus-taxi industry because the radius-based permits issued to minibus-taxi 
operators and the lack of their effective regulation gave the minibus-taxi industry more operational 
freedom than the bus industry (Naude, 1999: 169), allowing the minibus-taxi industry to win more 
passengers. The status quo of bus operators receiving a ticket-based subsidy without a clear end 
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continued for some time, with the minibus-taxi industry continuing to grow. With the change in the 
political dispensation in the early 1990’s, government’s transport policies were reviewed. 
The competitive tender reforms were resurrected when the NDoT affirmed the mechanism by 
stipulating in the 1996 White Paper that “no service may be subsidised if such service is not 
competitively tendered” (Walters and Cloete, 2008: 1163).   
In response to the 1996 White Paper and in preparation for the legislation of the competitive 
tender requirements, the NDoT introduced interim contracts in 1997, with the existing subsidised 
operators (Naude, 1999: 181). The interim contracts were designed to maintain the existing funding 
arrangement (Naude, 1999: 181), but transition the industry to competitive tendering, with the aim of 
giving the existing operators a window period to organise their business structures to be able to 
competitively tender. It was also aimed to give the existing operators a contractual footing so that the 
agreements could be given a legal end. All interim contract services were only intended to last one to 
three years and all services were to be finalised by competitive tender by July 2001. (Naude, 1999: 181)  
By 1999 this process had begun to run its course with a few interim contract operators 
completing the competitive tender process. However, the attempts at reforming the competition and 
regulation of the industry was met with two obstacles. The first, organised labour realised, following 
the conclusion of a few competitive tenders, the risks posed to workers and therefore, began to oppose 
the reform attempts. This led to the Tripartite Heads of Agreement (HOA) in 1999, which set 
conditions to reduce job losses and wage reductions. However, in the ensuing years, labour continued 
to voice their discontent (Walters and Cloete, 2008: 1164). Secondly, a bus operator took the Western 
Cape Government to court for failing to meet the planning requirements for competitive tender; the 
operator won the case. The combination of these two short-comings lead the NDoT to place a 
moratorium on competitive tenders in 2001 (Walters, 2014: 2).   
The NLTTA, enacted in 2000, attempted to resolve this impasse by making provision for 
operating contracts to be negotiated between the relevant government structure, organised labour and 
the operating companies, as an alternative to competitive tendering (Walters, 2013: 36). One of the 
conditions of negotiated contracts was the economic empowerment of small business and previously 
disadvantaged operators within 24 months of signing the contract (Walters and Cloete, 2008: 1165). 
Following the NLTTA, a few negotiated contracts had been signed, but 2003 was the last year that any 
negotiated contracts had been entered into (Walters, 2014: 2). By 2013, any interim, tendered or 
negotiated contracts that had expired was extended month-to-month with the same conditions as their 
original contracts. At that stage, the bus industry had been operating on, bar the 13 cities where the 2007 
PTSAP was being implemented, short-term extensions for 12 years (Walters, 2014: 3).  
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Since the last negotiated contracts, entered into in 2003, there had been no reform attempts in 
the conventional bus industry, until the 2007 PTSAP, covered in the following section, and until the 
NDoT converted all interim contracts to kilometre-based contracts in 2009. All tendered and 
negotiated contracts had already been operating on a kilometre-based subsidy system prior to the 
conversion of interim contracts. The NDoT converted all operators to kilometre contracts to curb 
subsidy claims. The bus industry had seen significant ridership increases which made it difficult for the 
NDoT to predict and budget accordingly for the bus industry subsidies. Noteworthily, the NDoT 
simultaneously fixed the number of kilometres that each operator had to operate, due to the Division 
of Revenue Act (Walters, 2010: 365), and despite increased passenger demand, the number of kilometres 
had not been increased between 2001 and 2014 (Walters, 2014: 3).  
In summary of the state of the conventional bus industry in the years prior and during the 
implementation of the 2007 PTSAP, Walters remarks that funding for bus subsidies has been the 
‘single largest weakness’ in the public transport contracting system. Walters continues to state that the 
government’ s approach to the bus industry was in direct contradiction to the policies and strategies 
approved by cabinet, placed financial strain on the bus operators and operational strain on the public 
transport system due to growing passenger demand (Walters, 2010: 365). 
3.4. The 2007 Public Transport Strategy and Action Plan  
In the 2007 Public Transport Strategy and Action Plan (PTSAP), the National Department of 
Transport (NDoT) acknowledged the decline of the public transport sector and predicted its continued 
decline into the future. The NDoT noted the increase in car ownership between 1995 and 2003 by 33 
percent. Over the same period, car use for work-related trips grew by 20 percent while public transport 
trips for the same purpose only grew by ten percent. This translates into increased congestion in cities 
across South Africa.  
Public transport remained the dominant mode of travel, driven by circumstance rather than 
choice. The NDoT reported that 38 million citizens still had no access to a private car, making them 
dependant on public transport or walking all the way to their destinations. Captive public transport 
users were also dissatisfied with the quality of public transport services. Greater than 50 percent of users 
raised issue with overcrowding on trains, buses and taxis; as well as the quality of facilities at stops, ranks 
and stations.  
The impetus to reform the public transport sector came from the pressure to provide reliable 
public transport of a high standard to meet the needs of the impending 2010 FIFA World Cup. With 
the 2007 PTSAP, the NDoT set out to upgrade public transport modes and simultaneously introduce 
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a new Integrated Rapid Public Transport Networks (IRPTNs). The NDoT sought to accelerate this 
reform programme in 12 cities and six districts. The objective was to reform the commuter rail, bus and 
minibus services into a single integrated system that matched the quality of Bus Rapid Transit systems 
around the world.  
The reform strategy would be implemented in three phases. Phase one was to be implemented 
between 2007 and 2010 and would include modal upgrades and implementing basic IRPTNs in all 
candidate cities. Phase two extended from 2010 to 2014 seeking modal upgrades to be complete across 
all modes, intermediate IRPTNs established and all operators transformed into formalised operators 
to provide network services. Phase three was due to run from 2014 to 2020 and sought IRPTNs to 
provide full coverage across all 12 cities and 6 districts, accompanied by demand management techniques 
for private car users and land use plans to support the public transport networks.  
The PTSAP sought to reform all three spheres of public transport reform, simultaneously: 
Competition, service characteristics and operator business structure. Competition was to be reformed 
from on the route to for the route, initially through negotiated 12-year contracts to be followed by 
tendered contracts. The public transport service characteristics was to be reformed from the 
unscheduled, low quality services of the minibus-taxi industry and the scheduled but unreliable services 
of the conventional bus industry into a BRT standard of service. This included pre-board electronic 
fare collection, integrated schedules, real-time information, universal accessibility and clean and safe 
stations and vehicles. The NDoT also sought to reform the business structure of the minibus-taxi 
operators into formal operators with whom local governments could contract to provide services.  
3.5. Urban form and transit use 
Three dimensions influence modal choice: modal characteristics, user characteristics and urban form. 
According Cervero, who draws on consumer choice theory, modal choice is made through a 
comparative evaluation between modal characteristics and the user’s characteristics, in terms of the 
utility derived from the mode (Cervero, 2003:119).  Therefore,  travel time, affordability, reliability, and 
ease-of-use characteristics such as universal accessibility, electronic fare payment and real-time 
information, play a role in determining a user’s choice (Johnson, 2003:25).  
In a separate paper, Cervero and Seskin evaluate several studies and find that urban form 
influences modal choice through land-use, density and site design of the origin or destination of the trip 
(Cervero and Seskin, 1995:25).  It was further found that the influence of each urban form characteristic 
is weak, although positive. The significant influence of urban form on transit use comes from the 
combination of land-use, density, and site design (Cervero and Seskin, 1995; Kitamura, Mokhtarian and 
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Laidet, 1997; Johnson, 2003). Three studies, below, demonstrate how urban form impacts on transport 
use.  
Cervero conducted a study of 57 suburban office developments in the United States of America 
(USA), where a three percent increase in transit and ride-share modes correlated with a ten percent 
increase in retail floor space in the office developments (Cervero, 2003:129). As one example among 
many, this demonstrates that a mixture of land uses on a single site increases transit use. 
Cervero and Seskin cite a study by Kenworthy and Newman (1989) that found a reduction in 
fuel consumption per capita with increased density in comparably sized cities in the USA, Europe, and 
Asia (Cervero and Seskin, 1995: 23). Conversely, this suggests that private vehicle use is higher in 
dispersed urban forms, while transit and non-motorised transport use is higher in more compact urban 
forms.  
A comparative study, included in Cervero and Seskin’s (1995) paper, by Untermann in 1984 of 
two areas in Houston, USA, found that a ten percent increase in elements such as parks, plazas, benches, 
sculptures, trees and ample sidewalks, could translate into a 15 percent decrease in private vehicle trips. 
The same study found that the area with more pedestrian elements boosted NMT, accounting for 30 
percent of total trips compared to seven percent found in the area with sparse pedestrian elements 
(Cervero and Seskin, 1995: 38). These two findings combined to suggest that more people are likely to 
use transit to, and walk in, an area with attractive pedestrian elements than use private vehicles and park 
directly at their destination.  
Modal choice is a complex topic and it is difficult to isolate one factor to determine its impact 
on transit use. However, it is has been found that mixed land-use, high density cities with attractive sites 
positively influences transit use. Therefore, urban planning, through land-use, density and attractive 
site elements, is of consequential importance when implementing new transport solutions to city urban 
scapes.  
Urban form of Bogota, Columbia and Curitiba, Brazil 
Bogota, Columbia 
Bogota has one of the highest population densities in the world with an average of 21 276 persons per 
km2 in 2010. The city is characterised by a social housing deficit and therefore low-income households 
have built informal settlements on the urban periphery where the highest densities exist, reaching more 
than 40 000 persons per km2. Higher income households are found toward the north of Bogota, closer 
to work opportunities. A key characteristic for Bogota is that even where density is comparatively low, 
it is still greater than approximately 5000 persons per km2 (Guzman and Bocarejo, 2017: 4504). Low-
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income households spend more income and time on transport and are often limited to public transport 
services, in comparison to wealthier households who predominantly use private vehicles and spend less 
time traveling to activities (Bocarejo and Tafur, 2013: 4). 
Curitiba, Brazil 
Curitiba, the state-capital of Parana in Brazil, saw rapid expansion in its population from approximately 
150 000 people in the 1950’s to 1.9 million in 2017 (Agencia IBGE, 2017), with a population density of 
4 405 persons per km2 (City Population, 2018). The result of the rapid expansion was an undesirable 
city to live in – there was a shortage of electricity, communication connectivity, paved roads, adequate 
sewerage, and increasing traffic congestion (Mikesh, no date: 1). Faced with these challenges the city 
sought to create a master plan to guide its urban development, which was approved in 1966. Curitiba 
created radiating axes from its centre with public transit and high-density mixed land-use zones along 
the axes, which acted like corridors (Agulhan et al., 2015).   
Urban form in South African cities  
During the Apartheid era,  urban form was characterised by the government’s racial hierarchy. White 
people lived closest to economic opportunities, coloured and Indian people next closest, and black 
people, who formed the majority people group, lived on the urban periphery. All people groups lived 
predominantly in suburban residential areas and travelled to their jobs in the economic centres. Very 
few people lived where they worked or vice versa (Naude, 1999: 3; Khosa, 1998: 20). The Apartheid 
government again allowed a hierarchy of transport modes to develop. Significant investment was put 
into highway networks that encouraged private car use, while mass transit for lower racial classes was 
provided through sub-standard conventional bus and urban rail systems (Hitge, G and Vanderschuren, 
M, 2015: 36). This meant that the private car developed as the most convenient mode of travel. In 
addition to a system that encouraged private car use, the minibus-taxi industry birthed out of the 
inadequate provision of bus and rail mass transit (Sauti, 2006: xvii). 
Since 1994, the post-Apartheid government has struggled to implement its policies that sought 
to encourage urban densification, diversification of land-uses, and improve the quality of public 
transport (SACN, 2016: 49) 
This has meant that much of the urban designs that characterised the South African city during 
Apartheid continue to define the South African city today - urban spread, low density, single purpose 
land use, and limited site design that actively encourages NMT and transit use. The private motor 
vehicle remains the most convenient form of transport, public transport remains of sub-standard 
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quality, and the majority of citizens still have to travel long distances to reach economic centres, now 
with increasing congestion.  
3.6. Conclusion 
The literature review unpacks the three framework questions – complexity of reform as it impacts on 
the capacity to implement the PTSAP, the history of reform in the bus and minibus-taxi industry as it 
impacts on the influence of industry transition negotiations, and urban form as the PTSAP was 
inspired by BRT designs from South America.  
Public transport reform can be viewed along three dimensions – competition, operator business 
structure, and service characteristics. Each dimension can be reformed along a spectrum of formality. 
Competition between operators can be unregulated and in-the-market, or it can be highly regulated and 
for-the-market. Operator business structures can be small where a vehicle owner informally picks up 
passengers for a fare, or it can be large with strict corporate controls. Service characteristics can be a 
simple passenger experience where case fares are determined ad-hoc upon boarding and user 
information is informally shared, or it can be a highly convenient passenger experience with high levels 
of automation and user information is formally provided. To reform all three dimensions from 
informality to formality simultaneously, as the PTSAP intended, requires a highly capable state.  
Since 1990 reform in the transport industry has focused on increasing public transport use, 
increasing modal integration, devolving planning, implementation and management functions to local 
government, and curbing escalating operator subsidy costs carried by the NDoT. Reform in the 
minibus-taxi industry has pursued formality and has been characterised by increasing levels of 
stakeholder consultation. While reform in the conventional bus industry has pursued for-the-route 
contracts but has been characterised by stagnated progress. The minibus-taxi industry’s relationship 
with government has seen improvement through the increased consultation, however the conventional 
bus industry’s relationship with government has deteriorated as the industryhas come under strain 
from operating subsidies. The difficulty with reforming the transport industry has left the user 
experiencing overcrowding, increasingly unaffordable fares, disorderly operator practices, and 
congestion. 
The combination of high density, mixed land use and attractive site design encourages transit use. 
South Africa drew its inspiration for the PTSAP from South American cities that were characterised by 
one or more of these elements.  South African cities, on the other hand, are characterised by urban 
spread, low density, largely single-purposed land uses, and limited site design that actively encourages 
NMT and transit use. This, together with infrastructure that promotes private car use, has left 
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questions as to the appropriateness of the ‘gold-standard’ BRT employed in the PTSAP for the South 
African urban form.  
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4 Case one: Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan 
municipality 
4.1. Introduction  
This chapter presents the first case study in this dissertation. It begins with an overview of Nelson 
Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality (NMBM) prior to the initiation of the IPTN programme. It 
provides insights into the city’s population, unemployment, GDP growth, car ownership and a brief 
description of the layout of the city. All contributors to increasing congestion in urban environments. 
It continues to give a detailed break-down of transport modal choices, affordability of public transport, 
the dominant issues that users have with transport and the dominant factors that influence modal 
choice, as found in the 2013 National Household Travel Survey (NHTS). The section concludes with 
an overview of the institutional arrangements that preceded the transformation efforts of the IPTN 
programme.  
The overview is followed by an evaluation of the outcomes of the city’s IPTN project. The 
‘achieved outcomes’ are evaluated against the ‘intended outcomes’ by the NMBM, as defined by IPTN 
design parameters set by the NDoT in the PTSAP.  
This is followed by a detailed timeline of events and decisions taken on the IPTN project 
between 2007 and 2015. All the above sections are analysed and discussed in the concluding section 
which details the proposed factors to have caused the status of the IPTN project as at the end of 2017.  
4.2. City overview 
NMBM first displayed an interest in reforming public transport in 2007. Around the time, the city had 
a population of 1.15 million residents, an unemployment rate of 23.6 percent and GDP growth sat at a 
high of 6.2 percent (Eastern Cape Socio Economic Consultative Council, 2017). Car ownership across 
the Eastern Cape had steadily been increasing from 13.9 percent in 1996 to 15.5 percent in 2003 (Lombard 
et al., 2007) and continued to increase to reach 17.4 percent by 2013 (Satistics South Africa, 2013). The 
number of households having access to a car increased from 33.8 percent in 2003 (Lombard et al., 2007) 
to 38.3 percent in 2013 (Satistics South Africa, 2013). The metropole consists of Port Elizabeth and its 
surrounding suburbs, as well as the outlying urban nodes of Uitenhage, Kwanobuhle, Despatch and 
Motherwell (SSI Engineers and Environmental Consultants, 2011). 
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The state of transport  
According to the 2013 NHTS, households, for any transport needs, travel predominantly by minibus-
taxi with 38.1 percent of households using the mode; while private car use makes up 30.6 percent. This 
is followed by 19.1 percent of households walking, 9.1 percent of households opting to use a bus, and 
0.9 percent opting for rail. It should be noted that the city has a limited urban rail network which only 
serves a small portion of the metropole.  
In the Eastern Cape, the majority of public transport users, 39.6 percent, spend less than 10 
percent of their household income on public transport; while 28.5 percent spend more than 20 percent 
of their household income. 
The study found that 7.2 percent and 12.6 percent of residents found minibus-taxis to be too 
expensive and the drivers to drive recklessly, respectively. For transport by public bus, the most 
significant issues were the unavailability of buses at specific times and that users would have to walk 
long distances to reach a bus stop. The same issue was raised with trains in terms of the length needed 
to be travelled to reach the station, while no trains being available was the second most important issue. 
In general, the largest percentage of respondents, 21.7 percent, cited that there were no transport 
problems. And fewer than ten percent of respondents cited poor road conditions, rude drivers and 
overloading as issues.  
The three largest factors that influence the transport choice are cost, time and safety from 
crashes with 21.6, 19.8 and 18.0 percent of households citing these factors, respectively.  
Institutional arrangements of the local public transport sector 
Conventional bus services are operated by Algoa Bus Company (ABC), the only government-subsidised 
bus operator, who operated a fleet of 408 vehicles in 2011 (SSI Engineers and Environmental 
Consultants, 2011). Hundreds of minibus-taxi operators operate 2118 minibus-taxi’s in the minibus-taxi 
industry. The industry is governed by ten minibus-taxi associations, namely: Port Elizabeth and District 
Taxi Association, Uncedo Service Taxi Association, Uitenhage and District Taxi Association, Algoa 
Taxi Association, Northern Areas Taxi Association, Eastern Cape Long Distance Taxi Association, 
Western Suburbs Taxi Association and Norwich Long Distance Taxi Association (SSI Engineers and 
Environmental Consultants, 2011).  
Commuter rail services are provided by the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA) 
between Uitenhage and Port Elizabeth. Limited train services are provided and ridership in 2010 
averaged 7344 passengers per day (SSI Engineers and Environmental Consultants, 2011).  
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The population were reliant on public transport and made their modal choice based on cost, 
travel time and safety. These three aspects are some of the key advantages presented by the BRT model. 
4.3. System outcomes evaluation 
The NMBM launched a IPTN pilot phase in 2013 and had operated for ten months before being 
terminated (Former Algoa Bus Company [ABC] employee, personal interview, 2017, August 17; 
Laph’umilanga official, personal interview, 2017, August 17; NMBM official, 2017). Figure 2 above, 
shows the four routes that ran during the pilot phase. Following the termination in November 2013 no 
other IPTN services were run by the end of 2017. Therefore, the outcomes on having achieved the 
intended criteria was evaluated against the pilot phase operations. Despite the lack of IPTN operations 
since November 2013, the NMBM continued to pursue the implementation of the IPTN. Therefore, 
the project is considered to be in a state of delay. 
The NMBM published the Public Transport Plan in 2006, which was the first plan hoping to 
transform the public transport sector. This plan was followed by study tours, further business plans 
and eventually culminated into the 2011 Comprehensive Integrated Transport Plan (CITP). The IPTN 
design criteria listed on the following page was found in the CITP.
Figure 2: Pilot phase IPTN layout (Source: Compilation of literature review and interview data) 
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Table 1: Comparison between intended outcomes and achieved outcomes of the NMBM IPTN project. 
 Criteria Intended outcome Achieved outcome 
A
cc
es
si
b
ili
ty
 
Walking distance to 
trunk/feeder stop 
400m1 Delayed due to partial 
project roll-out3 
Headway High frequency1 Achieved during pilot 
phase2 
Daily operational hours 16-24 hours 15 hours a day during pilot 
phase 2 
Weekly operational days 7 days Achieved during pilot 
phase2 
Percentage of population 
within walking distance of 
trunk/feeder 
“all citizens”1 Delayed due to partial 
project roll-out3 
Se
rv
ic
e 
q
u
al
it
y 
Vehicle and 
station/interchange 
experience 
Safe, clean, modern and 
universally accessible 
stations and vehicles. Maps, 
timelines and real-time 
information.1 
Achieved during pilot 
phase. But no real-time 
information displayed3 
User service experience Scheduled, reliable, 
affordable, and integrated 
schedules, fares and routes.1 
Achieved during pilot 
phase3 
In
fr
as
tr
u
ct
u
re
 
Roads High speed, dedicated, 
median lanes1 
Partially achieved on pilot 
phase trunk route3 
Vehicles  Articulated buses with 
multiple doors on both 
sides, low floor.1 
Achieved4 
Fare system Pre-board electronic fare 
payment1 
Paper ticket fare system5 
Stations Centralised median lane 
platforms and kerbside 
stops.1 
Achieved on some sections 
of pilot phase trunk route3,1 
O
p
er
at
io
n
s 
Predicted passenger trips 
per day 
450 0001 51 8686  
Predicted fare revenue per 
annum 
R1 billion1 R0.00 (2016/17)7 
Intended first operations 
date 
July 20118 February 2013 (terminated 
Nov 2013)4 
Intended all operations 
date 
January 20141 None (2016/17)4 
                                                                    
1 SSI Engineers and Environmental Consultants, 2011 
2 Nelson Mandela Bay Tourism, 2012 
3 Nelson Mandela Bay Municipal Official, personal interview, 2017 
4 Adewumi and Allopi, 2014 
5 Former Algoa Bus Company Public Transport Specialist, personal interview, 2017 
6 Laph’umilanga Transport Services, personal interview, 2017 
7 Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality, 2017 
8 Gauthier and Weinstock, 2010 
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NMBM set the objective for all residents to be within 400m of an IPTN bus stop or station. This was 
only partially achieved because the pilot phase operated on routes, which did not cover the entire 
metropolitan (NMBM official, personal interview, 2017, August 21 ). The CITP stated no time objective 
for the desired headways on trunk or feeder routes, however it was stated that the services should be 
‘high frequency’. This was considered to be achieved as the pilot phase operated on head ways ranging 
from 10mins to 30mins in the peak, depending on the route (Nelson Mandela Bay Tourism, 2012). The 
pilot phase also operated on seven days a week but only ran for 15 hours a day (Nelson Mandela Bay 
Tourism, 2012), which was short of the 16-24 hours intended for the IPTN design. User experience of 
vehicles, stations and services were satisfactory during the pilot phase (NMBM official, personal 
interview, 2017, August 21). This outcome was based on an interview with an NMBM official, which 
may exhibit bias, and no user satisfaction assessment has ever been completed. No real-time information 
was given to passengers on bus arrival and departure times. 
The IPTN services ran on dedicated lanes in the CBD of Port Elizabeth and ran in mixed traffic 
on the remainder of the routes (NMBM official, personal interview, 2017, August 21) therefore the 
intended roads infrastructure criteria was only partially achieved. NMBM achieved the intended vehicle 
criteria when modern articulated buses arrived in  time for the 2010 World Cup (Adewumi and Allopi, 
2014). There were conflicting reports as to whether or not the buses had the doors on the wrong side or 
whether the vehicles were too large for the dedicated lanes (Sell off the IPTS buses and pay back 
taxpayers: Afriforum Port Elizabeth, 2015; Sesant, 2016). However, despite the uncertainty on the 
suitability of the buses, the vehicles are within the bounds of the intended criteria and therefore the 
criterion is deemed to have been achieved. 
Pre-board electronic ticketing was supposed to be implemented but would have taken eight to 
ten months, which was an unrealistic timeframe to be achieved for the pilot phase. Therefore, the 
NMBM opted for an interim paper-based ticket system. However, with the termination of the pilot 
phase in November 2013, the electronic ticket system was never realised (Former ABC employee, 
personal interview, 2017, August 17). Median boarding and alighting is implemented in the CBD of 
Port Elizabeth, but in others areas the buses dock on the kerbside (Adewumi and Allopi, 2014; NMBM 
official, personal interview, 2017, August 21).  
The pilot phase reached a high of 51 868 passengers for the month of October 2013. During the 
pilot phase, the system carried an average of 730 passengers per day (Former ABC employee, personal 
interview, 2017, August 17; Laph’umilanga official, personal interview, 2017, August 17. It is 
significantly short of the 450 000 passengers per day and the associated R1 billion fare revenue predicted 
for the first year of full operations. By the end of the financial year 2016/17, the City reported no fare 
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revenue from the IPTN (Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality, 2017). The IPTN services started two years 
later than planned and terminated after ten months of operations, which by the end of 2017, was yet to 
be relaunched. However, the City continued to pursue the implementation of the IPTN project which 
allows the evaluation that the system is delayed
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Figure 3: Timeline of events between 2007 and 2012 relating to the early years of the IPTN project and The World Cup. 
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4.1. Project timeline 
The following section details events and decisions along the project timeline in figure three, below from 
inception to the end of 2017. The causal links in the chronological narrative help to unearth the 
underlying factors that have caused the delayed state of the NMBM’s IPTN project. 
The NMBM began to show an interest in BRT in 2007. City officials and taxi industry 
stakeholders travelled to Bogota and Pereira on a study tour of their BRT systems in 2007, funded by 
The Institute for Transportation and Development Policy (ITDP) (Wood, 2014a). This visit was 
reciprocated by the Managing Director of Pereira’s BRT with a visit to Nelson Mandela Bay in 
December 2007 (Wood, 2014a). As a result of these exchanges, the initial Nelson Mandela Bay BRT 
system was based on the BRT system in Pereira (Siyongwana and Binza, 2012). KPMG were 
commissioned by the NMBM to prepare a business plan for the public transport operational plan. The 
draft of the business plan was published in December 2008 (Nelson Mandela Bay Transport Forum, 
2009).  
The mini-bus taxi industry rejected the draft business plan for two reasons. Firstly, the industry 
cited a lack of consultation in the preparation of the business plan or the NMBM’s operational plan. 
Secondly, the industry believed that the NMBM did not factor in the transition costs of transforming 
the existing industry stakeholders into bus operators, as the PTSAP required (Laph’umilanga official, 
personal interview, 2017, August 17. The opposition to the business plan in the boardroom was 
followed by protests on the city streets in January and February 2009 (Schalekamp and Behrens, 2010; 
Siyongwana and Binza, 2012; Laph’umilanga official, personal interview, 2017, August 17). The NMBM 
conceded to the taxi industry, leading to the creation of the Nelson Mandela Bay Transport Forum 
(The Forum) in February 2009. The Forum consisted of representatives from each of the ten mini-bus 
taxi associations in the NMBM area. The NMBM also procured and funded a transport consultant to 
assist The Forum with its transition (Siyongwana and Binza, 2012; Laph’umilanga official, personal 
interview, 2017, August 17).  
Ironically, despite the commitment from the NMBM to include the existing public transport 
industry in the planning of the BRT system, it was found that by early 2009, the NMBM was at a 
“reasonably advanced planning stage” (Van Ryneveld, 2008; Siyongwana and Binza, 2012) having 
already procured 24 low-floor vehicles for the BRT operations (Adewumi and Allopi, 2014).  
The Forum published a Strategic Business Plan in March 2009 (Laph’umilanga official, personal 
interview, 2017, August 17). The Strategic Business Plan led to the creation of five primary cooperatives, 
comprising of the ten taxi associations. Board members, from the primary cooperatives, were elected to 
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the secondary cooperative, Laph’umilanaga, which was mandated to negotiate with government on 
behalf of the ten taxi associations  (Laph’umilanga official, personal interview, 2017, August 17). The 
creation of the cooperatives was a drawn-out process, and as a result, negotiations started later than 
anticipated and the first MoU was only signed in May 2010 (Laph’umilanga official, personal interview, 
2017, August 17).  
“To get to that stage of having the cooperative established and having everyone elected was significant 
for our industry” (Laph’umilanga official, personal interview, 2017, August 17).  
“One of the achievements was that the City was able to unite the industry under one negotiating 
body” (NMBM official, personal interview, 2017, August 21).  
The World Cup 
Following the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), the first tranche of funds was 
released. Laph’umilanga made a point of disclosing that the NMBM released the funds to the transport 
specialist, not to the secondary cooperative. This suggested a sentiment of distrust between the two 
parties. These funds enabled Laph’umilanga to procure offices, equipment and drivers in preparation 
for the World Cup operations (Laph’umilanga official, personal interview, 2017, August 17; 
Independent transport specialist, personal interview, 2018a, November 20). The public transport 
services were run smoothly during the World Cup, but confusion on the continuation of the services 
followed soon after the tournament’s conclusion. 
Negotiations for the continuation of the services – the IPTN services, were to continue 
following the signing of the MoU, during the World Cup (NMBM official, personal interview, 2017, 
August 21; Independent transport specialist, personal interview, 2018a, November 20). However, “due 
to power struggles, this did not happen” (NMBM official, personal interview, 2017, August 21). As a 
result, by July 2010, the 24 buses procured for the IPTN services were parked at an old fresh produce 
market in Motherwell (Siyongwana and Binza, 2012). Negotiations for the IPTN services continued 
after the world cup.  
There was also confusion on the intended purpose of the first tranche of funds. Laph’umilanga 
believed the MoU encompassed both the World Cup services and the IPTN services. Therefore, the 
first tranche of funds was used to cover their set-up costs for office rental, equipment, employees etc. 
that would be needed for both the World Cup and IPTN services. However, the NMBM intended for 
the first tranche of funds to only be used for the operations of the World Cup services. The independent 
transport specialist agreed with the NMBM’s view that the World Cup services and the IPTN services 
were two distinctly different agreements.  
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“The World Cup services was a one-off, it was not part of the IPTN services. We should have been 
negotiating about how things were going to start off” (Independent Transport Specialist, personal 
interview, November 20) 
The NMBM promised a second tranche of funds at the start of the IPTN services, which would 
include funding to cover set-up costs. However, the IPTN services did not start following the World 
Cup which contributed to the confusion. 
Faced with needing to maintain their office set-up, Laph’umilanga requested the second tranche 
of funds upon conclusion of the World Cup. These funds were delayed. Laph’umilanga subsequently 
used the profit from the World Cup services to cover their costs beyond July 2010. In October 2010, 
Laph’umilanga again requested the second tranche of funds. This time, they were informed that the 
NMBM did not have the second tranche of funds because it had been spent on the World Cup. The 
NMBM promised that Laph’umilanga would receive the funds at a later date and requested that a 
Memorandum of Agreement is negotiated for the funding to be released. This was followed, in 
December 2010, with an emergency figure to help Laph’umilanga to cover their cost until March 2011, 
at which point the balance of the funds would be released. Following this agreement, the NMBM paid 
Laph’umilanga five tranches of R400 000.00, effectively back paying Laph’umilanga from August 
2010. These funds were used to pay director fees, rent and other liabilities (Laph’umilanga official, 
personal interview, 2017, August 17). However, in January 2011, the NMBM accused Laph’umilanga of 
misallocating funding which results in the remainder of their funding being blocked in February 2011. 
(Laph’umilanga official, personal interview, 2017, August 17). This stalled negotiations and lead to a 
court case where the High Court, on 21 September 2011, instructed that the entire industry membership 
and election process be vetted. This was to verify the validity of Laph’umilanga’s mandate to represent 
the NMB mini-bus taxi industry. This process was led by Adv Max Boqwana (Independent transport 
specialist, personal interview, 2017, November 20). The vetting process concluded with the election of 
the boards of the Primary Cooperatives in January 2012 and the board of Laph’umilanga, in February 
2012. (Laph’umilanga official, personal interview, 2017, August 17). Following this vetting process, 
Laph’umilanga again requested the second tranche of funds. At this point Laph’umilanga discovered 
that their grant was used for to pay consultants for a concert that never happened (Laph’umilanga 
official, personal interview, 2017, August 17).  
This discovery leads to the unfolding of the corruption narrative. Before we cover that section of 
the narrative, we will first go back to unpack the timeline of events relating to the Pilot Project.
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Figure 4: Timeline of events between 2011 and 2016, relating to the Pilot Project and corruption allegations. 
 38 
The Pilot Project 
Discussion around how to utilise the 25 buses began in 2011 because of pressure from the NDoT and 
National Treasury on the NMBM to produce results that justified the grant allocations (Former ABC 
employee, personal interview, 2017, August 17; NMBM official, personal interview, 2017, August 21). 
These discussion culminated in Laph’umilanga, Algoa Bus Company (ABC), and the NMBM agreeing 
to the pilot project plan (Laph’umilanga official, personal interview, 2017, August 17) in April 2012. The 
three stakeholders worked together to plan, implement and operate the pilot project.  
The first bus began operations on 20 January 2013. The agreement saw the taxi industry remove 
60 vehicles from the routes and ABC remove their vehicles. The Pilot Project was operated in a joint 
venture between ABC and Laph’umilanga ((Former ABC employee, personal interview, 2017, August 
17; Laph’umilanga official, personal interview, 2017, August 17). ABC agreed to train the taxi operators 
on operating a bus operating company. In exchange, ABC received payment for the pilot project bus 
operations and the taxi industry received compensation for removing their vehicles. The pilot project 
ran on four routes. Interestingly, one of the conditions set by the NMBM was that the pilot project 
should not run in direct competition with any other existing public transport route (Former ABC 
employee, personal interview, 2017, August 17;  Laph’umilanga official, personal interview, 2017, 
August 17). The aim of the pilot project was to let the people see that something is happening (Former 
ABC employee, personal interview, 2017, August 17; Laph’umilanga official, personal interview, 2017, 
August 17; NMBM official, personal interview, 2017, August 21 ).  
The relationships between all three stakeholders took strain through the pilot project. It seemed 
to ABC that the taxi industry was largely not interested in learning. ABC ended up running the busses. 
As a result of this working relationship, ABC vowed that they would never work with the taxi industry 
again (Former ABC employee, personal interview, 2017, August 17). ABC also claimed that the sixty 
vehicles that the taxi industry removed from the roads were not necessarily originally operating on the 
routes that were included in the pilot project.  
“The taxis did not remove their vehicles from the university route. We had a count of 10 000 people 
on that route per day before we started. The pilot project took something like 600 passengers per day. 
What happened to the other 9500 passengers? They were being transported by taxis. They were being 
paid R6500.00 per taxi that was parked off, but they were never on that [the university] route.” 
(Former ABC employee, personal interview, 2017, August 17). 
The relationship between ABC and Laph’umilanga took strain due to the events described above, 
while both Laph’umilanga’s and ABC’s individual relationships with the NMBM took strain due to 
compensation issues. The cause of strain between Laph’umilanga and the NMBM related to vehicle 
compensation and started after the first month of the pilot project operations ( Laph’umilanga official, 
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personal interview, 2017, August 17). While, ABCs compensation problems started upon conclusion of 
the Pilot project and related to vehicle operations (Former ABC employee, personal interview, 2017, 
August 17).   
Laph’umilanga received vehicle compensation, from the NMBM, for the 60 vehicles in storage. 
However, after the first month of the pilot project the payments stopped. Eventually, after 
negotiations, Laph’umilanga and the NMBM agreed for Laph’umilanga to use their surplus grant 
funding to pay the vehicle compensation of the 60 operators. The NMBM would reimburse 
Laph’umilanga for these funds. This agreement was to last until the NMBM was able to solve its 
compensation problems. However, by August 2013, Laph’umilanga had run out of grant funding to 
use for operator compensation (Laph’umilanga official, personal interview, 2017, August 17). At this 
point the operators stopped receiving compensation for their stored vehicles.  
Later that year, in November 2013, the Pilot Project was cancelled to the surprise of 
Laph’umilanga. The NMBM decided to end the operations because the routes were running along 
main routes and were not connecting residential areas to activity nodes. “There were no O - D’s” ( 
NMBM official, personal interview, 2017, August 21). The NMBM decided that it would be more 
fruitful to end the services and enter discussions around operating from residential areas to the CBD. 
The NMBM told Laph’umilanga that the services were going to restart in 2014 and therefore wanted 
the mini-bus taxi vehicles to remain in storage. But in January 2014, Laph’umilanga received a letter 
stating that the IPTN operations were closing down (Laph’umilanga official, personal interview, 2017, 
August 17). At this point an ongoing postponement ensued. 
“They insisted on shutting it down, but they said that we will start again in three months with a 
full starter service. And that was three months three months, negotiations, they always said three 
months, three months.” (Laph’umilanga official, personal interview, 2017, August 17).  
But the services never actually started again. As a result, the vehicles were kept in storage through 
2014 and 2015. Laph’umilanga placed the blame for the continued storage of the taxi vehicles on the 
NMBM. But Crispian Olver (2017) found a different reason for the stored taxis which he details in his 
book, ‘How to steal a city’.  
‘Even though the pilot project had ended in January 2014, the taxis continued to demand their 
ongoing compensation payment, claiming that their taxis were being held in storage by the 
municipality. But, when I looked into this in August 2015, I found that the taxi operators were in 
fact refusing to take their vehicles back’ (Olver, 2017).  
Olver also found that there were only 59 vehicles being stored, while the NMBM were paying 
compensation for 60 vehicles. Furthermore, “most of the vehicles were dilapidated and only 12 of the 
59 were repairable.”, which possibly amounted to fraud. Olver states that a company called Axios had 
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been appointed by the metro to take-in the vehicles and certify that they were road worthy and that the 
vehicles were licensed to operate along the pilot routes. According to the claims of ABC, not all of the 
taxis were removed from the pilot routes (Former ABC employee, personal interview, 2017, August 17). 
Axios failed to record that only 59 vehicles were being stored, that majority of the vehicles weren’t road 
worthy and that allegedly the vehicles in storage were not all from the pilot routes. According to Olver, 
the head of infrastructure and engineering had stated that a criminal case of misrepresentation and 
fraud had been opened (Olver, 2017).  
In September 2015, metro officials tried to push a memorandum through council that sought 
to authorise the compensation to taxi operators of R6.2 million. This was for the storage of their 
vehicles for the period of September to December 2014. It did not account for the 2015 period: January 
to September 2015. The memorandum furthermore tried to get authorisation for the NMBM to repair 
the vehicles. The memorandum failed to state that the compensation was not budgeted for and was not 
within the bounds of the original pilot project agreement (Olver, 2017).  
Olver believes that Axios may have colluded with the taxi owners, and the NMBM had, at best, 
turned a blind eye to the truth (Olver, 2017). Considering this memorandum, it appears the NMBM 
might have been involved in the collusion themselves.  
In October 2015, Laph’umilanga again raised the issue of the vehicle compensation with the 
NMBM (Laph’umilanga official, personal interview, 2017, August 17; Olver, 2017). The Mayor at the 
time said that the matter had been referred to the Council’s Transport Committee. The difficulty faced 
by the Transport Committee was that they were repeatedly failing to make quorum (Olver, 2017). 
Following this meeting between Laph’umilanga and the Mayor of the NMB, Laph’umilanga wrote a 
letter on 20 November 2015, setting an ultimatum to “resolve all IPTS matter” within seven days or 
there would be consequences. As a fulfilment of the threat of consequences, on 25 November 2015, the 
industry blockaded the city centre and demanded that the IPTS must start now (Laph’umilanga 
official, personal interview, 2017, August 17; Olver, 2017). 
Following this protest, Laph’umilanga and the NMBM managed to negotiate a settlement. 
The industry claimed R12 million for vehicle compensation related to the vehicles in storage. However, 
the NMBM offered R5.5 million on condition that the vehicles were first collected from storage. 
Laph’umilanga agreed and this concluded the Laph’umilanga compensation issue with the NMBM 
(Olver, 2017). The agreed settlement compensation for the whole of 2014 and 2015 was paid in February 
2016 (Laph’umilanga official, personal interview, 2017, August 17).  
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ABC was not immune to the struggles of getting compensation out of the municipality. The 
NMBM were unsatisfied that the buses were not carrying the passenger numbers that they had 
expected, laying the blame at the feet of ABC. It appeared as though the NMBM did not want to pay 
ABC their due compensation for operating the vehicles because the NMBM “did not make very much 
money” from the Pilot Project. ABC responded to these claims by stating that they were instructed by 
the NMBM to design the Pilot project routes not to run in competition to existing routes (Former ABC 
employee, personal interview, 2017, August 17). As stated earlier, the NMBM official shared that the 
routes did not have any O-Ds, and for this reason, the NMBM decided to end the pilot project. It is 
reasonable to deduce therefore that the NMBM were aware of the unlikelihood of the pilot project 
making significant financial returns on the pilot operations. The issue was resolved after a few months 
of discussion, with the NMBM agreeing to pay ABC for the pilot project trips for which they were 
claiming compensation (Former ABC employee, personal interview, 2017, August 17). 
Corruption allegations 
Vital to the accurate narrative of the NMB IPTS are the corruption allegations aimed at both the 
minibus-taxi industry and the NMBM. Tracking back to February 2012, in the earlier section relating 
to The World Cup, Laph’umilanga questioned why the grant allocated for the IPTN was used for 
another purpose. Laph’umilanga believed that the grant vote had been used to pay a Cape Town based 
entertainment company for a concert that never happened (Laph’umilanga official, personal interview, 
2017, August 17).  
Laph’umilanga believes that this questioning and political pushing resulted in the “Pikoli 
Report”. In November 2012, Vusi Pikoli was hired by law firm Brown Braude & Vlok to conduct a 
preliminary investigation into irregularities identified in the IPTN project (de Kock, 2014). The 
investigation took five months, finishing in March 2013 and was commissioned by the Deputy Mayor 
of NMBM (Kimberly, Makunga and de Kock, 2013). Among the findings of the Pikoli report was 
money spent on a music festival that did not take place and on an events organiser (de Kock, 2014), 
possibly corroborating the allegations made by Laph’umilanga. The Pikoli report also suggested that 
was evidence that Laph’umilanga spent excessive amounts on inflated salaries, bonuses, unauthorised 
loans and donations (Kimberly, Makunga and de Kock, 2013). 
In August 2013, it was stated that Mayor Ben Fihla was yet to table the report before the 
NMBM Council (Kimberly, Makunga and de Kock, 2013) and in March 2014, it was reported that the 
city manager advised that the report should go under legal review before it can be adopted (de Kock, 
2014). In May 2014, Vusi Pikoli had a meeting with the ANC caucus supposedly to defend the findings 
in his report (Kock, 2014).  
 42 
In an August 2015 article, the then Mayor of NMBM, Dani Jordaan stated that the NMBM 
had established a forensic investigation into the IPTS because of the “Pikoli Report”. He also confirmed 
that “some of the individuals identified during the investigation” had already been disciplined, in 
collaboration with the Hawks and other law enforcement agencies. In another report, it was confirmed 
that the IPTS boss at the time had resigned in August 2015, ahead of internal disciplinary action (Rnews, 
2015a) 
Allegations of corruption seemed to come from multiple areas related to the IPTN project. 
Security, software systems, legal work, facilities management, vehicle storage and the automated fare 
system are all areas where corruption allegations were mounted (Asmal, 2015; Rnews, 2015b; (Former 
ABC employee, personal interview, 2017, August 17; Laph’umilanga official, personal interview, 2017, 
August 17; Olver, 2017). 
Crispian Olver provides a concise overview of the alleged corruption in the NMBM. Olver 
states that through his research he found a “festering nest of corruption, with sections of the metro 
administration having been captured by criminal interests that pulled the strings of a complex 
machinery designed to bleed the metro dry. The political and business operators behind this had 
captured much of the metro’s formal systems around the project through a combination of ruthless 
intimidation and corruption, while political structures provided political cover in exchange for some of 
the spoils” (Former ABC employee, personal interview, 2017, August 17; Olver, 2017).  
4.2. Analysis of the case study findings 
The Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality had good intentions when they published the first IPTN 
business plan in December 2008. Increasing car ownership since 1996 increased the likelihood of 
congestion and the risk of the associated negative economic consequences. The majority of residents 
still used minibus-taxis as their main mode of transport but were dissatisfied with reckless driving and 
found the service to be too expensive. Almost 30 percent of households spent more than 20 percent on 
public transport a month and  cost was the biggest driver for modal choice. 
BRT promised to be a break away from public transport as experienced in NMB – unreliable, 
expensive and dominated by minibus-taxis. BRT was to be a scheduled, safe, clean and modern public 
transport system. It also posed an attractive solution to the NMBM to overcome the challenges of 
governing the informal paratransit minibus-taxi industry. During their study tours to Pereira and 
Bogota in 2007, the political leaders and City officials learnt that it was possible to integrate the minibus-
taxi industry into formal bus operations, via a transformative project like BRT.  
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Therefore, through the 2008 IPTN business plan, the NMBM undertook a complex transport 
project that sought to alter all three dimensions of public transport reform, as outlined in Chapter three. 
Based on the accessibility, service quality, infrastructure and operations objectives that the 
NMBM set for itself, it only managed to partially achieve its outcomes. Most significantly, the system 
only operated during an eleven-month pilot phase stint, during which it did not reach its intended 
ridership figures. The system was supposed to be fully implemented by January 2014 with a fare revenue 
of R1 billion per annum. In the 2016/17 financial year, no fare revenue had been collected as reported in 
the 2017 NMBM Annual Report.  
This section proposes that there are three dominant reasons the IPTN project did not fulfil 
NMBM’s expectations and that at the end of 2017, the project was found in a state of delay. These three 
factors are a breakdown in trust between Laph’umilanga and the NMBM, a lack of political will within 
the NMBM to implement the IPTN and financial mismanagement and perceived corruption on both 
the parts of the NMBM and the minibus-taxi industry.  
Factor one: Breakdown in trust between Laph’umilanga and the NMBM 
Three excerpts from the narrative are indicative of eroding trust between the minibus-taxi industry and 
the NMBM over the ten-year period reported in this case study. The first is found in the beginning of 
the project relating to planning, the second is linked the clarity of funding following the World Cup 
and the third is about compensation for minibus-taxis removed for the pilot phase.  
First excerpt comes from the onset of the project, the minibus-taxi industry and NMBM had 
to work to restore a working relationship. The minibus-taxi industry rejected the first draft IPTN 
business plan citing a lack of consultation. Yet, despite the opposition both through formal 
engagements and protests by the minibus-taxi industry, the NMBM continued with planning and 
procured IPTN vehicles. This continuation of IPTN planning cultivated the belief in Laph’umilanga 
that the minibus-taxi industry was just being informed of IPTN plans, rather than engaged for input 
into the plans (Siyongwana and Binza, 2012). Following this period, the NMBM procured and funded 
an independent transport specialist to assist the minibus-taxi industry, as an outcome of industry 
transition engagements. This improved the level of trust between the minibus-taxi industry and the 
NMBM.  
Soon after this improvement in trust between the parties, the second excerpt demonstrates 
further eroding of trust. Confusion ensued as to the intended purpose of the first tranche of funds and 
when Laph’umilanga was to receive the second tranche of funds. This placed fresh strain on the 
relationship between the two parties. From these series of events, it is apparent that Laph’umilanga had 
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potentially overstretched themselves financially on the expectation that negotiations would conclude 
shortly. Turning to the NMBM for the funds, Laph’umilanga believed due to it, they experienced a 
few unexpected obstacles. The NMBM First denied Laph’umilanga’s request for the funding, then 
revealed that the funds had been spent. This was followed by new conditions for the transfer of the 
funds being set. The funds were released after the conditions were met, but the NMBM finally reversed 
their decision alleging financial mismanagement by Laph’umilanga. This, yet again, eroded the trust 
between Laph’umilanga and the NMBM.  
The final excerpt that displayed the erosion of trust between the NMBM and Laph’umilanga 
related to the pilot phase. The evidence suggests that both Laph’umilanga and the NMBM flouted the 
rules. The series of events spans nearly three years but eventually concludes with a negotiated 
compensation agreement. The excerpt taken from Crispian Olver’s book, How to Steal a City, 
summarises the state of trust between the parties. 
“As for the compensation payment, the matter has been referred to the Council’s Transport 
Committee, chaired by Babalwa Lobishe,’ he added. Rockman was not happy. ‘Councillor Lobishe 
is failing you, Mr Mayor. You must fire her, just like you have done with your officials,’ he said. 
Babalwa, unable to keep her cool, yelled back at him. A vicious shouting match ensued, and the 
meeting ended on a sour note. …The taxi industry was fast losing patience. On 20 November, 
Rockman wrote a letter to Danny and Bicks, giving them an ultimatum. ‘We hereby request that 
you resolve all matters within seven days of receipt of this letter,’ he wrote, threatening some 
undetermined action if we failed to do so.” (Olver, 2018) 
The undetermined action turned out to be protests that demanded the immediate start of the 
IPTN services.  
The three excerpts from the timeline demonstrated interactions that lacked trust. An antagonist 
relationship ensues between the minibus-taxi industry and the NMBM in 2008, 2010 and again in 2013 
through to 2015. In each case, after months of disagreement, the NMBM eventually compromised to 
the demands of Laph’umilanga. The demands of Laph’umilanga appear to also possibly be founded on 
questionable motives through the course of the narrative. This leaves questions on whether the parties 
involved had malicious intent to abuse IPTN resources, with no intention to build a trusting 
relationship, which is vital for successful industry transformation. Even with an overwhelming amount 
of qualitative evidence of possible malicious intent found by this dissertation, it is difficult to conclude 
that all parties involved, in fact, behaved with malicious intent, because none of the allegations have 
been tried in a court of law.  
An alternatively proposal on the evident mistrust between the stakeholders is the strained history 
between government authorities, the minibus-taxi industry and the conventional bus industry. An 
environment where there is deep-seated mistrust could tempt stakeholders to act in their own interests 
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vehemently, and perhaps even maliciously. It is possible that the state of the relationship between the 
minibus-taxi industry and the NMBM prior to the IPTN programme was so strained that it required a 
highly skilled negotiation team. Perhaps the NMBM, as the necessary leaders of the transition process, 
lacked the capacity to effectively navigate the complexities of the industry transition. Furthermore, 
perhaps the NMBM lacked the capacity to even identify the skills needed by the negotiation team to 
overcome the potentially deep-seated mistrust. Therefore, I propose that because the allegations of 
corruption are untested this dissertation cannot determine whether the NMB IPTN is delayed because 
of malicious intent by the stakeholders. Rather, this dissertation proposed that the NMBM lacked the 
capacity within its negotiation team to overcome the deep-seated mistrust formed through the 
governments reformation attempts of the public transport sector from 1984 to date. Furthermore, this 
dissertation proposes that the NMBM also lacked the capacity to be able to identify and execute suitable 
solutions to the challenges being experienced by the IPTN negotiation team.  
Factor two: Lack of political will 
Three excerpts from the timeline demonstrate a lack political will to see the IPTN project implemented.  
The first excerpt is the fact that the industry negotiations for the IPTN services was supposed 
to take place during the World Cup. The NMBM official, who appeared uncomfortable throughout 
the interview, simply stated that “power struggles” was the reason for the lack of negotiations, with a 
reluctance to share any information beyond this. These stalled negotiations had detrimental effects on 
the NMBM’s ability to implement the IPTN services. There appeared to be a lack of urgency to resolve 
this impasse, which was apparent from placing the IPTN busses in storage and the drawn-out 
negotiations to the point which required intervention from the NDoT and National Treasury.  
The second excerpt which demonstrated a lack of political will was the pilot project. All three 
interviewees shared that the pilot project was put forward as a marketing exercise. This had the biggest 
impact on the route selections, where instructions were given for pilot routes to not run in direct 
competition with existing routes. All three interviewees also shared that the routes were chosen 
knowing that they did not have adequate O-D pair, indicating that the ridership figures should have 
been expected to be low. Which proves the decision to terminate the pilot project citing poor ridership 
figures to be counter-intuitive. These series of decisions bring into the question the seriousness with 
which the NMBM approached the pilot project. Following the conclusion of the pilot routes the IPTN 
project entered three years of seemingly perpetual delay with the NMBM periodically promising a 
restart, which is the third excerpt.  
A contributing factor to the continued delay was the lack of consensus between 
Laph’umilanga and the NMBM on the compensation for stored vehicles. From the NMBM’s side, the 
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Transport Committee repeatedly failed to reach quorum, making it impossible for the NMBM to make 
decisions on compensation amongst other decisions. This contributed to the strain between the 
NMBM and Laph’umilanga and is indicative of political leadership within the NMBM that was not 
serious about seeing IPTN issues being resolved. 
The excerpts above all could have been resolved if the political leadership had insisted on its 
resolution. This factor could demonstrate a capacity on the part of the political leadership to enforce its 
will. Alternatively, it could demonstrate a political leadership to whom the perpetual delays enabled an 
alternative motive.  
Factor three: Financial mismanagement and corruption allegations  
The suggestion of an alternative motive is plausible, given the overwhelming amount of corruption 
allegations. Three excerpts from the timeline demonstrate how allegations between the minibus-taxi 
operators and the NMBM delayed the implementation of the IPTN services.  
The first excerpt comes from late 2010; following the World Cup the NMBM revealed that the 
funds allocated to the IPTN project had been spent. This event transpired after a few months of 
negotiations after the World Cup. The NMBM promised to release the funds requested by 
Laph’umilanga pending a second Memorandum of Action, which took another three months to reach 
agreement.  
The second excerpt is taken from December 2010 to early 2012. Upon the release of the 
promised funding in December 2010, the NMBM accused Laph’umilanga of financial 
mismanagement. This was followed by court proceedings and an audit on Laph’umilanga which, 
delaying the IPTN further, lasted until early 2012.  
The third excerpt follows from the conclusion of the vetting process which culminated from 
the court proceedings. Once Laph’umilanga had validated their mandate to represent the minibus-taxi 
industry, it requested their promised funding. The NMBM revealed at this stage that they had used the 
grant funding allocated for IPTN services to pay for consultants for a fundraising concert for the IPTN. 
This resulted in the preliminary investigation by Adv Pikoli. The report found financial 
mismanagement and alleges corruption in both Laph’umilanga and the NMBM. There was a three-
year delay before any action was taken on the report until late 2015, further delaying the implementation 
of the IPTN.  
Financial mismanagement was alleged from as early as 2010 and again alleged in 2012, causing 
delays that repeatedly pushed implementation back by years.  
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4.3. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the three sections above demonstrate that the IPTN project was hampered by the state 
of the relationship between the minibus-taxi industry and the NMBM and by the alleged widespread 
mismanagement of resources. Both these issues could have been resolved if there had been sufficient 
political will and skill within the administration to ensure no resources were abused, allegedly, a 
productive relationship between the minibus-taxi industry and the NMBM was developed and that, 
where avoidable, time delays were minimised. With an apparent lack of these two key components, the 
NMBM never managed to implement anything of significance.
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5  Case two: City of Tshwane  
5.1. Introduction  
This chapter begins with a city overview of the City of Tshwane (CoT) prior to the IPTN programme. 
The overview details population, unemployment, GDP growth, car ownership and brief description of 
the layout of the city. It details modal choice statistics, public transport affordability, dominant user 
issues that influences modal choice, as found in the 2013 National Household Travel Survey. The 
section concludes with an overview of the institutional arrangements that preceded the transformation 
efforts of the IPTN programme.  
The city overview is followed by an evaluation of the IPTN programme. The achieved 
outcomes are evaluated against the outcomes intended by the CoT, as defined by IPTN design 
parameters as set out in the PTSAP.  
This is followed by a timeline analysis of events and decisions taken on the IPTN project 
between 2008 and 2017. All the above sections are analysed and discussed in the concluding section 
which details the proposed factors which have caused the outcomes of the IPTN project as at the end 
of 2017.  
5.2. City overview 
The CoT first showed an interest in transforming the public transport sector using BRT in 2007. At 
the time the population was estimated to be 2.3 million residents (City Planning, 2008), with an 
unemployment rate of 23.5 percent in 2008 (Office of the Executive Mayor, 2016) and GDP growth of 
5.9 percent in the 2007/8 financial year (City of Tshwane, 2008). Car ownership across Gauteng 
decreased from above 40 percent in 1996 to below 35 percent in 2003 (Lombard et al., 2007), even 
though the number of new car-owning households increased by 120 000 households. The increased 
number of cars on the road occurred concurrently with a significant population growth due to inter-
province migration (Lombard et al., 2007). Therefore, the data does not reflect the probable increase 
in congestion over the 1996-2003 period. By 2013, household car ownership in the province had 
increased to 38.5 percent (Statistics South Africa, 2014a) 
In Tshwane the number of households having access to a car increased from 33.0 percent in 
2003 (Lombard et al., 2007) to 51.1 percent in 2013 (Satistics South Africa, 2013). The statistics for the 
CoT seem significantly out of proportion with the figures reported for Gauteng and South Africa in 
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the same study conducted by Statistics South Africa. Therefore, even though the figures are reported, 
they should be considered with caution. Tshwane consists of Hammanskraal and Soshanguve in the 
North, Atteridgeville in the West, Centurion in the South and Bronkhorstspruit in the East, amongst 
other suburbs.  
The state of transport 
Minibus-taxi use in Tshwane was marginally the dominant mode of all travel, at 33.9 percent, over the 
use of private cars, at 33.5 percent. This is followed by 12.8 percent of households walking as the 
preferred mode for all travel. While other forms of public transport followed with 9.5 percent of 
households opting for transport by bus and 8.0 percent opting for transport by rail.  
In the province of Gauteng, 32.4 percent of households spent more than 20 percent of their 
household income on public transport in 2013. While, the majority of households, 38.3 percent, spent 
less than 10 percent on public transport. 
The most important transport related problems expressed in the 2013 NHTS was reckless 
driving by taxi drivers, 10.7 percent of households experienced this problem, while 9.5 percent and 9.4 
percent of households expressed a problem with taxis being too expensive, and traffic congestion being 
unbearable, respectively. Modal choice in Tshwane is determined most significantly by travel time, 
travel cost and safety from accidents with 41.2 percent, 26.2 percent and 8.5 percent of households citing 
these factors respectively.  
Institutional arrangements of the local public transport sector 
Subsidised, conventional bus services in Tshwane are operated by PUTCO, North West Star, 
Atteridgeville Bus Service and Pretoria City Transport (City of Tshwane, 2012a). Thousands of 
minibus-taxi operators operate approximately 6500 vehicle trips in the AM and PM peaks, on 462 
routes across the city (City of Tshwane, 2012a).  
Commuter rail services are run by PRASA along four corridors: Mabopane to Pretoria CBD, 
Rayton to Pretoria CBD, Saulsville to Pretoria CBD, and Eerster Frabrieke to Hercules. Rail ridership 
in the morning peaks of 2008, ranged from an average of 3000 passengers on some routes and reached 
highs of 9000 passengers on others (City of Tshwane, 2012a).  
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5.3. System outcomes evaluation 
 
Figure 5: A Re Yeng layout of implemented routes (Source: A Re Yeng website) 
 
 The promises of BRT, as seen in South American cities such as Bogota, gave the CoT the opportunity 
to overcome the three dominant passenger satisfaction issues – reckless taxi drivers, high cost of 
traveling by taxi and increasing traffic congestion. BRT also presented the opportunity to reduce travel 
time, reduce travel costs and improve safety from accidents. Tshwane put their first BRT-orientated 
IPTN plan together in 2007, which was subsequently reviewed and rejected by National Treasury. A 
new plan was developed by A-M Consulting Engineers (AMCE) and approved in 2012. The ‘Intended 
outcomes’ in the table below were taken from the Phase 1 Operational Plan developed by AMCE in 
2012.  
CoT started with a 7km route between Pretoria CBD and Hatfield, expanding the services 
towards Wonderboom in the North, on an interim basis (Knopjes, 2016; A Re Yeng consultant, 
personal interview, 2017, November 23; CoT senior official, personal interview, 2018, July 16). The CoT 
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continues to pursue the implementation of the IPTN project; therefore, it is evaluated to be in a state 
of delay.  
The CoT intended to have ‘most residents’ within a walking distance of less than one kilometre 
to a trunk station or feeder stop. Given the partial roll-out of line 2A and line 1A, this outcome is delayed 
until the entire system is implemented. The trunk route was to run with headways of between three to 
five-minutes, and 15-minute headways on the feeder routes. On the implemented lines thus far, the 
trunk routes run at headways of between seven and ten minutes, while the feeder runs at headways of 
between ten and twenty minutes. The objective to run services for a minimum of 15 hours a day, seven 
days a week, was achieved.  
 The CoT set out to provide public transport that is safe, clean, modern, universally accessible, 
and providing real-time information. This was achieved, along with the service being scheduled, 
affordable, reliable and with integrated routes and fares. The roads, vehicle, ticketing and station 
infrastructure objectives was achieved on the implemented lines. 
The first phase was supposed to begin by April 2014 with full implementation by June 2017. It 
anticipated a full first phase ridership of 127 000 passenger trips per day and a fare revenue of R254 
million. However, pilot services were only launched in November 2014 and the remaining phases are 
yet to be fully implemented. The partial implementation of phase one, to date, led to lower than 
expected ridership figures of 4500 passenger trips per day and an associated lower fare revenue of              
R5 952 293.00 per annum. In summary, A Re Yeng is operating although short of CoT’s intended 
outcomes, the CoT also continues to implement the project and therefore is evaluated to be delayed. 
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Table 2: Comparison between intended outcomes and achieved outcomes for all components of IPTN design 
 Criteria Intended outcome Achieved outcome 
A
cc
es
si
b
ili
ty
 
Walking distance to 
trunk/feeder stop 
Less than 1km1 Delayed due to partial 
project roll-out2 
Headway Trunk: 3-5mins; Feeder: 
15mins1 
Trunk: 7-10mins; Feeder: 
10-20mins2 
Daily operational hours 15 hours1 Achieved2 
Weekly operational days 7 days1 7 days2 
Percentage of population 
within walking distance of 
trunk/feeder 
“most residents”3 Delayed due to partial 
project roll-out2 
Se
rv
ic
e 
q
u
al
it
y 
Vehicle and 
station/interchange 
experience 
Safe, clean, modern and 
universally accessible 
stations and vehicles. Maps 
and real-time information.2 
Safe, clean, modern and 
universally accessible 
stations and vehicles. Maps 
and real-time information.2 
User service experience Scheduled, reliable, 
affordable, and integrated 
schedules, fares and routes.2 
Scheduled, reliable, 
affordable, and integrated 
schedules, fares and routes.2 
In
fr
as
tr
u
ct
u
re
 
Roads Trunk: Dedicated, median 
lanes, priority at 
intersections. 
Feeder/complimentary 
routes: Mixed traffic - some 
priority.2 
Trunk: Dedicated, median 
lanes, priority at 
intersections.  
Feeder/complimentary 
routes: Mixed traffic-some 
priority.4 
Vehicles  Low floor buses with level 
boarding. 18m articulated 
bus and 12m rigid bus.2  
Low floor buses with level 
boarding. 18m articulated 
bus and 12m rigid bus.2  
Fare system Pre-board electronic fare 
payment2 
Pre-board electronic fare 
payment2 
Stations Enclosed, attractive design 
and side walk bus stops2 
Enclosed, attractive design 
with side walk bus stops.2  
O
p
er
at
io
n
s 
Passenger trips per day Phase 1: 127 0002 45005 
Fare revenue per annum Upon completion of phase 
1: R254 million2 
R5 952 293.00 (2016/17)6 
First operations date April 20141 November 20147 
All operations date Completed phase 1: June 
20172 
Phase 1 partially 
implemented2 
                                                                    
1 Odendaal, 2012 
2 A Re Yeng, 2015 
3 City of Tshwane, 2012 
4 City of Tshwane Official, personal interview, 2017 
5 National Treasury, 2017 
6 City of Tshwane, 2017 
7 Mudzuli, 2014 
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Figure 6: Timeline of events between 2007 and 2017, in relation to the initial plan to the launch of interim line 1A services 
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5.4. project timeline 
Starting and re-starting 
The CoT already had a strategy approved, in January 2007, to reform public transport through the 
Strategic Public Transport Network (SPTN). This was changed to become the Tshwane Rapid Transit 
plan, in May 2007, to include BRT (Mclachlan, 2008; Van Ryneveld, 2008; City of Tshwane, 2012a). 
The initial 2008 Operational Plan for A Re Yeng was designed by Advanced Logistics Group, a group 
of international and local consultants (Gauthier and Weinstock, 2010; City of Tshwane, 2012a; Former 
AMCE consultant, personal interview, 2018, July 10) and was adopted by Council in 2009 (City of 
Tshwane, 2012b), followed by the completion of  the preliminary design and environmental approval 
of line one (City of Tshwane, 2012a).  
The BRT system was supposed to be running by the World Cup (A Re Yeng consultant, 
personal interview, 2017, November 23; CoT official, personal interview, 2017, November 23) however, 
national government raised concerns about the preliminary design towards the end of 2009 (City of 
Tshwane, 2012b; CoT senior official, personal interview, 2018, July 16; Former AMCE consultant, 
personal interview, 2018, July 10) and later withdrew the PTISG funding in September 2010. The 
funding was withdrawn for the following reasons: Line one directly competed with the Mabopane to 
Tshwane Priority Rail Corridor; inaccessible stations along the R80 highway; high project cost; and the 
absence of a full IPTN plan (Council of City of Tshwane, 2012; CoT senior official, personal interview, 
2018, July 16). A new consultant was appointed towards the end of 2011, and together with officials from 
the CoT Transport and Development Department made up the Project Management Unit (PMU) 
established in March 2012 (A Re Yeng consultant, personal interview, 2017, November 23; CoT senior 
official, personal interview, 2018, July 16; Former AMCE consultant, personal interview, 2018, July 10). 
Auswell Mashaba Consulting Engineers (AMCE) were the appointed consultants for six years through 
two three-year contracts, with the intention of building the internal CoT capacity by the end of the six-
year period (Former AMCE consultant, personal interview, 2018, July 10). However, upon investigation 
in 2018, it was found that limited capacity transfer had taken place by the time that the PMU consultants 
had stopped working on the project. Very few of the original project stakeholders were still involved 
and two project stakeholders, who had been involved in the project since 2009 and 2011, respectively, 
expressed concern over the amount of A Re Yeng institutional memory that has remained in the CoT 
( CoT senior official, personal interview, 2018, July 16; Former AMCE consultant, personal interview, 
2018, July 10).  
“The plan was that the PMU would be run by AMCE but towards to the end of the second PMU 
period, it would morph into the IPTN unit and the CoT would take over and AMCE would 
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disappear into the sunset. But the problem was the continuity of staff and experienced staff on the 
CoT’s side who actually have the public transport experience.” (Former AMCE consultant, personal 
interview, 2018, July 10) 
The PMU reviewed and re-routed line one and produced a new operational plan, with the 
intention to start line one construction in 2012 (A Re Yeng consultant, personal interview, 2017, 
November 23; CoT official, personal interview, 2017, November 23). The NDoT started to apply 
pressure again in early 2012 to begin to see construction progress. The revised plan involved constructing 
line one first, followed by Line 2, but the timeline for line one construction was too long to satisfy the 
political pressures (A Re Yeng consultant, personal interview, 2017, November 23; Former AMCE 
consultant, personal interview, 2018, July 10; CoT senior official, personal interview, 2018, July 16).  
“Because there were a lot of commitments on the part of the CoT, but nothing was happening. 
Treasury threatened to direct the funds to other cities so that is why they decided just to do 
something short just for operational purposes just so that they can see that something is happening.” 
(CoT official, personal interview, 2017, November 23) 
Hence the decision was taken to begin with Line 2, starting in the CBD to Menlyn, via Hatfield, 
with the CBD-Hatfield segment as the starter-service (A Re Yeng consultant, personal interview, 2017, 
November 23; Former AMCE consultant, personal interview, 2018, July 10).   
Line 2A: CBD to Hatfield ‘starter’ service 
It was originally envisaged that a trunk service would run on dedicated lanes from the CBD to Menlyn. 
Hatfield would be reached using a complementary service, which would operate on the same dedicated 
lanes as the trunk service, but would turn off the trunk service to run a loop in mixed traffic through 
Hatfield and then re-enter the dedicated lanes to connect to Menlyn (A Re Yeng consultant, personal 
interview, 2017, November 23; Former AMCE consultant, personal interview, 2018, July 10). However, 
two factors changed this original design. First, the Mayor of Tshwane wanted to have an official 
unveiling of the state-of-the-art A Re Yeng stations (A Re Yeng consultant, personal interview, 2017, 
November 23; CoT senior official, personal interview, 2018, July 16; Former AMCE consultant, personal 
interview, 2018, July 10). And second, the planners realised that passengers connecting to the Gautrain 
would prefer that the A Re Yeng service would run directly to the station as opposed to walking seven 
blocks between the two services (Former AMCE consultant, personal interview, 2018, July 10). This 
change of design necessitated that the original kerbside stop envisaged for Hatfield be redesigned to a 
median station. The CoT Council were informed of, and agreed to this design change in May 2012, and 
sought to have construction start in the second week of June 2012 with a showcasing event scheduled 
for 28 June 2012 (Council of City of Tshwane, 2012).  
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However, the Hatfield station sod-turning took place in, and construction only started, in July 
2012 (Odendaal, 2012; Barrabas, 2016). The station unveiling took place in March 2013 (Venter, 2013; 
Former AMCE consultant, personal interview, 2018, July 10) with the first buses running on Line 2A 
by 11 November 2014, seven months later than intended (City of Tshwane, 2012b; Mudzuli, 2014). This 
‘forced route’ has had significant impacts on the overall project costs, ridership and NDoT funding 
allocations (CoT official, perosnal interview, 2017, November 23).  
This decision increased the project costs because it affected the industry transition negotiations 
and it required more expensive infrastructure. A median station is more expensive to build than a kerb-
side station, and construction costs in the CBD and in Hatfield proved to be higher than expected, due 
to unmapped underground utility services. However, the increased construction costs could have been 
avoided in Hatfield had the route not changed from mixed traffic to trunk and had the station not 
changed from a kerbside stop to a median station.  
When the decision was made in 2012 to implement a starter service from the CBD to Hatfield, 
the PMU was aware that that section didn’t have the required demand to meet the ridership 
expectations (A Re Yeng consultant, personal interview, 2017, November 23; CoT senior official, 
personal interview, 2018, July 16; Former AMCE consultant, personal interview, 2018, July 10). 
“…that is why we don’t have the passenger numbers because no one is travelling from Hatfield to the 
CBD.” (A Re Yeng consultant, Personal interview, 2017, November 23) 
“This inception system would only run from Hatfield to the CBD, its only 7km. It was known that 
it would run at very low passenger volumes. We knew that and the model told us that that it would 
run with 3500 trips a day but the planning at that stage as that it would not run for too long before 
line 1 came on stream and line 2B down to Menlyn came onstream.” (Former AMCE consultant, 
personal interview, 2018, July 10) 
The demand for the CBD to Hatfield route was going to be low because most passengers travelled 
from Menlyn directly to the CBD and vice versa. The CBD to Hatfield trunk route breaks up a natural 
Origin – Destination (O-D) pair established by the taxi industry: CBD to Menlyn (A Re Yeng 
consultant, personal interview, 2017, November 23; CoT official, personal interview, 2017, November 
23; CoT senior official, personal interview, 2018, July 16; Former AMCE consultant, personal interview, 
2018, July 10). It was anticipated that six months later Line 2B and Line 1A services would come on 
board which would improve ridership. However, Line 2B and Line 1A took longer than anticipated to 
come on-board. By November 2017, Line 2B had not yet materialised (A Re Yeng consultant, personal 
interview, 2017, November 23) and services had only been launched on Line 1A in October 2017 
(Moatshe, 2017a).  
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The last factor that was impacted by the decision to implement the Hatfield-CBD trunk service 
was industry transition. This decision to run trunk services between the CBD and Hatfield received 
opposition from the minibus-taxi industry (CoT official, personal interview, 2017, November 23; CoT 
senior official, personal interview, 2018, July 16).  
“And this I must say has created a lot of problems that we are still sitting with, even now, in terms 
of industry transition. Because ideally, we were going to negotiate for an O-D which is CBD to 
Menlyn and before we even formally start negotiations there was this pressure to roll-out this [CBD 
to Hatfield] which is not even an O-D.” (CoT Official, personal interview, November 23) 
Initially, the minibus-taxi industry had opposed the Phase 1A implementation date – April 2014, 
on the grounds that they believed that the negotiations would not be complete in time (A Re Yeng 
consultant, personal interview, 2017, November 23; CoT official, personal interview, 2017, November 
23). The first consultation for pre-negotiations was expected to take place in June 2012 (CoT, 2012c). 
The minibus-taxi industry was concerned that introducing a Hatfield – CBD service would cause the 
minibus-taxi industry to lose market share. This would weaken their negotiating position and they 
could lose out on the compensation that they were owed (CoT official, personal interview, 2017, 
November 23). Even though the industry disagreed on rolling out Phase 1A before negotiations were 
complete, their commitment did not waiver. They were willing to remove their vehicles and operate the 
services and signed an MoU to this end in November 2012. At the outset of negotiations, the taxi 
industry made it clear that they were not happy about the fact that they would be losing out financially 
(CoT official, personal interview, 2017, November 23).  
Interim compensation 
In response to the concerns of the minibus-taxi industry, the CoT introduced ‘interim compensation’. 
Interim compensation was designed to allow the CoT to operate the CBD to Hatfield BRT services in 
parallel to the existing public transport services in the area (CoT official, personal interview, 2017, 
November 23; CoT senior official, personal interview, 2018, July 16; Former AMCE consultant, 2018). 
The Menlyn-CBD route is traditionally operated by the Menlyn Taxi Association, Pretoria Central 
Association and Alarus Park Association. It was agreed that each operator would remove, and receive 
compensation for, one vehicle. These vehicles would stop operating between the CBD and Hatfield, 
Line 2A, but would continue to operate from Hatfield to Menlyn. When the Hatfield to Menlyn 
section, Line 2B, was ready for roll-out all minibus-taxi operations would be removed from the route. 
The operators would then receive compensation for all their vehicles, according to the ‘per-vehicle’ 
value agreed from the interim compensation negotiations (CoT official, personal interview, 2017, 
November 23).  
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The CoT viewed this as a suitable solution because it expected the interim period to only last 
for six months (CoT official, personal interview, 2017, November 23; CoT senior official, personal 
interview, 2018, July 16; Former AMCE consultant, personal interview, 2018, July 10). However, that 
did not turn out to be the case. Following the interim compensation agreement, negotiations for full 
industry transition, along Line 2A and 2B, continued. An MoU was signed between the CoT and the 
minibus-taxi industry in November 2012 (CoT official, personal interview, 2017, November 23), and an 
MoA was signed in June 2013 (Tshwane BRT system ‘will benefit taxi industry’, 2013; CoT official, 
personal interview, 2017, November 23). The negotiations for Line 2A and 2B were only concluded in 
June 2016, while Line 2A operations started two years earlier in November 2014.  
At this stage, the CoT had already been paying interim compensation for two years, which was 
already longer than anticipated. The CoT had hoped to conclude interim compensation at the launch 
of Line 2B, which was expected to be completed by March 2016 (City of Tshwane, 2012b; Barrabas, 
2016), which would have coincided with the conclusion of the full industry transition negotiations in 
June 2016 (CoT official, personal interview, 2017, November 23). However, that had not happened and 
public opposition to the proposed Menlyn to Hatfield design stymied construction progress. The 
stalled Line 2B construction resulted in the affected minibus-taxi operators still receiving interim 
compensation until as late as November 2017 (CoT official, personal interview, 2017, November 23; 
CoT senior official, personal interview, 2018, July 16).  
With delays on Line 2B, the CoT shifted their focus to Line 1A. The minibus-taxi industry 
approved this decision on condition that Line 2A interim compensation would not be compromised 
and that it would not alter the final compensation agreement for Line 2A and 2B (CoT official, personal 
interview, 2017, November 23). The on-going delay of Line 2B construction and the resulting 
continuous interim compensation for Line 2A ballooned the project cost (A Re Yeng consultant, 2017; 
CoT official, personal interview, 2017, November 23; Former AMCE consultant, 2018).  
“If you put the interim conversation plus the compensation together then it [the total compensation 
cost for Line 2A and Line 2B] is a lot higher than was expected.” (CoT official, personal interview, 
2017, November 23) 
Line 2B: Hatfield to Menlyn 
Line 2B connects the CBD to Hatfield trunk route to Menlyn, via Lynwood Road and Atterbury Road, 
both dual lane carriageways. The initial Line 2B design was to construct an additional lane and 
expropriate land along Lynwood and Atterbury Roads. However, the quotes received for this work was 
more than double what the CoT had previously been quoted for construction per kilometre of the BRT 
corridor (A Re Yeng consultant, personal interview, 2017, November 23; CoT senior official, personal 
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interview, 2018, July 16). This option was unaffordable for the CoT, who instead opted to reduce the 
number lanes along Lynwood and Atterbury Road from two lanes for general traffic to one lane for 
general traffic with one dedicated lane for A Re Yeng (CoT senior official, personal interview, 2018, July 
16; Former AMCE consultant, 2018). Significant public opposition stemmed from this decision, causing 
delays in implementing Line 2B (A Re Yeng consultant, personal interview, 2017, November 23; 
Moatshe, 2017b; Former AMCE consultant, personal interview, 2018, July 10).  
Opposition for the lane reduction for Line 2B came from within the CoT as well as from 
external stakeholders. The PMU was of the opinion that if the CoT was serious about BRT, then it 
would have to take away private car space ( CoT senior official, personal interview, 2018, July 16; Former 
AMCE consultant, personal interview, 2018, July 10). A consultant from AMCE spoke to how the 
Roads and Traffic department with the CoT disagreed with this sentiment.  
“There were contributions from the CoT’s Roads and Traffic Department, they were not part of 
the PMU, but we would interface where designs affected the traffic etc. The roads guys quite frankly 
put up obstacles all the time. They stymied the project because they were really against taking away 
road space for public transport.” (Former AMCE consultant, personal interview, 2018, July 10) 
The public opposed the lane reduction, as well as four independent traffic engineers, who 
believed that the CoT did not correctly gauge the morning peak hour demands at the intersections along 
Lynwood Road (Moatshe, 2017b). Line 2B was originally planned to begin operations in April 2015 
(CoT, 2012b) but this was later extended to March 2016 (Barrabas, 2016). However, following the 
change in local government after the local elections in August 2016, the CoT conducted an economic 
impact assessment which further delayed the project (A Re Yeng consultant, personal interview, 2017, 
November 23; Moatshe, 2017b). In November 2017, these design alternations were still being considered 
and no progress on planning or construction was found (A Re Yeng consultant, personal interview, 
2017, November 23; CoT senior official, personal interview, 2018, July 16) 
5.5. Analysis of case study findings 
The CoT started considering public transport reform through BRT at a time of positive economic 
growth, increased car ownership and the dominance of public transport by the minibus-taxi industry. 
The well-intended objectives of the IPTN plan that saw BRT being implemented proved to be more 
challenging than expected. The analysis of the case finds that A Re Yeng is delayed due to two factors 
namely, weak planning and a misalignment between political objectives and planning conditions.  
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Factor one: Weak planning 
The impact of weak planning within the IPTN project resulted both in time overruns and cost 
overruns. Two excerpts from the case provide the evidence.  
Operational plans had been completed in 2008 but concerns raised about the basic principles 
of BRT design by national government led to funding being withdrawn. The subsequent process of 
appointing new project consultants and producing a new planning document delayed the project until 
2012.  
“From the City’s side a new project manager was appointed, who had no real experience in BRT 
planning, in fact I think that is one of the great weaknesses of A Re Yeng. In general, the authorities 
side had a great weakness in their planning ability and I still believe that it is the same as today” 
(Former AMCE consultant, personal interview, 2018, July 10) 
This sentiment was concurred by a CoT official, who explained that the administration had a 
very small team of people overseeing the project. The individuals were mostly seconded from other 
departments and often entire responsibilities like industry transition, stakeholder engagement and 
systems planning only had one or two staff members. The team grew as the project grew but it still left 
a significant reliance on external consultants. The efforts made to bolster the CoT’s transport planning 
capacity was not sustained, as today most of the institutional knowledge has been lost with almost a 
complete change of IPTN project staff. 
The second example of weak planning causing time delays and cost overruns comes two years 
later in 2014. The plan to restore the natural O-D pair of the CBD to Menlyn within six months of 
launching Line 2B failed to materialise. The initial plan to expropriate land for additional lanes proved 
to be too expensive, while the adjusted plan of reducing general traffic to one lane and dedicating one 
existing lane to A Re Yeng received significant opposition both from the public and within the CoT. 
By the end of 2017, this impasse on Line 2A was still not solved. The impact of this drawn out planning 
process has seen the minibus-taxi operators receive interim compensation for nearly three years longer 
than originally expected. It has also prevented A Re Yeng from reaching ridership figures beyond the 
4 500 passengers that is currently being achieved.  
Besides the small staff compliment, the plan developed in 2008 displayed a lack of capacity to 
apply the principles of BRT design to Tshwane’s context. While the lack of adequate design in 
consideration of public opinion and cost factors is evidenced in the fact that it has been four years since 
Line 2A began to experience its challenges. 
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Factor two: Misaligned political objectives and planning conditions 
It is critical to recognise that A Re Yeng does not find itself with low ridership figures solely due to poor 
planning. Political leadership played a critical role in causing the outcomes of the IPTN project to be 
delayed.  
Pressure from the NDoT in 2012 saw the CoT political leadership make the decision to 
implement Line 2B, despite the planners being aware that the route between the CBD and Hatfield 
would only reach 3 500 trips a day. Line 2B was chosen because it was quickly implementable, which 
allowed the CoT to satisfy the concerns of the NDoT. Furthermore, the Mayor’s push for the route to 
be used as the unveiling of A Re Yeng’s state-of-the-art stations changed the project plan and increased 
cost. This political factor as well as the realisation by planners of the need to align with the Gautrain 
services led to the mixed traffic ‘complementary’ route being changed to a dedicated trunk route in the 
median.  
This political decision caused the introduction of ‘interim compensation’. A concept which 
the CoT continues to pay to the minibus-taxi operators ballooning project costs and with a weak ability 
to ensure that the taxi industry is adhering to the agreement.  
“And I remember one of the guys from the finance workstream, saying that I [can] go stand on 
Lynwood road at the university and a taxi comes past; I don’t know where he has come from, he 
could be competing with the BRT, he has just made a short detour around Hatfield, but I don’t 
know where he has come from, it could be from Menlyn but I don’t know [where the taxi has come 
from].” (Former AMCE consultant, personal interview, 2018, July 10). 
5.6. Conclusion 
In conclusion, A Re Yeng is delayed due to both weak planning capacity and poor political decision 
making. The planning team lacked both an adequately sized team, with a reliance on consultants, as 
well as lacked the ability to plan according to the principles of BRT design. The planning function 
within the administration’s IPTN team also seemed to lack the ability to critically engage with the 
designs produced by the consultants. Poor political capacity is also evident in the planning function 
because the transport political head should have pre-empted the public push-back on the designs.  
The political decision to implement Line 2B bordered on political interference because the decision 
was made despite the knowledge that it would be detrimental to the project in the long term. 
Implementing Line 2B solved a short-term political problem of justifying expenditure to the National 
Treasury. However, the same political drive was not present when problems with Line 2A started to 
hamper the project’s ability to improve its ridership figures. As a result, towards the end of 2017 the 
CoT was again faced with the pressure from National Treasury to justify its need for funding.  
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6 Case three: City of Johannesburg  
6.1. Introduction  
This chapter begins with an overview of the city of Johannesburg (CoJ) prior to the initiation of the 
IPTN programme. The overview details population, unemployment, GDP growth, car ownership and 
a brief description of the layout of the city. This is followed by a detailed break-down of transport 
modal choice, affordability of public transport, the dominant issues that users have with transport and 
the dominant factors that influence modal choice, as found in the 2013 National Household Travel 
Survey. The section concludes with an overview of the institutional arrangements that preceded the 
industry transformation efforts of the IPTN programme.  
The overview follows with a section evaluating the outcomes of the IPTN programme. The 
achieved outcomes are assessed against the outcomes intended by the CoJ, as defined by IPTN design 
parameters as set out in the PTSAP.  
This is followed by a detailed timeline analysis of events and decisions taken on the IPTN 
project between 2003 and 2017. The data in all the sections are analysed and discussed in the concluding 
section which details the proposed factors to have caused the outcome of the IPTN project as at the end 
of 2017. 
6.2. City overview 
In 2006, the CoJ was already in the full swing of transforming the city’s public transport through a plan 
called the Spatial Public Transport Network (SPTN). On the verge of implementation of the SPTN, 
BRT was introduced. At the time the population was estimated to be 3.7 million residents (Human 
Sciences Research Council, 2013), with an unemployment rate of 23.6 percent in 2004 (South African 
Cities Network, 2006). Gauteng recorded GDP growth of 6.1 percent in 2006 (Statistics South Africa, 
2006). As mentioned in the previous Chapter, car ownership in the province of Gauteng was not 
representative of the increased congestion on the roads of Gauteng between 1996 and 2003.  
In Johannesburg the number of households having access to a car increased from 32.1 percent 
in 2003 (Lombard et al., 2007) to 41.5 percent in 2013 (Satistics South Africa, 2013). Johannesburg is 
made up of Soweto in the west; Fourways, Midrand and Sandton toward the north and the CBD in the 
south east.  
The state of transport 
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Minibus-taxi use is the dominant mode of travel for households in Johannesburg, at 39.2 percent, 
followed by private car use at 26.5 percent, accounting for all household trips. Thereafter, 15.7 percent 
of households walk all the way to work, eight percent use trains and 7.2 percent travel by bus. 
In the province of Gauteng, 32.4 percent of households spent more than 20 percent of their 
household income on public transport in 2013. The majority of households, 38.3 percent, spent less than 
10 percent on public transport in 2013.  
The most important transport related problems expressed in the 2013 NHTS were reckless 
driving by taxi drivers, 12.3 percent of respondents expressed this dissatisfaction. The second biggest 
concern was no busses being available, with 11.8 percent of households raising this issue; followed by 
taxis being too expensive, 9.6 percent of households noted this dissatisfaction. Modal choice in 
Johannesburg is determined most significantly by travel time, travel cost and flexibility with 36.6 
percent, 27.2 percent and 10.4 percent of households citing these factors, respectively.  
Institutional arrangements in the local public transport sector  
Subsidised, conventional bus services in Johannesburg are operated by PUTCO, Metrobus and other 
smaller operators who are collectively represented by the South African Bus Association of Operators 
(SABOA) (City of Johannesburg [CoJ], 2018). Thousands of taxis operate on a semi-informal basis with 
membership to taxi associations such as Top Six Taxi Association, the Greater Johannesburg Taxi 
Associations and other smaller bodies. Urban commuter rail services are provided by PRASA on an 
extensive network of routes.  
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6.3. System outcomes evaluation 
 
Figure 7: Rea Vaya layout of implemented routes (Source: City of Johannesburg Twitter account) 
BRT presented an attractive upgrade to the SPTN that simultaneously transformed the minibus-taxi 
industry and promised to attract car users to public transport. The BRT design was viewed as a minor 
departure from the existing SPTN plan. A scoping study was completed by the CoJ, together with 
international consultants - the Institute for Transportation and Development Policy (ITDP) and 
VIVA Cities, in November 2006. The intended outcomes for the design criteria of BRT is drawn from 
that scoping study. 
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Table 3: Comparison between intended outcomes and achieved outcomes for all components of IPTN design 
 Criteria Intended outcome Achieved outcome 
A
cc
es
si
b
ili
ty
 
Walking distance to 
trunk/feeder stop 
Within 500 meters of 
trunk/feeder corridor1 
Delayed due to partial 
project roll-out10 
Headway Peak: 1 – 3 mins headway; 
off-peak: 10 mins1 
Peak: 5 mins headway 
Off-peak: 15 mins headway2 
Daily operational hours 19 hours1 16 hours3 
Weekly operational days 7 days1 7 days3 
Percentage of population 
within walking distance of 
trunk/feeder 
85 percent1 Delayed due to partial 
project roll-out2 
Se
rv
ic
e 
q
u
al
it
y 
Vehicle and 
station/interchange 
experience 
Safe, clean, modern and 
universally accessible 
stations and vehicles. Maps 
and real-time information.1 
Unclean, no real-time 
information, maps missing, 
partial universal 
accessibility 
User service experience Scheduled, reliable, 
affordable, and integrated 
schedules, fares and routes.1 
Scheduled, reliable, 
affordable, integrated 
schedules, fares and routes  
In
fr
as
tr
u
ct
u
re
 
Roads Dedicated median busways 
and mixed traffic lanes1 
Trunk: Dedicated median 
bus ways.  
Feeder: mixed traffic3 
Vehicles  High floor buses with level 
boarding. 18m articulated 
and 12m rigid vehicles4 
High floor buses with level 
boarding. 18m articulated 
and 12m rigid vehicles.5 
Fare system Pre-board electronic fare 
payment1 
Started with paper-ticket 
system; upgraded to 
electronic payment4 
Stations Enclosed, attractive design 
and side walk bus stops1 
Enclosed, attractive design 
and side walk bus stops4 
O
p
er
at
io
n
s 
Passenger trips per day Full phase 1: 434 0006 
Phase 1A&1B: 80 0007 
51 3898  
Fare revenue per annum Unpublished R126 million8 
First operations date April 20091 August 20099 
All operations date Phase 1: September 2017 Phase 1C yet to be 
completed5 
 
                                                                    
1 City of Johannesburg, 2006 
2 Rea Vaya, 2018 
3 Walters, 2013 
4 City of Johannesburg, 2012 
5 Mccaul and Ntuli, 2011 
6 Gauthier and Weinstock, 2010 
7 City of Johannesburg, 2012 
8 City of Johannesburg, 2017 
9 Wood, 2014 
10CoJ official, personal interview, 2017, November 24 
11Former CoJ MMC for Transport, personal interivew, 2018, June 28 
12CoJ senior official, personal interview, 2018, July 16 
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The CoJ implemented Rea Vaya Phase 1A in three years, with the launch date marginally 
delayed. The real delays in implementation came in Phase 1B and persist with Phase 1C, which is 
currently delayed by more than a year. However, construction and minibus-taxi industry negotiations 
are on-going and therefore, the IPTN project is evaluated to be delayed.  
The CoJ intended for 85 percent of the population to be within 500 metres of a trunk station 
or feeder stop. However, due to the partial completion of Phase 1C and pending announcements on 
future phases, this is yet to be achieved. The system was supposed to operate for 19 hours a day, seven 
days a week, at headways of one to three minutes in the peak, and ten minutes in the off-peak. This was 
partially achieved with the system operating for seven days a week, but only for 16 hours a day. The 
headways achieved are five minutes in the peak and 15 minutes in the off-peak.  
The CoJ has managed to achieve a scheduled, reliable, affordable and integrated service. Even 
though the stations and vehicles do not meet the quality standards set out by the CoJ in the original 
scoping study, they do meet the intended infrastructure outcomes. Stations are enclosed, attractive and 
side-walk bus stops are present. The vehicles are 18-meter articulated buses or 12-meter rigid buses. The 
trunk routes operate with dedicated median lanes and the feeders operate in mixed traffic. The fare 
collection system started out as a paper-ticket system in 2009 but has subsequently been upgraded to a 
pre-board electronic payment system. 
The intended operations outcomes for Rea Vaya are also yet to be met. Full phase one was 
initially expected to reach a total of 434 000 passenger trips per day when fully operational, with phase 
1A and 1B expected to reach 80 000 passenger trips per day, collectively. Passenger trips on Phase 1A and 
1B have been climbing steadily over time and averaged at 51 389 passenger trips per day, for the 2016/17 
financial year. The revenue for the same period totalled R126 million. Initial operations were launched 
four months late, in August 2009 and all operations for Rea Vaya are yet to be launched, with full Phase 
one intending to be have been launched by September 2017.  
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Figure 8: Timeline of events between 2003 and 2009, in relation to the birth of BRT in SA to the start of formal Phase 1A industry negotiations. 
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6.4. Project timeline 
From SPTN to BRT 
Before the euphoria around the promises of BRT engulfed South Africa, the CoJ was already 
implementing an Integrated Transport Plan (ITP). Johannesburg’s ITP was drawn up in 2003 and had 
resulted in the development of the Strategic Public Transport Network (SPTN) (CoJ, 2011). The SPTN 
formed part of the Spatial Development Framework which championed urban densification of nodes 
along particular corridors, which are connected by the SPTN (CoJ, 2011). The SPTN was already called 
Rea Vaya and consisted of modest priorities for taxis and buses and kerb-side stops (Former CoJ MMC 
for Transport, personal interview, 2018, June 28; Former CoJ official, personal communication, 2018, 
June 26). In 2004, when South Africa won the right to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup, it came with a 
renewed imperative both from the CoJ and the NDoT to improve the quality of public transport. It 
became apparent that the SPTN was not a suitable solution for the passenger demands of the World 
Cup period (CoJ, 2011). Faced with no suitable alternative, the CoJ pursued the SPTN project. By 2006, 
the routing had been chosen, taxi operators were being taken on tours across Johannesburg to view the 
coming alterations and construction had already started along the route (Former CoJ MMC for 
Transport, personal interview, 2018, June 28). 
At this stage BRT was introduced to South Africa. International consultants, Lloyd Wright 
and Todd Litman, were invited to attend the Southern African Transport Conference in July 2006 
(CoJ senior official, personal interview, 2018, July 16; Former CoJ MMC for Transport, personal 
interview, 2018, June 28). This was followed by a meeting with the newly elected CoJ MMC for 
Transport, Rehana Moosajee (Wood, 2014b; CoJ senior official, personal interview, 2018, July 16; 
Former CoJ MMC for Transport,  personal interview, 2018, June 28). While being faced with the 
pressure to improve public transport for the World Cup, the CoJ were also faced with a recently failed 
attempt to introduce Metro Bus into Soweto (CoJ, 2011; Former CoJ MMC for Transport, personal 
interview, 2018, June 28).  
“I became very interested in BRT because it was apparent that it was not an either-or decision for 
dignified accessible public transport to the people of Soweto [and removing the taxis]. That there 
potential to bring these two things together in a new way which would also address the subsidy issue 
and even the subsidy playing field.” (Former CoJ MMC for Transport, personal interview, 2018, 
June 28) 
The CoJ had embarked on a project to surface all gravel roads in Soweto with asphalt from 2000 
to 2006 (‘Soweto roads tarred by 2005’, 2004; Former CoJ MMC for Transport, personal interview, 
2018, June 28); at which point, Metrobus started running services from Sunninghill to Soweto. This 
was met with significant resistance by the minibus-taxi industry, based on the complaint that it was the 
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minibus-taxi industry that had created the routes through Soweto and the CoJ was unfairly taking away 
their market share, by introducing Metrobus without including the minibus-taxi industry (Former CoJ 
MMC for Transport, personal interview, 2018, June 28). 
The case studies of incorporating the paratransit industry of South American cities into their 
BRT systems presented an attractive option for the CoJ. Following the meeting between Todd Litman, 
Lloyd Wright and the CoJ Department of Transport, the Mayoral Committee decided to send MMC 
for transport, Rehana Moosajee, World Cup CoJ Executive Director, Sibongile Mazibuko and 
Executive Director for Transport, Bob Stanway, on a study tour to Bogota, Columbia and Guayaquil, 
Ecuador in late August 2006. The decision was also taken to include public transport representatives 
from Metrobus, PUTCO, the Top Six Taxi Management (Top six) and the Greater Johannesburg 
Regional Taxi Council (GJRC) on the study tour (CoJ, 2006, 2011; Wood, 2014a; Former CoJ MMC 
for Transport, personal interview, 2018, June 28).  
Upon return to Johannesburg, the regional minibus-taxi bodies committed to working with 
the CoJ on investigating the possibility of implementing a BRT system in the city (CoJ, 2011; Former 
CoJ MMC for Transport, personal interview, 2018, June 28). However, the representatives made it clear 
that they did not have a mandate from their organisations to commit to the project (Former CoJ MMC 
for Transport, personal interview, 2018, June 28). By November 2006, in a full Council sitting and with 
representatives from the minibus-taxi industry in attendance in the public gallery, the BRT Phase One 
Scoping Study was presented. In this sitting the CoJ approved the upgrade of the SPTN to a full BRT 
network (CoJ, 2006, 2011; Wood, 2014a; Former CoJ MMC for Transport, personal interview, 2018, 
June 28). Phase one was split into Phase 1A and 1B to ensure that the public transport capacity of the 
CoJ was improved for the World Cup. Phase 1A linked Soweto to the World Cup stadia. Phase 1B linked 
schools, hospitals, universities and other sections of the city (CoJ official, personal interview, 2017, 
November 24). Construction on Phase 1A started in October 2007 with a sod turning by then-Mayor 
Amos Masondo at Charlton Terrace (CoJ, 2011, 2018). 
Expanding industry buy-in 
The CoJ began in-depth discussions with the minibus-taxi industry in January 2007. It was identified 
that Phase 1A would affect 10 Top Six associations and eight GJRC associations, 18 associations in total 
(CoJ, 2011). This was a complex time where the operators had to grapple with the concept of Rea Vaya. 
After a month of engagements, the two regional minibus-taxi bodies agreed to represent the industry 
in a BRT Taxi Steering Committee, comprising of the executives of both organisations (CoJ, 2011). This 
was a significant milestone for the minibus-taxi industry as the two regional bodies were traditionally 
opposed to each other. The opposition stems from the political landscape of the national bodies to 
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which GJRC and Top Six align. GJRC is aligned to SANTACO which had been given formal 
recognition by the national government, while Top Six were aligned to the National Taxi Alliance 
which, although acknowledged, were not formally recognised (Wood, 2014b; Former CoJ MMC for 
Transport, personal interview, 2018, June 28; Independent transport specialist, personal 
communication, 2018b, July 13). 
“These associations have a history of animosity amongst themselves. Now you told us that we must 
work with this association and with that association…they killed our people. You are mad. There is 
no way.” (Independent transport specialist, personal communication, 2018b, July 13) 
Below the steering committee, the industry set-up three levels of structures which comprised of 
Chairpersons, Executive Committee Members and all taxi operators from the 18 associations (CoJ, 2011). 
The structures allowed for input on industry-political matters, technical issues and allowing for all 
minibus-taxi operators to air their grievances. 
Conditional to the industry’s engagement was the appointment of technical advisors to assist the 
minibus-taxi industry. The CoJ agreed to this and what followed was a procurement process which 
allowed the CoJ to appoint and fund technical advisors for the industry (McCaul and Ntuli, 2011; 
Former CoJ MMC for Transport, personal interview, 2018, June 28; Independent transport specialist, 
personal communication, 2018b, July 13). Initially LTE Consulting Engineers were appointed, followed 
by Future of Transport Consulting (CoJ, 2011). 
During these initial engagements, the industry requested that a larger grouping of the 18 affected 
associations should go on a study tour (McCaul and Ntuli, 2011; Wood, 2014a; Former CoJ MMC for 
Transport, personal interview, 2018, June 28; Independent transport specialist, personal 
communication, 2018b, July 13). The second study tour was to Bogota and Pereira, Columbia in August 
2007; attended by twenty taxi industry operators, from 17 of the affected associations, and the then-
Mayor of Johannesburg (Wood, 2014a; Former CoJ MMC for Transport, personal interview, 2018, June 
28). Upon returning from the study tour, the CoJ signed an MoA in October 2007 with Top Six and 
in November 2007 with GJRC, outlining the mechanisms for further negotiations, albeit cautiously, 
without giving their full support as yet (CoJ, 2011; Venter. C, 2013; Former CoJ MMC for Transport, 
personal interview, 2018, June 28). A MoA was signed between the CoJ and Metrobus and PUTCO in 
September 2008  (CoJ, 2011; Allen, 2013) 
This engagement period and the ensuing negotiations was not an easy time for the minibus-taxi 
industry. The process was fraught with disruptions that took various forms from protest action and 
setting buses alight to board room disagreements and stalling tactics (Gauthier and Weinstock, 2010; 
Schalekamp and Behrens, 2010; Venter. C, 2013; CoJ senior official, personal interview, 2018, July 16; 
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Former CoJ MMC for Transport, personal interview, 2018, June 28; Former CoJ official, personal 
communication, 2018, June 26; Independent transport specialist, personal communication, 2018b, July 
13). Throughout the timeline, there were numerous stories shared by stakeholders of resistance from 
the minibus-taxi industry as it grappled with the transformation of its industry. The stories signify the 
political complexities of the Rea Vaya project and the political impact that the Rea Vaya project had on 
the minibus-taxi industry.  
The period from November 2007 to April 2009 was characterised by hundreds of meetings, 
workshops, road shows and conferences (CoJ, 2011; Former CoJ MMC for Transport, personal 
interview, 2018, June 28). Resolutions in support of negotiations with the CoJ and to protect the 
industry’s interests were taken in May, July and October 2008 (CoJ, 2011). Discussions to agree on the 
negotiation process began in February 2009 (McCaul and Ntuli, 2011). However, the engagement 
process stalled in April 2009, on the eve of the national government elections when SANTACO called 
a meeting between taxi operators and ANC political leadership (Schalekamp and Behrens, 2010; CoT 
official, 2017; Former CoJ MMC for Transport, personal interview, 2018, June 28). SANTACO were 
unhappy about being left out of the negotiations process and threatened national strike action (Venter. 
C, 2013) and to not transport voters to the polls in the impending national government elections 
(Former CoJ MMC for Transport, personal interview, 2018, June 28).  
“Two days before the elections a meeting is called at Gallagher Estate with ANC President Jacob 
Zuma. I was meant to do the welcome. The hall is entirely full of taxi operators from across the 
country. People at the back were just saying war talk war talk and stuff like that and there was no 
opportunity to do the welcome. President Zuma comes onto the stage after receiving a briefing on 
the BRT issue; he says that it looks like government has done a very bad job on consultation on the 
project. I think that what we should do is just hold horses on the project for now.” (Former CoJ 
MMC for Transport, personal interview, 2018, June 28) 
This decision by the President of the ANC put the project on-hold a month before the 
Confederations Cup which were due to start in May 2009. Rea Vaya’s first phase was due to start in 
April 2009, in time for the Confederations Cup (CoJ, 2006; Van Ryneveld, 2008). Following the April 
national government elections, Minister Sibusiso Ndebele was appointed as the Minister for Transport, 
replacing Minister Jeff Radebe. Minister Ndebele set up the National Joint Working Group which in-
essence expanded the BRT negotiations to include national interests by briefing SANTACO on the 
developments (Schalekamp and Behrens, 2010; Former CoJ MMC for Transport, personal interview, 
2018, June 28). This allowed the engagement process with the minibus-taxi industry to continue, which 
eventually concluded when the formal negotiations for Phase 1A affected operators opened in August 
2009 (CoJ, 2011; McCaul and Ntuli, 2011; Venter. C, 2013). 
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At the end of August 2009, Phase 1A started running on a starter service. The start of the interim 
service also saw factions within the minibus-taxi industry attempt to prevent Rea Vaya from becoming 
a reality. Four days before the launch of Phase 1A, the United Taxi Association Forum (UTAF) laid an 
unsuccessful court application to stop the launch of Rea Vaya (‘Taxi forum in court to halt BRT’, 2009; 
Venter. C, 2013; Independent transport specialist, personal communication, 2018b, July 13). The UTAF 
was formed in 2007, prior to the second study tour to Columbia as a Johannesburg regional body, 
aligned to SANTACO, and in opposition to BRT (Bathembu, 2009; Former CoJ MMC for Transport, 
personal interview, 2018, June 28; Independent transport specialist, personal communication, 2018b, 
July 13).  
“Increasingly, there was nervousness at the level of SANTACO [GJTC was aligned to 
SANTACO], NTA less-so because some of the NTA [National] leadership were in Top Six. The 
SANTACO national leaders were increasingly saying that why are these decisions being taken on behalf 
of our members without us being consulted. And the CoJ responded to say that national government was 
the correct sphere which SANTACO should engage. The CoJ will stick to engaging the sphere concurrent 
with the sphere of City government. And that essentially gave rise to UTAF, which essentially was a wing 
of SANTACO. SANTACO had very much pushed for the formation of UTAF.” (Former CoJ MMC 
for Transport, personal interview, 2018, June 28). 
The unsuccessful court bid was not the only attempt to stop Rea Vaya. In the days following 
the opening of Phase 1A, a night time Rea Vaya bus was shot-at in Soweto, while passing Nancefield 
hostel. This elicited a strong reaction from the CoJ, where the army and police carried out raids of the 
area and the army and police were stationed on buses and stations for months following the attack ("Rea 
Vaya rocked by shooting, 2009; Venter. C, 2013; Independent transport specialist, personal 
communication, 2018b, July 13)
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Figure 9: Timeline of events between 2009 and 2017, in relation to Phase 1A interim service launch to the end of the research period. 
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Phase 1A: From interim to full scale operations 
By the time that Phase 1A construction was complete, the industry negotiations had only just formally 
started. Therefore, it was necessary to establish an interim Vehicle Operating Company (VOC) so that 
the project would not be further delayed, while waiting for negotiations to conclude (CoJ, 2011). The 
starter-service launched five months later than initially projected due to delays in the construction and 
upgrade of major roads along the route (CoJ, 2011). The interim service ran from Thokoza Park in 
Soweto to Ellis Park in Bertrams. The patronage started on a high of 16 800 passengers for the first day 
(Venter, 2009; Adewumi and Allopi, 2014), spiked by the a city-wide strike by minibus-taxi operators. 
The average ridership, by the end of the month, had settled to 11 800 passengers per day (CoJ, 2011).  
The services were operated on an interim basis because the industry transition negotiations 
were not yet complete (CoJ, 2011; McCaul and Ntuli, 2011; Walters, 2013). The CoJ agreed to an interim 
vehicle operating agreement for a period of 12 years with Clidet (CoJ, 2011; McCaul and Ntuli, 2011), a 
company owned by the BRT Systems Trust (Walters, 2013). Metrobus was in-turn contracted by Clidet 
to manage the VOC (Walters, 2013; Former CoJ MMC for Transport, personal interview, 2018, June 
28). The interim VOC was needed to facilitate the purchase of buses from Scania, a Brazilian-based bus 
manufacturing company (CoJ, 2011; McCaul and Ntuli, 2011). Funding for the vehicles was provided by 
the Brazilian export credit agency, Banco National Desenvolvimento Economico Social. The buses were 
delivered from April 2009 (CoJ, 2011; Former CoJ MMC for Transport, personal interview, 2018, June 
28).  
The interim services required the CoJ to pay interim compensation to the affected minibus-
taxi operators. The operators affected by the Phase 1A starter service, placed their vehicles in storage 
from November 2009. With Phase 1A expansions in April 2010, a second tranche of operators received 
interim compensation and the remaining operators affected by Phase 1A received interim compensation 
from June 2010. The interim compensation agreements in each case were effective from the date signed 
until the operators began to receive profit from their shares in the VOC (CoJ, 2011; McCaul and Ntuli, 
2011). 
While Phase 1A was being rolled out, negotiations with the minibus-taxi industry continued. 
Twenty plenary meetings and more than 120 smaller meetings were held (CoJ, 2011). The deliberations 
during these meetings enabled the operators to transition from the minibus-taxi industry to the formal 
bus operating industry. The agreements reached during the negotiations ranged from the fee per 
kilometre to employment agreements to the value-chain agreements for Phase 1A (CoJ, 2011; McCaul 
and Ntuli, 2011; Former CoJ MMC for Transport, personal interview, 2018, June 28). Negotiations with 
the industry was concluded in September 2010 and the handover of the VOC from Clidet to Piotrans 
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was finalised on 1 February 2011 (CoJ, 2011; McCaul and Ntuli, 2011). Piotrans (Pty) Ltd was the first 
fully-minibus-taxi-owned VOC to manage BRT services for Phase 1A (McCaul and Ntuli, 2011). This 
transition also signified the change from interim Rea Vaya operations to full-scale Phase 1A services.  
In the implementation of Phase 1A a total 585 minibus-taxi vehicles were removed from the 
roads of Johannesburg, these were scrapped or sold, and in exchange the owners became shareholders 
in Piotrans. The value for a vehicle was determined to be R54 000, which each operator could then 
invest into Piotrans to buy a share into the company and contribute to the company’s working capital. 
A total of 313 shareholders own Piotrans through nine Taxi Operator Investment Companies (TOICs) 
(CoJ, 2011; McCaul and Ntuli, 2011; Independent transport specialist, personal communication, 2018b, 
July 13). 
Phase 1B and 1C: Beyond the World Cup buzz 
Phase 1B also began with interim services, operated by Piotrans. The interim management arrangement 
was necessary because the industry transition negotiations were not yet complete by the intended 
launch date. The engagements with the minibus-taxi industry started in August 2010 and followed a 
similar process to the Phase 1A industry transition – a period of engagements, an agreement to 
negotiate, industry technical support financed by the CoJ and a negotiation process facilitated by an 
independent facilitator.  
Drawing from the Phase 1A lessons and the increased awareness of the Rea Vaya project, the 
CoJ had hoped that the Phase 1B industry transition would be concluded quicker than Phase 1A. 
However, industry transition negotiations took significantly longer than anticipated (Dayimani, 2013; 
CoJ official, personal interview, 2017, November 24). 
“We had anticipated ourselves that we would finish very quick(sic). Because we had the experience 
of 1A.  It was not to be. The taxis needed more time to understand BRT. We had to do the same 
as we did in 1A. Take them in smaller groups, win the leadership to be confident, appoint a technical 
committee and pay for them and then gradually they started wanting to hear about BRT.” (CoJ 
official, personal interview, 2017, November 24)  
“One agreement can take three months. So, we don’t want to push them because then the agreement 
will collapse. They are so sensitive, they will tell us that we don’t want to be killed by our members. 
If we are going to agree with you here, we are going to be seen as selling out. So that is why we had 
to be very patient when we deal(sic) with them. Sometimes they will ask us for a caucus during the 
meeting and after two hours of caucusing, they will call you and they will say no, we’ve agreed not 
to continue today. We want a sleep over workshop for three days.” (CoJ official, personal interview, 
2017, November 24) 
Engagements with the minibus-taxi industry started a month before approaching bus industry 
stakeholders. PUTCO, Metrobus and small bus operators under SABOA began engagements with the 
CoJ in September 2010 (CoJ, 2011; CoJ official, personal interview, 2017, November 24). A Commitment 
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to Negotiate was signed by all parties in November 2010 (City of Johannesburg, 2010; CoJ, 2011; CoJ 
official, personal interview, 2017, November 24). The engagements period was only expected to run for 
two months with contract negotiations concluded by 2012 (City of Johannesburg, 2010; CoJ official, 
personal interview, 2017, November 24). But pre-negotiation engagements drew out until December 
2011, with negotiations only starting in earnest in 2012 (CoJ official, personal interview, 2017, November 
24). The first two years of negotiations were dominated by discussions on the structure of the VOC, 
the degree of affectedness of the different industry stakeholders and how the industry stakeholders 
should participate in the VOC (CoJ official, personal interview, 2017, November 24).  
Having agreed on the structure of the VOC, Litsamaiso (Pty) Ltd was able to be set-up as an 
interim organisation and was incorporated in September 2013 (City of Johannesburg, 2015; Litsamaiso, 
2016). Litsamaiso is 75 percent owned by taxi operators and 25 percent owned by PUTCO (City of 
Johannesburg, 2015). By 2012, construction was nearing completion, having started in 2008 (Walters, 
2013). Negotiations were yet to be completed, therefore, the phase 1B services, which launched in 
October 2013 (Ngcobo, 2016; Bhiman, 2017) with an interim management agreement with Piotrans 
(Dayimani, 2013; City of Johannesburg, 2015).  
By June 2015, negotiations had concluded with the signing of a vehicle operating agreement 
between the CoJ and Litsamaiso on 29 June 2015 (City of Johannesburg, 2015; "SA taxi bosses paid R830, 
2016). Litsamaiso took over the phase 1B operations a month later from Piotrans (City of Johannesburg, 
2015). This signified the fulfilment of full implementation of Rea Vaya Phase 1B, just more than three 
years after the intended completion deadline (City of Johannesburg, 2010).  
Construction started on Phase 1C in 2014 (Venter, 2016), along with engagements with the 
minibus-taxi and bus operators affected by 1C (CoJ official, personal interview, 2017, November 24). 
Initially, all services were anticipated to be operational by September 2017 (City of Johannesburg, 2014). 
However, by September 2017, the CoJ had signed their first agreement with the affected minibus-taxi 
associations and bus operators to enter into negotiations (CoJ official, personal interview, 2017, 
November 24; Cox, 2017; Dlamini, 2017).  
“In 1C, we spend time fighting about allowances, about three day workshops, about furniture for 
their [minibus-taxi industry’s] project office, about payment and number of hours that BRT 
planning data collectors are going to get… we’ve hardly had one substantive fight on the negotiations” 
(CoJ senior official, personal interview, 2018, July 16) 
“When we started they would negotiate each and everything line by line. If you’ve got an argument, 
a sentence will be debated for 30mins. Its slow. I must tell you, frustratingly slow. But we got them 
to sign this year [2017] with the Mayor.” (CoJ official, personal interview, 2017, November 24) 
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Phase 1C continues to be delayed as at July 2018 (CoJ senior official, personal interview, 2018, July 
16; Hosford, 2018). 
6.5. Analysis of case study findings 
Rea Vaya was implemented in under three years and ridership has steadily increased since Phase 1A. 
However, the implementation was not without difficulties and delays. This section will unpack the 
reasons behind the delays. It is proposed that, broadly, politics is the most significant underlying factor 
to have caused the delay of Rea Vaya. The influence of politics found in this case study was both positive 
and negative and are further broken down into five factors. These are political complexities within the 
minibus-taxi industry, distrust between the minibus-taxi industry and government, political leadership 
of the CoJ and the minibus-taxi industry, influence of other IPTN projects around South Africa, and 
the role of external political pressures.  
Factor one: Political complexities within the minibus-taxi industry 
Every interviewee spoke to the challenges of getting the associations to work together. Hundreds of 
meetings, workshops, roadshows and conferences were held in the first two years of the negotiations. 
An industry technical advisor summed up the difficulty between the associations with this description 
of the early engagement discussions.  
“Associations are formed as voluntary bodies that are not thoroughly regulated but now we have to 
form companies and work together. These associations have a history of animosity amongst 
themselves. Now we must work with this association with that association - they killed our people. 
You are mad. There is no way.” (Independent transport specialist, personal communication, 2018b, 
July 13). 
In addition to the difficulty of the political complexities between minibus-taxi associations; 
national and regional minibus-taxi bodies demonstrated considerable influence over the IPTN 
implementation process. The first example of SANTACO’s influence is the creation of UTAF who 
openly opposed BRT during negotiations and eventually filed a court case to stop the launch of Rea 
Vaya, shortly before the launch of Phase 1A. The second example of SANTACO’s influence was when 
the IPTN engagements were brought to a halt just before the 2009 national government elections. 
SANTACO openly complained of their lack of involvement in the BRT projects and complained of a 
usurping of their authority.  
Factor two: Distrust between the minibus-taxi industry and government 
Getting political buy-in took an estimated three years. The first excerpt is the interaction between the 
minibus-taxi industry and the CoJ during the introduction of Metrobus in Soweto, created a strained 
environment shortly before BRT was about to gain traction with the CoJ. This fuelled the distrust that 
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the minibus-taxi industry held toward the government. A second excerpt from the interview with the 
independent industry advisor describes how the attitude of the taxi operators changed over the two-
year period between initial engagements and formal negotiations.  
“In the beginning, they asked questions like why does the government not subsidise us, but they 
subsidise the buses? Why [do they want to subsidise us] because we are doing this thing [public 
transport] on our own. Initially, we did not have help. Why are they changing? They did not believe 
that if they became structured now, then they would get subsidies. They would say: “No…you are 
lying…you must go.” We want to see something written that says we are going to get subsidies. And 
the meeting flops.” (Independent transport specialist, personal communication, 2018b, July 13) 
Towards the end of the three-year engagement phase, the tone of the minibus-taxi industry 
changed, but reaching the point of formal negotiations was still a slow process. 
“You see you can gauge when they are beginning to trust you. They begin to ask questions like: “Do 
you trust government? or do you think that they are telling the truth?” As a social engineer you 
know when people are beginning to open up at a different level. I then show them the presentation. 
You show them and then they say no, we need to go discuss it alone.  “Are you sure that they will 
pay us for 12 years?” No, how can you have something for twelve years and lose it. No, you are lying. 
And then you will lose six months then.” (Independent transport specialist, personal 
communication, 2018b, July 13) 
Factor three: Political leadership of the CoJ and the minibus-taxi industry 
The success of the transformation and inclusion of the minibus-taxi operators is attributed to the 
political will of the senior leadership of the CoJ and the regional taxi associations. The two study tours 
played a significant role in allowing the respective leaders to engage across industry-government political 
differences; facilitating buy-in at the senior level. The political leadership of the transport department 
received a strong mandate from the Mayor. The Mayor made transport a stand-alone department 
following the 2006 Local Government Elections and lead the second study tour with representatives 
from the minibus-taxi industry.   
“During the first study tour, we flew via Madrid and there were inordinate amounts of waiting 
time so there was lots of opportunity to build relationship and have discussions etc.” (Former CoJ 
MMC for Transport, personal interview, 2018, June 28) 
However, Phase 1C continues to be delayed, and Phase 1B also had longer delays than 
anticipated. The minibus-taxi industry negotiations took longer than anticipated in Phase 1B and 
continue to take longer than anticipated in Phase 1C. The CoJ believed that the delayed implementation 
when comparing Phase 1A, and Phase 1B and 1C, came down to the political leadership of the Phase 1B 
associations.   
Phase 1B negotiations were characterised by a lack of centralised leadership within the minibus-
taxi associations. The minibus-taxi associations drove the Phase 1A negotiations through a steering 
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committee with sub-committees and reporting lines, which allowed minibus-taxi operators the 
opportunity to air their grievances. In Phase 1B, the committee directly responsible for negotiating with 
the CoJ grew in size and this made the negotiations less productive.    
“You also have a problem of no centralised leadership where too many associations leaders want to 
have a say. Unlike when we started with 1A.” (CoJ official, personal interview, 2017, November 24) 
Factor four: Influence of other IPTN projects around South Africa 
The compensation agreements for the later phases had also proven to be more expensive than in Phase 
1A. The minibus-taxi operators and technical support staff were now able to access information on 
previous compensation agreements. By 2014, when Rea Vaya was negotiating Phase 1B industry 
transition, Cape Town, Tshwane and George had all completed operator license compensation 
agreements. This drove the initial compensation demands up, resulting in an increased cost of 
implementing Phase 1B.  
“The taxi people also began to check how much was being paid in Cape Town and other places and 
would use those figures to determine what their vehicles and licenses were worth.” (CoJ official, 
personal interview, 2017, November 24) 
Factor five: The role of external political pressures 
Phases 1B and 1C were comparatively less urgent than Phase 1A. All the interviewees spoke to the 
importance of the World Cup for the success of Phase 1A. The World Cup provided the political 
pressure needed to motivate political leaders at all levels of government to improve the quality of public 
transport in Johannesburg.  Upon the conclusion of the World Cup, this pressure was removed. 
Acknowledging the importance of external driving forces in politics, the former MMC for Transport, 
who lead the formation of Rea Vaya, gave crucial advice to her successor, Cllr Christine Walters, 
providing crucial political stability to ensure the successful implementation of phase 1B.  
“Make sure that you put a date in the sand for the launch of Phase 1B because if you don’t, it’s 
never going to happen”. (Former CoJ MMC for Transport, personal interview, 2018, June 28) 
The external pressure that the World Cup provided and the impact of the momentum of Phase 
1A on Phase 1B was lost by the time that Phase 1C negotiations began. This loss of external political 
pressure was coupled with new political uncertainty. A senior City official reflected, during our 
interview, on the topic of the political change that came with the 2016 Local Government Elections.  
“In 1C, we spend time fighting about allowances, about three-day workshops, about furniture for 
their project office, about payment and number of hours that these planning data collectors are 
going to get, we have hardly had one substantive fight on the negotiations. It’s because 
fundamentally, there is a lack of credibility of government to delivery. The advantage of 1A is that 
we delivered on 1A, so those guys of 1B knew that we were going to deliver. But with 1C, new political 
leadership, the taxi industry has no guarantee that we are going to deliver so there they are pushed 
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on by the people who can only eat from the process. So they delay the process because they don’t know 
if they have an incentive to conclude the negotiations.” (CoJ senior official, personal interview, 2018, 
July 16) 
6.6. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the full implementation of Rea Vaya phase 1 has been delayed due to five underlying 
factors, all political influences: internal politics in the minibus-taxi industry, the relationship between 
the minibus-taxi industry, the influence of political leadership, the influence of other IPTN projects 
around South Africa, and the role of external political pressures.    
The industry negotiations had to overcome the history of animosity between associations, as well 
the as the political influence of the minibus-taxi industry’s national structures on local issues. The CoJ 
had to overcome the distrust of government within the minibus-taxi industry, engrained from decades 
of disagreement. Delay was also evident through higher than expected costs, where Phases 1B and 1C 
proved to be more expensive than Phase 1A because the minibus-taxi industry could benchmark their 
compensation packages against agreements in other South African cities. Phase 1A of Rea Vaya 
benefitted from strong political leadership, both within the CoJ and the regional minibus-taxi industry, 
and from external political pressures. While, Phases 1B and 1C experienced the consequences of less 
decisive political leadership within the minibus-taxi industry, and the absence of political certainty 
following the 2016 local government elections.  
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7 Case four: city of Cape Town  
7.1. Introduction  
This chapter begins with an overview of city of Cape Town prior to the initiation of the IPTN project. 
The overview provides details on population, unemployment, GDP growth, car ownership and a brief 
description of the layout of the city. It gives a detailed break-down of transport modal choices, 
affordability of public transport, the dominant issues that users have with transport and the dominant 
factors that influence modal choice, as found in the 2013 NHTS.  The section concludes with an 
overview of the public transport institutional arrangements that preceded the transformation efforts of 
the IPTN project.  
The overview follows with a section evaluating the success or delay of the IPTN project. The 
achieved outcomes are evaluated against the outcomes intended by the City of Cape Town (CoCT), as 
defined by IPTN design parameters as set by the NDoT in the PTSAP.  
This is followed by a detailed timeline analysis of events and decisions taken on the IPTN project 
between 2006 and 2015. All the above sections are analysed and discussed in the concluding section 
which details the proposed factors to have caused the outcome of the IPTN project as at the end of 
2017.  
7.2. City overview 
The CoCT first showed an interest in BRT in 2003, but the real impetus to transform the public 
transport industry came in 2007. The population in 2006 was estimated to be 3 239 million people  
(Western Cape Provincial Government, 2006) with an unemployment rate of 24.5 percent in 2007 
(Western Cape Provincial Treasury, 2012). GDP growth averaged at five percent between 2000 and 
2007 (Western Cape Provincial Treasury, 2012).  
In the Cape Town metropole household access to a private vehicle increased from 49.1 percent 
in 2003 to 50.5 percent in 2013 (Hunter Van Ryneveld, 2014). Cape Town consists of Atlantis and 
Bloubergstrand to the north, Hout Bay and Clifton to the west, Somerset West and Belville to the east 
and Simon’s Town to the south. 
The state of transport 
Minibus-taxi use is the dominate public transport mode of travel for all household trips in Cape Town, 
at 25.9 percent, followed by private car, with 36.7 percent of households travelling by car either as a 
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driver or a passenger. 14.3 percent of households travel by train, 12.5 percent ‘walk all the way’ to their 
destinations and bus has the smallest mode share of nine percent.  
In the Western Cape, 20.3 percent of households spent more than 20 percent of their 
household income on public transport in 2013. While, the majority of households, 56.7 percent, spent 
less than 10 percent on public transport in 2013.  
The most important transport problem in Cape Town was reckless driving by taxi drivers, 12.0 
percent of respondents expressed this dissatisfaction. The second biggest problem was crime, with 10.6 
percent of households raising this issue; followed by congestion, 8.1 percent of households noted this 
dissatisfaction. Modal choice in Cape Town is determined most significantly by travel cost, travel time 
and flexibility with 30 percent, 22.7 percent and 12.6 percent of households citing these factors 
respectively.  
Institutional arrangements of the local public transport sector 
Conventional bus services are provided by Golden Arrow Bus Services who run a fleet of 1021 vehicles, 
while rail is provided by Metrorail Western Cape, a division of PRASA. Minibus-taxi services are 
provided by approximately 10 000 to 12 000 licensed minibus-taxis on approximately 1 018 to 1350 
routes across the city (City of Cape Town, 2017: 82, Coetzee, Krogscheepers & Spotten, 2018: 792). The 
number of illegal operators is unknown. The minibus-taxi owners are governed by 119 associations, 
which in-turn are governed by six regional bodies (City of Cape Town, 2017: 82).  
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7.3. System outcomes evaluation 
 
Figure 10: MyCiTi layout of implemented routes (Source: MyCiTi website) 
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BRT presented an attractive solution to reducing the cost and time of travel in Cape Town, while 
simultaneously addressing the challenges of the minibus-taxi industry and increasing congestion. By the 
end of 2017, the CoCT had implemented BRT services along the Atlantic Sea Board, up the West Coast 
through the Milnerton/Dunoon area toward Century City, in the CBD/Woodstock area and into 
Vredehoek/Gardens. MyCiTi also ran an airport shuttle and an N2 Express route to Khayelitsha and 
Mitchell’s Plain.  
This dissertation does not assess the N2 Express section of the project, however at times it is 
not possible to separate the N2 Express from the assessment of the IPTN performance. The CoCT 
viewed the N2 Express as a supplementary MyCiTi service in the interim until rail can be upgraded 
(City Of Cape Town, 2012). The table below evaluates the intended outcomes of the MyCiTi IPTN 
project against the achieved outcomes of the project. The information is drawn from the MyCiTi 
Business Plans published by the CoCT in 2010, 2012, 2015, 2017 and the MyCiTi website.  
Public information sessions for phase 2A are underway, as the CoCT continues to roll-out 
adjusted IPTN plans that include BRT and ‘quality bus services’. The CoCT set out to bring 75 percent 
of the population within 500m of an IPTN station or stop. This has only been partially achieved due 
to the network still being implemented. The network was envisaged to operate seven days a week, 18 
hours a day at peak-time headways of seven minutes on the trunk and 10 minutes on the feeders. The 
network operates for seven days a week but post the moderation exercise, which sought to adjust the 
supply of buses to better match demand, the service only runs for 15 hours a day. During the peak the 
trunk runs at nine-minute headways while the feeders run at 28-minute headways. 
The CoCT sought to implement a public transport system that was safe, clean, affordable, 
reliable and universally accessible; operating on a scheduled, integrated system with real-time 
information. All of the above has been achieved. The service is provided by a combination of 18 metre 
articulated vehicles, and 12 and 9 metre rigid vehicles. On the trunk, the buses operate on dedicated 
roads in the median with enclosed stations, while on the feeders the buses operate in mixed traffic with 
kerb-side stops. The system began with paper-ticket fare collections and migrated to full electronic fare 
collection.  
Combining Phase one and the N2 Express, the CoCT anticipated a ridership of 75000 
passengers per day but by 2017, the system was achieving an average of 67 000 passengers per day. By 
the 2016/17 financial year, the system was expected to have a fare revenue of R214 million; for the 
2017/18 financial year fare revenue was R225 million. For implementation, Phase 1A and 1B were broken 
down into milestones, each with their own launch date. On average, each milestone was delayed by 
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between one and three years, with the Phase one finally completed by October 2015, instead of a year 
earlier, as intended.  
With the CoCT displaying an intention to implement Phase 2A, the IPTN project initiated in 
2006 is still in full-swing and is evaluated to be in a state of delay.  
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Table 4: Comparison between intended outcomes and achieved outcomes for all components of IPTN design 
 Criteria Intended outcome Achieved outcome 
A
cc
es
si
b
ili
ty
 
Walking distance to 
trunk/feeder stop 
500 metres1 Delayed due to partial 
project roll-out3 
Peak headway* Trunk: 7mins 
Feeder: 10min2 
Trunk: 9 mins 
Feeder: 28 mins3 
Daily operational hours 18 hours2 15 hours3 
Weekly operational days 7 days2 7 days3 
Percentage of population 
within walking distance of 
trunk/feeder 
75 percent1  Delayed due to partial 
project roll-out3 
Se
rv
ic
e 
q
u
al
it
y 
Vehicle and 
station/interchange 
experience 
Safe, clean, modern and 
universally accessible 
stations and vehicles. Maps 
and real-time information.1 
Achieved6 
User service experience Scheduled, reliable, 
affordable, and integrated 
schedules, fares and routes.1 
Achieved6 
In
fr
as
tr
u
ct
u
re
 
Roads Median, dedicated lanes 
with feeders in mixed traffic 
Achieved6 
Vehicles  18m articulated vehicles, 
12m and 9m rigid vehicles  
Achieved6 
Fare system Trunk: Pre-board electronic 
fare collection1 
Feeder: On-board electronic 
fare collection1 
Initially paper tickets but 
migrated to electronic fare 
collection2 
Stations Enclosed stations and 
kerbside bus stops1 
Achieved6 
O
p
er
at
io
n
s 
Passenger trips per day  
*Phase 1 and N2 Express 
75 0004  67 0004  
Fare revenue per annum 
*Phase 1 and N2 Express 
R214 150 000 (2016/17)5 R225 000 000 (2017/18)4 
First operations date Phase 1A1  
Milestone 0: February 2011 
Milestone 1: December 2011 
Milestone 2: February 2012 
Milestone 3: July 2012 
Milestone 4: September 
2013 
Phase 1B: October 20145 
Phase 1A5 
Milestone 0: May 2011 
Milestone 1: November 
2013 
Milestone 2: September 
2013 
Milestone 3: July 2015 
Milestone 4: July 2015 
Phase 1B: October 20155 
All operations date Phase 1: October 20145 Phase 1: October 20155 
                                                                    
1 City of Cape Town, 2010 
2 City of Cape Town, 2012 
3 Transport and Urban Development Authority, 2018 
4 City of Cape Town, 2017 
5 City of Cape Town, 2015 
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Figure 11: Timeline of events between 2006 and 2009, in relation to early-stage institutional commitment and taxi industry engagement. 
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7.4. project timeline 
Understanding the possibilities of BRT in Cape Town  
BRT was not new to the CoCT, the Western Cape Government had previously considered its 
implementation down Klipfontein Road, through Athlone. The CoCT had first become acquainted 
with the idea through a study tour in 2003 to Bogota, Columbia, led by then-Western Cape MEC for 
Transport, Tasneem Essop. However, its implementation did not materialise until interest in BRT was 
rekindled after a meeting in August 2006 with former-Mayor Helen Zille; Ibrahim Seedat, who was the 
Director of Public Transport Strategy at the NDoT at the time; Philip van Ryneveld, a former CFO of 
the CoCT; Lloyd Wright and Todd Litman (Wood, 2014b). This meeting was followed by a scoping 
study for a city-wide IPTN that included BRT in February 2007, which found that it was a feasible 
option. A few months later, the CoCT began compiling a planning document for an IRPTN consistent 
with the national government PTSAP, newly launched in April 2007 (City of Cape Town, 2010; Wood, 
2014b).  
Initial stakeholder engagements between the leadership of 14 minibus-taxi associations and the 
CoCT began in 2007 (Beukes, 2015). However, broader engagements with existing public transport 
operators was put on hold until the Phase 1A affected areas were determined to a sufficient degree. The 
first study tour to South America, which only included political leadership, technical officials and 
consultants took place in December 2007. Upon return, in early-2008, the CoCT appointed two 
international consultants to develop the operations and business plans for the first phase of the IRPTN. 
This plan, which was approved by Council on 27 August 2008, included an inner city service, and routes 
to the airport, Cape Town Stadium, Blaauwberg and Atlantis (City of Cape Town, 2010; Beukes, 2015).  
As further plans were developed, and construction started, it became apparent, in mid-2009, 
that the cost of the IPRTN project would escalate from R1.4 billion to R4.1 billion. As a result the 
CoCT Council decided to limit implementation to the services needed for the World Cup, and any 
further implementation to be based on the availability of NDoT funding (City of Cape Town, 2010; 
Wood, 2014b). 
Opposition flexes their muscles 
This period also saw the beginning of protests in opposition to the implementation of the IPTN plans, 
driven by associations aligned to the NTA and operators not included in the Phase one plans 
(Schalekamp and Behrens, 2010; Schalekamp, 2015; McLachlan, personal interview, 2018, July 25). 
Disruptions and protests continued into early 2009, reaching a point where the CoCT threatened to 
‘use the armed forces to prevent disruptions’ (Schalekamp and Behrens, 2010). Opposition to BRT 
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plans across the country bemoaned a lack of consultation on the plans and minibus-taxi operators raised 
concerns on the future their livelihoods. 
Schalekamp provided detailed records of six events between the minibus-taxi industry and the 
CoCT, in his doctoral thesis. The first was a public meeting held in Bloubergstrand in October 2008 
for minibus-taxi operators and residents affected by Phase 1A. The meeting was disrupted by paratransit 
operators and was forced to end early. The second interaction came at a ‘summit’ geared specifically for 
the minibus-taxi industry, hosted at Century City in November 2008. The ‘summit’, attended by 300 
invite-only representatives, was also cut short when operators who had not received an invitation 
disrupted the meeting. The third event recorded by Schalekamp occurred in December 2008 when a 
group of paratransit operators handed over a memorandum stating their grievances to then-Mayor Mrs 
Helen Zille at the Cape Town Civic Centre. The protest action turned violent with damage inflicted 
upon property, members of the public and public transport services. The fourth event comes in 
February 2009, when a ‘city-wide three-day strike’ brought minibus-taxi services to a standstill and was 
accompanied with violence. It was at this point that the CoCT placed the armed-forces on stand-by. 
Schalekamp also recorded that Ms Zille made attempts to resolve the impasse between the 
CoCT and NTA. The former-Mayor met with the regional leadership of NTA shortly after the strike. 
The parties agreed to a monthly meeting between the CoCT and the NTA leadership, and that the 
NTA members would give the IRPTN project a hearing. However, this agreement was short-lived with 
the NTA walking out of a meeting in early-March 2009, the fifth recording, shortly after this agreement 
was reached. Again, a meeting in mid-March 2009 also turned sour when NTA members disrupted a 
meeting for a broader grouping of minibus-taxi industry representatives hosted by the CoCT at the 
Civic Centre. 
As we know from previous chapters, opposition to BRT was not unique to Cape Town. The 
level of discontent in other cities resulted in a national level meeting between ANC President, Jacob 
Zuma (who was likely to be the next President of South Africa), city-level political leaders and minibus-
taxi operators was held in days before the National Elections in April 2009. All BRT projects and 
industry engagements were placed on hold until June 2009, following the National Elections. 
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Figure 12: Timeline of events between 2009 and 2016, in relation to industry transition and Phase 1 moderation. 
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From uncertainty to successful industry transition 
Formal engagements with the minibus-taxi industry started again in Cape Town in August 2009, when 
the CoCT issued the second draft of the prospectus initially issued in early-2009 for Phase 1A services 
(Schalekamp and McLachlan, 2016). To assist with achieving the industry transformation objectives, 
the CoCT procured independent advisors to assist the minibus-taxi industry in negotiations and 
setting-up operating companies in August 2009 (Schalekamp, 2015; McLachlan, personal interview, 
2018, July 25). Based on this prospectus, the CoCT engaged with eight taxi associations and two bus 
companies (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2010). The intention was for the affected operators to 
form two VOCs that would service Phase 1A. However, as will be detailed below, three VOCs were 
formed, namely TransPeninsula, Kidrogen and Table Bay Rapid Transit.  
TransPeninsula consists of Peninsula Taxi Association, Central Unity Taxi Association and 
Devils Peak Vredehoek Taxi Association. These three associations serve the inner city and Atlantic Sea 
Board areas. Kidrogen consists of Blaauwberg Taxi Association, Maitland Taxi Association, United 
Taxi Association, Ysterplaat Taxi Association, Du Noon Taxi Association and Sibanye Bus Services. 
These five associations serve the West Coast area. Table Bay Rapid Transit consists of previous bus 
companies, Golden Arrow Bus Services and Sibanye Bus Services. These two bus companies operate 
routes across the city, including the Phase 1A affected areas.  
The engagement phase came to an end and formal contract negotiations began in November 
2009. The CoCT signed an interim contract in February 2010 with TransPeninsula for World Cup 
services because the World Cup event space fell within the region of those affected associations 
(Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2010; Schalekamp, 2015; McLachlan, personal interview, 2018, July 
25). The contract was for services running between the CBD and the Cape Town Stadium, an inner-
city loop and park and ride facilities across Cape Town (City Of Cape Town, 2010). An interim contract 
was also signed with Golden Arrow Bus Services for an airport shuttle to run during the World Cup.  
The World Cup services ran from ‘test events’ prior to World Cup to 31 October 2010. Beyond 
the World Cup, Phase 1A was due for its first implementation (milestone zero) in February 2011. Phase 
1A was divided into five milestones, with the last milestone to be launched by September 2013 (City Of 
Cape Town, 2010). Phase 1A has been implemented with an average of a two-year delay on each 
milestone. 
In early 2011, negotiations with the five minibus-taxi associations that serve the West Coast area 
entered a more serious phase, spurred by the signing of an interim contract with TransPeninsula and 
construction of stations and road infrastructure up the R27 and along Blouberg Road (McLachlan, 
personal interview, 2018, July 25). Following the World Cup, the CoCT terminated the IRPTN services 
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to the Cape Town Stadium, except for event days. However, the CoCT maintained the operation of 
the inner-city loop and the airport shuttle which was served through the interim contract with 
TransPeninsula (Schalekamp, 2015). 
By early-2011, independent advisors appointed by the CoCT were able to convince the NTA-
aligned associations, Du Noon Taxi Association and Ysterplaat Taxi Association, to form an operating 
company with the three other West Coast Taxi Associations and Sibanye Bus Services (McLachlan, 
personal interview, 2018, July 25). The stakeholders, who were close to forming the VOC, Kidrogen, 
objected to the interim contract between the CoCT and TransPeninsula in April 2011. The grouping 
insisted that the CoCT also enter into an interim contract with themselves for the West Coast services, 
as the infrastructure was ready and buses were standing idle, following the World Cup. The CoCT 
ceded, and in May 2011 entered into two interim vehicle operating contracts with TransPeninsula and 
what was still to become Kidrogen (Schalekamp, 2015; McLachlan, personal interview, 2018, July 25). A 
week later, the CoCT launched Milestone zero. The interim contracts with TransPeninsula and 
Kidrogen were extended as infrastructure was completed and vehicles were delivered. However, the 12-
year contract negotiations were yet to concluded.  
Mid-way through negotiations, in late-2012, Sibanye Bus Services and the five minibus-taxi 
associations within Kidrogen experienced irreconcilable differences, resulting in the minibus-taxi 
shareholders buying Sibanye’s Kidrogen shares. A third VOC, called Table Bay Rapid Transit was 
formed between Sibanye Bus Services and Golden Arrow Bus Services to operate the trunk route 
between Table Bay and the CBD (Schalekamp, 2015; McLachlan, personal interview, 2018, July 25). 
The 12-year contract negotiations between the CoCT and the three VOCs concluded in August 
2013 (Schalekamp, 2015; Transport for Cape Town, 2015; McLachlan, personal interview, 2018, July 25). 
TransPeninsula, Kidrogen and Table Bay Rapid Transit operate the MyCiTi services for Phase 1A and 
Phase 1B, which is an extension of Phase 1A in the West Coast area. By the end of 2015, the CoCT had 
launched all milestones of Phase 1A and B.  
In 2012, the CoCT introduced the plan for interim services to the Cape Town South East 
suburbs of Khayelitsha and Mitchell’s Plain. Interestingly, along with this plan came a different 
approach to industry transition, as the CoCT experienced the effects in Phase 1A and B of the full 
services replacement model on the financial sustainability of the IRPTN project (McLachlan, personal 
interview, 2018, July 25). However, this thesis does not cover the events and decisions which impacted 
the outcome of the N2 Express service and only considers the events related to Phase 1A and B.  
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Adapting for the future and the consequences of moderation 
Following the signing of the final operating contracts with the three VOCs; the CoCT, for the first 
time, had the full understanding of actual operating costs. By late 2013, it also became increasingly 
apparent that fare revenue was lower than expected. This led to the belief that the required operating 
subsidy would be significantly higher than the provincial bus operating subsidy at the time. To 
overcome this problem, the CoCT moderated the MyCiTi services to better match supply with demand 
and thereby improve the cost recovery capabilities of the system  
Moderation was preceded by the analysis of different operating scenarios for a completed 
MyCiTi system, the results of which were compiled in the ‘Making MyCiTi financially sustainable’ 
report, published in May 2014 (Transport for Cape Town, 2015). The adjustments suggested by the 
report were applied to Phase one from late-2014 (McLachlan, personal interview, 2018, July 25). The 
adjustments, outlined in the 2015 MyCiTi Business Plan, included changing vehicle sizes, changing 
route frequencies as well as removing or adding new routes, increasing peak fares in comparison to off-
peak fares, permitting minibus-taxis to re-enter certain routes, and improving internal management 
structures.   
The CoCT acknowledged that the moderation trade-off was a slightly decreased quality of 
service for a smaller operating deficit and a more financially sustainable public transport service. It is 
difficult to assess whether the voids created by moderation are only being serviced by the re-licensed, 
and therefore legal, operators or if illegal operators have re-entered the respective MyCiTi routes. There 
are differing takes on the matter. According to the former-Transport political head in Cape Town, Cllr 
Brett Herron (2018), no illegal operators have been found along the MyCiTi routes. However, other 
interviewees have shared that vehicles licensed to do long-distance services now ran peak time services 
as well (McLachlan, personal interview, 2018, July 25). 
Whether illegal operators have re-entered MyCiTi routes or not, the MyCiTi services, by the 
conclusion of this dissertation improved its revenue-to-cost ratio to 48 percent from 30 percent (Venter, 
2015), prior to moderation and continues to be one of the CoCT’s flagship projects with plans afoot to 
roll-out Phase two, albeit using a substantially different reform model (Transport and Urban 
Development Authority, 2017b). 
7.5. Analysis of case study findings 
The CoCT has exceeded its fare revenue target; improved its revenue to cost-recovery ratio, its daily 
ridership figures are below the intended target, but it is the highest figure in the country, the service 
standards are lower than initially intended, and despite longer delays per milestone Phase one roll-out 
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was effectively only delayed by one year. Despite this positive picture, the IPTN plan continues to not 
fulfil initial expectations and the implementation of the project was not without its challenges.  
In the analysis, it was found that there are three factors that have resulted in the delay of the 
IPTN fulfilling initial expectations; as well as two further factors that explain why the CoCT was able 
to overcome the challenges during implementation. These are: gold-standard BRT is inappropriate for 
Cape Town, underestimated cost of full industry replacement, funding uncertainty, prudent political 
leadership, and the adaptability of the Transport and Urban Authority.  
Factor one: Gold-standard BRT is inappropriate for Cape Town 
The operationally successful examples of BRT that the CoCT visited in South America were 
characterised by high density cities with bi-directional flow and continuous demand along the trunk 
routes (Wood, 2014a). However, Cape Town is characterised by the opposite due to the legacy of 
Apartheid era spatial planning.  
The effects of Apartheid era spatial planning on the urban form of Cape Town today sees most 
residents living in low-density environments and working in higher density environments, usually 10 – 
20 kilometres apart. This results in high demand during AM and PM peak hours, to and from work, 
and low demand during off-peak hours. This in-turn requires a fleet capable of satisfying the peak 
demands, resulting in a large idle fleet during off-peak. BRT also requires costly initial infrastructural 
outlays to harness its potential for operational cost savings; which placed an added financial burden on 
a system which does not have the requisite urban densities to reach the ridership figures need to harness 
BRT’s potential for zero operational subsidies.    
Dispersed urban form, high peak to base ratios, single directional flow and point to point 
demand have consistently been given as reasons for the higher operating costs and lower daily ridership 
(City of Cape Town, 2010, 2012; Grey and Behrens, 2013; Transport for Cape Town, 2015; Transport 
and Urban Development Authority, 2017a; Former CoCT Mayco Transport, 2018).  
However, the data presented in the project timeline shows a series of events between August 
2006 and August 2008 which lead to the implementation of BRT in Cape Town. During this two-year 
period; a face-to-face meeting between the most senior CoCT political leadership and BRT experts, a 
scoping study, an international study tour, input and direction from the NDoT and the development 
of business and operational plans were not enough for the CoCT political leadership and 
administration to see the fundamentally inappropriate nature of BRT for Cape Town. This points to 
a potential initial lack of capacity within the CoCT to adequately consider the pros and cons of BRT 
for the city spatial form. 
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Factor two: Underestimated cost of full industry replacement  
Full industry replacement involved compensation for vehicles and operating licenses, as well as the 
formation of three VOCs. The engagements and negotiations also continued for longer than expected, 
resulting in the use of interim contracts and in three phases of compensation – Early Exit 
Compensation, Early Compensation and Final Stage Compensation. These contributing factors 
demonstrate that the CoCT miscalculated the potential market values of minibus-taxi operations in the 
initial planning stages. It must be noted that reliable data on the minibus-taxi industry is notoriously 
difficult to source.  
“These revisions revealed that the original estimates were underestimated, primarily due to the 
preliminary information available at time of estimating as a result of the short time frames to 
achieve a service by World Cup 2010…The estimated costs of the transition of the current minibus-
taxi industries to the IRT were found to be higher than initially estimated. The industry transition 
costs initially did not include amounts payable for the surrender of vehicles as it was assumed that 
should this be required it would be funded by National Government separately.” City of Cape 
Town, 2010 
It also demonstrates that the CoCT misread the state of the political relationship within the 
minibus-taxi industry, as well as between government and the minibus-taxi industry. The history 
between NTA, SANTACO and government influenced the anti-BRT protests that flared up in late-
2008/early-2009. The push for increased consultation on BRT plans (Schalekamp and Behrens, 2010) 
and issues around driver harassment by Metro Police (Schalekamp, 2015) demonstrated the mistrust 
between the government and the minibus-taxi industry. The complexities around government and 
minibus-taxi engagements in relation to full industry replacement in the IPTN project is addressed by 
Schalekamp and Behrens in their 2010 journal paper, Engaging paratransit on public transport reform 
initiatives in South Africa. A quote from the paper summarises the analysis of full industry 
replacement’s impact on the MyCiTi project: 
“Assumptions that paratransit at the aggregate level would be a willing player in the formalisation 
process proposed under the IRPTN programme and BRT projects, and that it would respond 
positively to the truncated timeframes under which the local governments propose that it make this 
radical shift, have proved to be unrealistic.” Schalekamp and Behrens, 2010 
Factor three: Funding uncertainty  
In June 2009, the CoCT Council limited the IPTN development to the availability of funding from the 
NDoT. This was partly a driver behind Phase one being broken up into milestones and caused the two-
year average delay of each milestone launch. South African legislation necessitates that funding is 
reviewed in three-year cycles and is received on an annual basis. The quote below summarises the impact 
that a lack of funding certainty has had on the IPTN project. 
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“Certainty around funding would make a huge difference to implementation and meeting 
milestones. Government budgets in three-year cycles, and national government is reluctant to make 
longer-term commitments because of unexpected demands on the budget that may arise. I 
understand their lack of ability to commit because three years ago they didn’t know that they were 
going to fund free education. Now suddenly they have to find that money and that is where parts 
of the cuts of the grants is going. I am not blaming national government, but it is certainly a massive 
factor in the way that we implement - the lack of certainty and the lack of commitment to the 
funding stream that goes longer than three years.” CoCT senior official, personal interview, 2018, 
July 18 
Factor four: Prudent political leadership 
The CoCT demonstrated prudent political leadership that was able to adequately respond to changing 
circumstances. There are four examples of the political leadership of the CoCT influencing the IPTN 
project. The first example is the attendance of the political leadership, along with existing industry 
leadership, on the study tours to South America. This demonstrated the seriousness with which the 
CoCT was considering the adoption of BRT. As well as showing the CoCT’s serious intention to 
include the existing public transport stakeholders in the reform efforts.  
The second example comes in 2008 when former-Mayor Mrs Helen Zille met in a one-on-one 
meeting with the regional leadership of NTA. The success of the meeting was questionable because at 
the next broader engagement meeting, the NTA leadership walked out. However, it demonstrated a 
commitment from the political leadership to overcome the political challenges that the IPTN project 
faced. The third example is the CoCT Council setting limits on IPTN implementation when it learnt 
that the project costs had ballooned. Combined with this example, was the decision by the Council to 
allow four percent of rates income to contribute towards covering the IPTN project. Although the 
former had a negative impact on the implementation timeframes for Phase one; the financial prudence 
of the political leadership had a positive impact in decreasing the MyCiTi’s subsidy requirements.  
The last example is the initiation of the moderation exercise by the former-TDA 
Commissioner Melissa Whitehead. Moderation has improved the financial sustainability of the IPTN 
project. Moderation allowed minibus-taxi vehicles to re-enter Phase 1 routes, a decision which is in direct 
conflict with the initial intentions of the IPTN plan. However, the moderation exercise proved to be a 
precursor to the drive for hybridity found in the 2015 business plan and onwards.  
Factor five: Adaptability of CoCT’s Transport and Urban Development Authority 
Operating contracts, business and operational plans were changed to respond to the realities of the 
IPTN system, as lessons were learnt through implementation. Three examples demonstrate this point.  
The first example comes from what appeared to be strategy adjustments to engaging with the 
minibus-taxi industry. After the failed attempt to host the first public meeting, the CoCT cancelled all 
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further planned public meetings and instead followed the first public meeting with a ‘summit’ for 
minibus-taxi operators only. This was followed by a one-on-one meeting between former-Mayor Mrs 
Helen Zille and the NTA regional leadership, once it was identified that NTA was a driving force 
behind much of the opposition. This was followed by ongoing engagements with the minibus-taxi 
industry by CoCT officials, but an external consultant was appointed to engage directly with the NTA-
aligned associations. This strategy eventually paid off through the formation of Kidrogen.  
The second example is the willingness of the CoCT’s TDA to form three VOCs instead of two, 
upon the advice of external consultants, Organisational Development Africa. Schalekamp notes in his 
doctoral thesis that the strained relationship between the minibus-taxi associations and Sibanye Bus 
Services was evidence of the political difficulties between the two industries. The willingness of the 
CoCT to opt for a more expensive industry transition arrangement to ensure the smooth running of 
the IPTN services is testament to their capacity to adapt the initial plans to the lessons learnt through 
implementation.  
The third example is the adjustments in the business and operational plans developed between 
2009 to 2017. Almost immediately, in the 2010 plans the CoCT identified factors that would contribute 
to lower than expected operational performance. This remained the case in the 2012 plan and from the 
completion of the moderation exercise in 2013/14, the CoCT embarked on a drive to improve the 
financial sustainability of the IPTN project. This led to the introduction of ‘hybridity’ in the 2015 and 
subsequent plans. The capacity and willingness of the CoCT to adapt the initial plans to develop an 
IPTN that suits the realities of Cape Town has contributed to the IPTN operational successes.  
7.6. Conclusion 
The CoCT’s IPTN project is delayed due to five underlying factors. Three of the factors are negative in 
nature and two of the factors, although causing the project to fall short of its intended outcomes, had 
an overall positive influence on the project. The first cause of delay is distilled to be that the CoCT’s 
political leadership initially failed to recognise that gold-standard BRT was inappropriate for Cape 
Town’s spatial form. The second cause was the ballooned cost of the IPTN project caused by the 
intention to replace all existing public transport operators in the phase one footprint with MyCiTi 
services. The third cause comes down to municipal finance legislation that restricts government funding 
to three-year cycles.  This restriction coupled with the CoCT Council’s prudent decision to limit IPTN 
implementation to the availability of national treasury funding was a significant contributor to the 
delays in achieving each milestone. These three factors collectively explain MyCiTi’s lower ridership, 
higher operational costs, and longer implementation timeframes.  
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There are two remaining factors that have caused the MyCiTi project to meet almost all of its 
intended objectives. The first factor is prudent political leadership which played an active role in 
ensuring that the project was able to overcome challenges in the industry transition negotiations and to 
implement the moderation exercise to ensure that the IPTN project remained financially sustainable. 
The second factor that positively contributed to the outcomes found in 2017, was the adaptability of 
the CoCT’s transport authority, TDA. TDA displayed a willingness to critique the IPTN project in its 
original form, worked to suggest alternatives, and was flexible to change operational practices and 
industry transition solutions to ensure that the original ‘intended outcomes’ remained achievable.  
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8  Case five: George Local municipality 
8.1. Introduction  
This chapter begins with an overview of the city of George prior to the initiation of the IPTN project. 
The overview provides details on population, unemployment, GDP growth, car ownership and a brief 
description of the layout of the city. It gives a detailed break-down of transport modal choices, 
affordability of public transport, the dominant issues that users have with transport and the dominant 
factors that influence modal choice, as found in the 2013 NHTS.  The section concludes with an 
overview of the institutional arrangements that preceded the transformation efforts of the IPTN 
project.  
The overview follows with an evaluation of the success or delay of the IPTN programme. The 
achieved outcomes are assessed against the intended outcomes set the George Local Municipality 
(GLM), as defined by the IPTN design parameters outlined in the PTSAP. 
This is followed by a detailed timeline analysis of events and decisions taken on the IPTN 
project between 2003 and 2016. All the above sections are analysed and discussed in the concluding 
section which details the proposed factors which caused the outcomes of the IPTN project as at the end 
of 2017.  
8.2. City overview 
At the time of renewed interest in transforming the public transport industry, 2007, the population in 
George was estimated to be 148 000 residents with an unemployment rate of 18 percent in 2009 (George, 
no date). The GDP of George grew by an average of 4.11 percent between 2000 and 2010 (George, no 
date). There is limited data on car ownership in George, but it can be inferred that car ownership 
increased over the period 2003 to 2013. In the Western Cape, car ownership increased from an estimated 
45.5 percent in 2003 (Lombard et al., 2007) to 48.4 percent in 2013 (Statistics South Africa, 2014b). In 
the District Municipality of Eden, in which George is the largest city, 33.5 percent of households had 
access to a car in 2013 (Statistics South Africa, 2014b). George consists of the outlying suburbs of 
Wilderness and Herolds Bay, with Blanco and Heatherlands in the West, Denneoord in the North, 
Glenwood in the East and Thembalethu and Pacoltsdorp in the South.  
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The state of transport 
Minibus-taxi use is the dominant mode of travel for all household trips in the Eden District, at 35.1 
percent, followed by ‘walking all the way’ with 28.6 percent of households using this mode. Thereafter, 
26.3 percent of households use private cars either as a passenger or driver, 4.6 percent use a bus and 1.1 
percent use a train as their mode of travel. 
In the Western Cape, 20.3 percent of households spent more than 20 percent of their 
household income on public transport in 2013. While, the majority of households, 56.7 percent, spent 
less than 10 percent on public transport in 2013.  
The most important transport related problems for respondents to the 2013 NHTS in the Eden 
District was no buses available, 18.1 percent of respondents expressed this dissatisfaction. The second 
biggest concern was minibus-taxi trips being too expensive, with 12.8 percent of households raising this 
issue; followed by rude drivers, 9.1 percent of households noted this dissatisfaction. Modal choice in the 
Eden District is determined most significantly by travel cost, travel time and comfort with 43.1 percent, 
30.4 percent and 7.1 percent of households citing these factors respectively.  
Institutional arrangements of the local public transport sector 
Public transport in George is provided by an estimated 250 minibus-taxi operators. They are organised 
into three taxi associations, namely Uncedo, the George Taxi Owners Forum and the George 
Huurmotorvereeniging. These owners operate an estimated 400 operating licenses. There is also a 
single conventional bus operator that held operating permits prior the IPTN project called Louis 
Muller Transport (George Municipality, 2011).   
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8.3. System outcomes evaluation 
 
Figure 13: Map of GoGeorge IPTN (Source: GoGeorge website) 
The Western Cape Department of Transport and Public Works (DTPW) had been engaged in the idea 
of transforming the public transport sector in the George Local Municipality (GLM) since 2003. The 
introduction of the PTSAP, the DTPW and GLM found a renewed impetus to transform the industry. 
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Table 5: Comparison between intended outcomes and achieved outcomes for all components of IPTN design 
 Criteria Intended outcome Achieved outcome 
A
cc
es
si
b
ili
ty
 
Walking distance to 
trunk/feeder stop 
400-600m1 Delayed due to partial 
project roll-out 
Headway High: 15mins; Low: 1 hour1 Peak: 10 mins headway 
Off-peak: 30 mins 
headway2 
Daily operational hours 14-18 hours1 16 hours2 
Weekly operational days 7 days1 7 days2 
Percentage of population 
within walking distance of 
trunk/feeder 
85% of urban built 
environment3 
Delayed due to partial 
project roll-out1 
Se
rv
ic
e 
q
u
al
it
y 
Vehicle and 
station/interchange 
experience 
Simple, safe, clean stations 
and vehicles, with some 
universally accessibility1 
Achieved1 
User service experience Scheduled, reliable, 
affordable, and integrated 
schedules, fares and routes.1 
Achieved1 
In
fr
as
tr
u
ct
u
re
 
Roads Roads able to withstand 
rear-axle vehicles with high 
loads2 
Achieved1 
Vehicles  Combination of standard, 
midi and mini buses. High 
and low floor.1  
Achieved1 
Fare system Pre-board electronic fare 
payment1 
Started with paper-ticket 
system1; upgraded to 
electronic payment4 
Stations Simple stops. Either a pole 
and bus stop sign or bus 
stop with single shelter5 
Achieved1 
O
p
er
at
io
n
s 
Passenger trips per day 51 6281 12 4006 
Fare revenue per annum R120 500 367 (2013/14)1 R37 301 620.00 (2016/17)7 
First operations date January 20121 December 20142 
All operations date July 20152 Phase 4, 5 and 6 to be 
launched2 
 
 
                                                                    
1 George Municipality, 2011 
2 GIPTN, 2018 
3 Aboo and Robertson, 2016 
4 “GoGeorge smart card on its way”, 2018 
5 Robertson, Aboo and Daniels, 2016 
6  National Treasury, 2017 
7 George Local Municipality, 2017 
8GIPTN consultant, personal communication, 2017, October 2 
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GoGeorge was launched three years later than intended, with phases four, five and six are yet to be 
launched. Ridership is four times lower than expected and fare revenue is correspondingly lower as well. 
The GLM and the DTPW continues to pursue the implementation of GoGeorge and therefore the 
project is assessed to be delayed.  
The initial plan was to operate a system for seven days a week at head ways of 15mins in the 
peak and one hour in the off-peak, operating between 14 and 18 hours a day and bringing 85 percent of 
the urban population within 400 to 600 metres of a bus stop. Most of the intended outcomes have 
already been achieved. GoGeorge operates at headways of 10mins in the peak and 30mins in the off-
peak for 16 hours a day, seven days a week. The only delayed outcome is having 85 percent of the 
population within 400-600 metres of a station, but this is due to the fact that the last three phases are 
yet to be launched.  
The intended quality of the service was achieved, as well as the intended vehicles, roads and 
stations criteria was also achieved. The system started on a paper-based ticket system which was due to 
be upgraded to an electronic fare collection system in 2018.
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Figure 14: Timeline of events between 2003 and 2015, in relation to institutional arrangements and industry transition. 
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8.4. project timeline 
The beginning 
GoGeorge started in 2003 as a community integration project between Thembalethu, the Apartheid-
era blacks-only area, and the George CBD. A year later, the corridor project evolved into the George 
Mobility Strategy as a joint project between the DPTW, GLM, and the Eden District Municipality. 
The George Mobility Strategy sought to develop a comprehensive city-wide bus network, rather than 
a single corridor project (Mooiman and Esson, 2013; Robertson, Aboo and Daniels, 2016). The George 
Mobility Strategy was renamed to the George Integrated Public Transport Network (GIPTN), 
branded as GoGeorge. The bus system was first designed in 2006 (GIPTN consultant, personal 
communication, 2017, October 2). Provincial government initiated engagements with the minibus-taxi 
industry in 2007. The objective of the initial engagements was to determine the willingness of the 
minibus-taxi industry to transform into a formally-contracted bus company (Aboo and Robertson, 
2016; GIPTN consultant, personal communication, 2017, October 2). 
 “Let’s have a conversation to see if you [minibus-taxi industry] would be willing to transform, given 
that we don’t have the legislation to be able to put this in place.” (GIPTN consultant, personal 
communication, 2017, October 2) 
At the time, the National Land Transport Transition Act (NLTTA), of 2000, was the governing 
legislation. It only allowed for a ‘provincial government, transport authority or core city’ to negotiate 
with public transport service providers, where the service provider already had an existing interim 
contract. The NLTTA was replaced by the National Land Transport Act (NLTA), of 2009. The 
NLTA made provision for a 12-year negotiated contract with a service provider, once only, where the 
service provider could be an ‘operator of unscheduled services’ as well as other operators listed in section 
41(2) of the NLTA. The NLTA also placed the responsibility for planning, implementation and 
management of IPTNs with local municipalities. Provincial government was given the responsibility 
to reinforce local governments who lacked the capacity and resources to fulfil their land transport 
duties. 
The PTSAP was launched in 2007, which diverted government attention to the major cities in 
preparation for the 2010 World Cup (Aboo and Robertson, 2016; GIPTN consultant, personal 
communication, 2017, October 2). This slowed the progress in the industry engagements as the DTPW 
had to shift its focus to implementing public transport services in Cape Town on key World Cup 
orientated routes.  
The 2009 NLTA that followed the PTSAP changed the public transport contracting authority 
from the provincial government to local government. The NLTA enabled the GIPTN to be 
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implemented but it is also created a new obstacle for the project. The challenge that the GIPTN project 
faced following this legislation change is that the GLM lacked the capacity to plan, implement and 
manage an IPTN on its own. To overcome this change in institutional responsibility, the DTPW 
entered into two agreements to establish a partnership with the GLM, namely the Inter-government 
Agreement (IGA) and the Financial Agreement (FA) The consultations prior to the agreements took 
two years to conclude, starting in 2009 and concluding in April 2011 (Mooiman and Esson, 2013; 
GIPTN consultant, personal communication, 2017, October 2).  
The IGA, saw the two government spheres become jointly responsible for the planning, 
management and funding of the GIPTN. The GLM gained engineering, financial, town planning, legal 
skills, and institutional knowledge, from the DTPW, to enable it to manage the GIPTN system. While 
through the FA, the DTPW agreed to subsidise the operational deficits of the GIPTN (George Local 
Municipality [GLM], 2011; Mooiman & Esson, 2013). A full transfer of skills from the DTPW to the 
GLM was to occur by July 2016 (GLM, 2011) but this had not happened by September 2017 (GIPTN 
consultant, personal communication, 2017, October 2) 
“The local and provincial government sign the IGA and the FA and province agreed to underwrite 
the entire thing because they believed in the transformation” (GIPTN consultant, personal 
communication, 2017, October 2). 
Industry transition 
The formal negotiations were preceded by industry engagements with the three local minibus-taxi 
associations and the conventional bus operator (Aboo and Robertson, 2016). The engagements went a 
long way to build trust between the stakeholders, however two issues in the formal negotiations delayed 
the implementation date by two years (GIPTN consultant, personal communication, 2017, October 2). 
Once the inter-government relationship was outlined government re-initiated engagements 
with the existing local public transport industry. The first ‘Affected Persons Register’ (APR) was 
opened in June 2011 and a second APR in 2013. The register sought to identify all industry stakeholders 
that wished to participate in the GIPTN (Aboo and Robertson, 2016; GIPTN consultant, personal 
communication, 2017, October 2). The APR was followed by the signing of a MoA between 
government and the industry in September 2011. The first formal industry negotiations session took 
place in November 2011. (Mooiman and Esson, 2013; Aurecon, 2016; GIPTN consultant, personal 
communication, 2017, October 2). The government hoped to be able to conclude negotiations quickly 
however, the late start in 2011 meant that negotiations only began in earnest in 2012. And by June 2012, 
negotiations had stalled for six months on the issue of operating license compensation.  
 107 
The original idea put to the industry during the engagements in 2007 did not include operating 
license compensation. The industry agreed to this arrangement, in principle. The arrangement was that 
the industry would relinquish their operating licenses and in return they would receive company shares, 
employment benefits and training. However, by 2010, Cape Town, Johannesburg, Tshwane and 
Nelson Mandela Bay municipalities had agreed to compensate the industry for their operating licenses 
in their IPTN projects. This set a precedent for compensation for operator licenses, which the industry 
in George now demanded (Mooiman and Esson, 2013; Aboo and Robertson, 2016; GIPTN consultant, 
personal communication, 2017, October 2). 
Operator compensation ballooned the cost of the GIPTN. As a result, provincial government 
could no longer solely underwrite the project, therefore additional funding was sought from National 
Treasury. After six months of discussions, George was included as the 13th city in the Public Transport 
Infrastructure and Systems Grant (PTISG) and for these six months the industry negotiations stalled 
until funding was secured. (GIPTN consultant, personal communication, 2017, October 2) 
“…it was then decided to go to national and request for George to be the 13th city [in the PTISG]. 
Constitutionally they could not deny us finding even though we are not one of the [original] 12 cities. 
We were able to present a strong enough argument as well as demonstrate our progress that they 
[National Treasury] agreed to grant us funding. At the end of 2012, we [George] became the 13th 
city” (GIPTN consultant, personal communication, 2017, October 2) 
With extra funding secured, negotiations could continue. Agreement over operator license 
compensation was reached in June 2013. Each operator had to sign a Participation Commitment 
Declaration Agreement before compensation could be issued (GIPTN consultant, personal 
communication, 2017, October 2). The operator license compensation mechanism was determined 
through a lengthy process. Firstly, a moratorium on operating licenses was placed on issuing new or 
renewing licenses in 2010. Once operating licenses were determined to be valid, they were placed in ‘safe-
keeping’ for the duration of the negotiations until compensation was paid. Licenses in ‘safe-keeping’ 
were renewed every six months.  
After determining the number of valid operating licenses in George, the value of the minibus-
taxi industry had to be determined through route evaluations. The route evaluations were determined 
from the data collected in an economic baseline survey conducted in 2007, the Current Public 
Transport Record from 2009 and the PRE-study completed in 2010. It was agreed compensation would 
be determined on a sliding scale.  
There were three options available to operators: buy-in, buy-out or do not engage. Those that 
opted to ‘buy-in’ were compensated for the first five years of the operating contract. They received 
R5500 per month for the first operating license, R4500 for the second, R3500 for the third and R1500 
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for the fourth. Those that opted to ‘buy-out’ were compensated once off, also using a sliding scale. An 
operator was paid R350 000 for the first operating license, R250 000 for the second, R150 000 for the 
third and R100 000 for the fourth and every subsequent operating license thereafter. Those that chose 
to ‘not engage’ they would continue to operate until the end of their operating license period but were 
not guaranteed to have their licenses renewed. 
Interaction between the three spheres of government  
Funding from National Treasury solved the compensation problem, but it introduced an issue with 
fleet ownership. Initially the Vehicle Operating Company (VOC) was to own the fleet, but national 
government funding conditions required that the fleet be owned by the Municipality. This was a 
difficult point for the industry stakeholders because the operators were accustomed to owning their 
vehicles. However, after four months of negotiations the industry agreed to the new fleet ownership 
arrangement. It was agreed that the GLM would purchase the vehicles using capital funds, with the 
permission of National Treasury, due to the precedent set in other cities. The GLM would then transfer 
the ownership of the vehicles to the VOC at the end of the useful life of the vehicles, which was 
determined to be 12 years, or at the earliest possible time with the permission of National Treasury. The 
new fleet ownership model was agreed and signed in October 2013 (GIPTN consultant, personal 
communication, 2017, October 2).  
Following the agreement of the fleet ownership model, the government and the existing 
operators signed the GIPTN operating contract with George Link (Pty) Ltd on 31 October 2013. George 
Link was the VOC formed by the existing public transport operators. Although the negotiations were 
incomplete, the contract was signed because 31 October 2013 was set as a completion milestone in the 
agreement between GLM and National Treasury. It was necessary to meet this milestone for the 
GIPTN to receive the next tranche of funding from the National Treasury. Therefore, a process of 
‘annexure negotiations’ began following the signing of the operator contract.  
“In between that, national says there are specific goals that need to be hit in order for your tranche 
of money to be released. One of the goals was them signing a contract. We signed it on the 31 October 
2013 because we made it a milestone, of course we did not think that we would hit so many glitches. 
But it was contingent on them signing all the annexures before the contract could be implemented. 
At the beginning of 2014, we started to finalise the annexures. The annexures had all the detail 
around pricing, the contract rates per kilometre, the pre-operations costs, branding, training etc.” 
(GIPTN consultant, personal communication, 2017, October 2) 
During the fleet ownership negotiations, the NDoT introduced a framework that prevented any 
national government funding from being used for anything that is not universally accessible 
(Robertson, Aboo and Daniels, 2016; GIPTN consultant, personal communication, 2017, October 2). 
This complicated matters for the GIPTN team because it believed that a mixed-traffic bus service with 
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a fleet that comprised of standard buses, midibuses and minibuses was the best solution for George 
(GIPTN consultant, personal communication, 2017, October 2). The trouble that this presented was 
that there were no universally accessible minibuses available in South Africa and to import one would 
have ballooned costs. 
“National was so focused on doing BRT BRT BRT, we came in and said we are not doing BRT, 
we are doing a conventional bus service. We said that we would like to have a mini-bus vehicle but 
there are no universally accessible mini-buses in the country. To import one would cost the same 
price as bringing a standard bus which disrupts your entire funding plan…that threw a wonderful 
spanner in the works” (GIPTN consultant, personal communication, 2017, October 2) 
It took six months of deliberation between the GIPTN team and the NDoT to reach an 
agreement in which the GIPTN team would design and manufacture the first universally accessible 
minibus-taxi vehicle. Even though this was a significant achievement for the country, it came at an 
increased project cost and time delay for the GIPTN project. Following the signing of a manufacturing 
contract with Mercedes-Benz in May 2014, a further nine months were added for vehicle design and 
manufacture, before the vehicles could be used in the system (GIPTN consultant, personal 
communication, 2017, October 2).
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Figure 15: Timeline of events from 2014 to 2015, in relation to the launch of the first three phases 
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Launching the GoGeorge service   
Due to this delay, on 8 December 2014, phase one had to run without minibuses (GIPTN consultant, 
personal communication, 2017, October 2). Phase one was launched three and a half years after the 
original intended roll-out date. The initial lack of universally accessible vehicles increased the start-up 
operation costs (GIPTN consultant, personal communication, 2017, October 2) as it was more 
expensive to run standard buses than minibuses. Standard buses also excerpt greater wear on roads than 
minibuses. Many of the routes that ran through suburbs were intended for the minibus-taxi fleet and 
therefore the road infrastructure was not upgraded. These roads were damaged as a result, which had a 
negative impact on initial public acceptance and required unexpected spending on maintenance. 
“National refused to allow us to use the current minibus as it stood. Which affected our sequence 
of phases for rolling out.” (GIPTN consultant, personal communication, 2017, October 2). 
The GIPTN project saw three significant leadership changes in the lead-up to the launch of phase 
one. The first was the unfortunate loss of Tom Queba, the lead negotiator for the minibus-taxi 
industry, who was shot dead in May 2014 (Caxton News Service, 2016). In the same month, Donald 
Grant replaced Robin Carlisle as the Western Cape MEC for Transport. These two changes stalled the 
project for three months before the annexure negotiations started up again in August 2014. Later that 
year, the minibus-taxi industry’s lead advisor, Jonathan Bloom, left the taxi negotiating team in 
November 2014 (GIPTN consultant, personal communication, 2017, October 2).  
“In May 2014, the lead negotiator at the time was Mr Tom Queba. Mr Queba was assassinated. 
This throws the entire systems out of kilter, because none of the industry members were willing to 
step up to take over as lead negotiator for fear of also being assassinated. The project stalled and in 
between we had a change in MEC which made life very complicated because he was not briefed. 
Literally, Tom was assassinated and MEC Donald took the post up a week later which made life 
complicated because there was now no history.” (GIPTN consultant, personal communication, 2017, 
October 2). 
Phase two and three were rolled out in February 2015 and May 2015, respectively. There were 
minor contestations around the routing of Phase three because the VOC disagreed with the GIPTN 
team on the need for transfers. As a result, at the launch of Phase three, the VOC ran the buses on the 
routes that the taxi operators previously ran. However, this issue was resolved within two weeks and 
the VOC agreed to run the routes as per the instructions of the GIPTN team (GIPTN consultant, 
personal communication, 2017, October 2). 
Following the launch of phase three, in July 2015, a group of dissident minibus-taxi operators 
protested against the GIPTN in opposition to the compensation model agreed in June 2013 (GoGeorge, 
2015; Sinxo, 2015). The protest, which was largely peaceful, began in Thembalethu, which was due for 
phase four launch in August 2015. The following month, on the eve of the launch of phase four, violent 
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protests erupted also instigated by a group of dissident minibus-taxi operators who had not agreed to 
the negotiation terms (ANA, 2015; Herman, 2015; Koyana, 2015; GIPTN consultant, personal 
communication, 2017, October 2). The protestors were believed to be a part of the UNCEDO 
association, which was affected by the phase four services. A third round of protests flared up again in 
October 2015, on the same compensation issue as the protest in August and July 2015 (Asmal, 2015; 
Stander, 2015).  
“The protestors burnt the buses which threw the phase four discussions out of the window for quite 
a long time because it boiled down to these disgruntled operators, who worked on the premise that 
the system was never going to come into play, so they never signed any of the registrations in 2011 
and 2013. They did not sign the MoA. And now it is all very political” (GIPTN consultant, personal 
communication, 2017, October 2) 
By mid-2017, the government had reviewed the industry negotiation processes to verify that the 
disgruntled operators were not denied an opportunity to influence the negotiation outcomes. The 
court found in the government’s favour. However, by the end of 2017, phase four had yet to be 
launched. 
8.5. Analysis of case study findings 
The George Local Municipality had good intentions with its IPTN project. There was positive 
economic growth and increasing car ownership in the region., along with a dissatisfaction amongst 
public transport users of the quality of public transport available in 2007.  
George, on many fronts, was ahead of the national developments to improve public transport, 
but it was the development of the NLTA that ultimately gave GLM and DTPW the legal framework 
within which the GIPTN project could be implemented. The NLTA was preceded by the PTSAP, 
which saw the introduction of BRT as the new public transport mode of choice. Even though, the 
PTSAP was a catalyst for change, it also proved to be an impediment to the GIPTN project reaching its 
intended outcomes. Through the analysis of the findings, the underlying reasons for the achieved 
outcomes falling short of the intended outcomes is distilled down to two factors: lack of capacity at the 
NDoT, and multiple changes in leadership. 
Factor one: Lack of capacity at the National Department of Transport 
Prior to the PTSAP, the public transport service providers in George were satisfied with transferring 
their operating licenses for VOC shares without the need for compensation. However, the PTSAP saw 
Cape Town and Nelson Mandela Bay compensate minibus-taxi operators for their operating licenses 
and vehicles. This created the precedent for compensation in George, geographically half-way between 
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the two metropoles. This increased the industry transition cost and necessitated DPTW and GLM to 
approach the NDoT and National Treasury for funding.  
This decision in turn affected both the fleet ownership model and the fleet design 
characteristics. The fleet ownership model changed considerably from the fleet being owned by the 
operating company to the fleet being owned by the municipality, with the ownership agreed to be 
transferred to the VOC at a future date. The fleet design characteristics necessitated the design and 
manufacture of a new universally accessible minibus-taxi vehicle, unique for South Africa. These fleet 
changes contributed to the delayed implementation timeline; and increased cost through the design and 
manufacture of the new vehicle, as well as increased infrastructure maintenance cost through the need 
to use inappropriate vehicles on select routes in the initial stages of the phases one, two and three.  
“One decision, the knock-on operational effect is phenomenal and if you don’t fully comprehend it,  
you will end in a series of problems” (GIPTN consultant, personal communication, 2017, October 
2) 
Therefore, it is proposed that the GIPTN project has taken longer to implement, has cost more 
than the initial budget and is yet to reach its forecast ridership figures because the PTSAP set a 
precedent, and conditions, which were misaligned with the conditions found in George. It is further 
proposed that the NDoT lacked the nuanced local knowledge of the South African context required to 
develop plans relevant for its cities and towns. It is also proposed that the NDoT lacked the capacity to 
adapt national plans to the nuanced conditions of local contexts.  
‘The biggest lesson learned in George is that it is the institutional arrangements and the alignment 
of the interests of all affected stakeholders that take the most time and are the biggest determinant 
of success and failure. These stakeholders include the Municipality, Provincial and National 
government, politicians, the taxi industry and the public.’ (Mooiman and Esson, 2013) 
Factor two: Multiple changes in leadership  
Throughout the GIPTN project there were multiple political leadership changes. Mooiman and Esson 
find that political stability and buy-in are crucial factors in the success of a multi-year, multi-stakeholder 
project.  
“There was a series of HoD’s that went through at province that made the carry-through of the 
project slightly complicated because you needed the political will to go forth” (GIPTN consultant, 
personal communication, 2017, October 2). 
The year before the launch of the first three phases saw leadership changes in the province and 
the minibus-taxi industry. These two stakeholders were the driver of the GIPTN project and the most 
significant opponent to the project, respectively. When the project reaches the point of launching phase 
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four, the most contentious phase of the GIPTN, we see violent protests driven by a group of dissident 
minibus-taxi operators. By the end of this research period, end-2017, phase four was yet to be launched.  
Therefore, it is proposed that the delays in implementation found at the end of 2017, and 
therefore the continued delay in reaching the forecasted ridership figures and the continued unexpected 
pressure on the fiscus through the need for unintended subsidies, is due to the political leadership, in 
both provincial government and the minibus-taxi industry, changes in quick succession that preceded 
the launch of GoGeorge.   
It is proposed that the current delays would not have been as lengthy had the provincial 
leadership and minibus-taxi leadership remained unchanged, because it was under the leadership of 
MEC Robin Carlisle, Tom Queba and Jonathan Bloom that the GIPTN team were able to navigate the 
political complexities through the most difficult phases of the negotiations.  
8.6. Conclusion 
In conclusion, it is proposed that the GIPTN project is delayed due to a lack of capacity in the NDoT 
to develop plans that are relevant to local contexts, a lack of capacity in the NDoT to adapt their plans 
to local contexts and the instability caused by quick-successive changes in political leadership. The 
GIPTN project is an example of what could have been achieved through stakeholder engagement. 
While it also stands as an example of the risks of an attempt to implement a one-size-fits-all approach 
to transformation projects.   
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9 Discussion  
9.1. Introduction 
This chapter considers all five cases in a cross-case analysis. The chapter investigates whether a national 
narrative exists that explains the delay of the five IPTN case studies. It does this through a comparative 
analysis of the system outcomes evaluation, in terms of each characteristic identified from the PTSAP, 
and an analysis of similarities found in the underlying factors  for each case.  
9.2.  comparative System outcomes evaluation  
The NDoT set out to reform the public transport industry through the PTSAP. In addition to the 
strategy to reform all three dimensions of the public transport industry, the NDoT provided 
quantifiable design and project criteria for the 13 IPTN projects across South Africa. These criteria – 
accessibility, service quality, infrastructure, and operations, are detailed in the table, below. Each City 
outlined their own IPTN criteria, against which each case study was evaluated in the earlier chapters. 
Overall, the five case studies found that the IPTN’s are delayed in comprehensively achieving their 
criteria.  
Accessibility 
The NDoT aimed for 85 percent of all urban residents to be within 1000m of a trunk or feeder system. 
The Cities, bar the CoT, intended to build more comprehensive systems. CoCT and CoJ aimed at 75 
percent and 85 percent of residents, respectively, to be within 500m of a station. The GLM allowed 
itself a range of 85 percent of residents within 400 to 600m, while the NMBM set the most ambitious 
target of ‘all citizens’ within 400m of a station.  The CoT aimed to have ‘most’ residents within 1000m 
of a station or stop. All Cities were delayed in achieving this criterion because none of the projects had 
implemented all IPTN phases by the end of 2017.  
The service headway range set by the NDoT was largely achieved, with delay found in George.  
NMBM’s assessment of ‘high frequencies’ during the pilot phase was considered to mean ten-minute 
headways in the peak. CoT operated services with peak trunk headways between seven and ten-minutes, 
and feeder headways between ten and 20 minutes. CoJ ran all their IPTN routes at headways of five 
minutes in the peak. CoCT operated their MyCiTi services at an average headway of nine minutes on 
trunk routes and 28 minutes on their feeder routes. GLM ran their services at headways ranging 
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between five and 15 minutes on GoGeorge’s trunk routes and between 20 and 35 minutes on feeder 
routes.  
IPTN services were to run for seven days a week between 16 and 24 hours a day, as set by the 
NDoT. All five IPTN project ran services for seven days week, including NMBM during their pilot 
phase. On operational hours NMBM, CoT, and CoCT ran services for 15 hours a day, only one hour 
short of the NDoT’s objective. The CoJ and GLM ran services for 16 hours a day.  
In terms of accessibility, all five IPTN projects were in a state of delay. The only criterion that 
all five IPTN projects had achieved was providing services for seven days a week. Similarly, none of the 
five IPTN projects had achieved the walking distance-population percentage criterion. This 
demonstrates that the timeline within which the five case study cities were expected to achieve 85 
percent of residents being within 1000m of a station or stop, was too ambitious.  
The GLM did not achieve the peak headway criteria that the NDoT hoped to achieve. It 
should be noted that George is a non-metro, but also a non-rural, city and therefore an IPTN service 
with the headways desired by the NDoT may not have been an appropriate design. Throughout the 
GoGeorge case study it was found that the IPTN project team intentionally designed a system that was 
suited for the local context and that may not have met the guiding criteria set by the NDoT.  
This dissertation did not unpack why the CoT and the NMBM did not operate for at least 16 
hours a day; however, in Cape Town the operational hours decreased following the moderation of 
services conducted to curb operational costs. This could prove that 16 to 24-hour operations was an 
unrealistic target, given the high operational costs of the IPTN systems.  
It should also be noted that the dominant reason for NMBM being delayed in achieving its 
accessibility criteria is because no services were running at the end of 2017.
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Table 6: Comparative analysis of all five IPTN's system performance 
 Criteria PTSAP Nelson Mandela Bay Tshwane Johannesburg Cape Town George 
A
cc
es
si
b
ili
ty
 
Walking distance to 
trunk/feeder stop 
Within 1000m of 
trunk or feeder 
Distance: 400m 
Delayed due to partial 
project roll-out 
Distance: 1000m 
Delayed due to partial 
project roll-out 
Distance: 500m 
Delayed due to partial 
project roll-out 
Distance: 500m 
Delayed due to partial 
project roll-out 
Distance: 400-600m 
Delayed due to partial 
project roll-out   
Headway (Peak time) Trunk: 5-10 mins 
Feeder: 10-30mins 
‘High frequency’ 
during pilot phase 
Trunk: 7-10mins; 
Feeder: 10-20mins 
All routes: 5 mins  
 
Trunk: 9 mins 
Feeder: 28 mins 
Trunk: 5-15 mins 
Feeder:20–35mins 
Daily operational 
hours 
16 – 24 hours a day 15 hours a day during 
pilot phase  
15 hours 16 hours 15 hours 16 hours 
Weekly operational 
days 
7 days 7 days during pilot 
phase 
7 days 7 days 7 days 7 days 
Percentage of 
population within 
walking distance of 
trunk/feeder 
85% of metro 
residents 
Population: ‘All’ 
Delayed due to partial 
project roll-out 
Population: ‘Most’ 
Delayed due to partial 
project roll-out 
Population: 85% 
Delayed due to partial 
project roll-out 
Population: 75% 
Delayed due to partial 
project roll-out 
Population: 85% 
Delayed due to partial 
project roll-out 
Se
rv
ic
e 
q
u
al
it
y 
Vehicle and 
station/interchange 
experience 
Safe, clean, modern 
and universally 
accessible stations and 
vehicles. Maps and 
real-time information. 
Safe, clean, modern 
and universally 
accessible stations and 
vehicles. Maps, 
timelines provided, 
but no real-time 
information 
Safe, clean, modern 
and universally 
accessible stations and 
vehicles. Maps, 
timelines and real-
time information. 
Unclean, no real-time 
information, maps 
missing, partial 
universal accessibility.  
Safe, clean, modern 
and universally 
accessible stations and 
vehicles. Maps, 
timelines and real-
time information. 
Simple, safe, clean 
stations and vehicles, 
with universally 
accessibility. Maps, 
timelines provided 
but no real-time 
information. 
User service 
experience 
Scheduled, reliable, 
affordable, and 
integrated schedules, 
fares and routes. 
Scheduled, reliable, 
affordable, and 
integrated schedules, 
fares and routes 
during pilot phase 
Scheduled, reliable, 
affordable, and 
integrated schedules, 
fares and routes. 
Scheduled, reliable, 
affordable, integrated 
schedules, fares and 
routes  
Scheduled, reliable, 
affordable, and 
integrated schedules, 
fares and routes. 
Scheduled, reliable, 
affordable, and 
integrated schedules, 
fares and routes. 
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 Criteria PTSAP Nelson Mandela Bay Tshwane Johannesburg Cape Town George 
In
fr
as
tr
u
ct
u
re
 
Roads Dedicated median bus 
ways with coloured 
lanes.  
Partially dedicated lanes 
in the median. 
Trunk: Dedicated, 
median lanes, priority at 
intersections.  
Feeder/Comp routes: 
Mixed traffic-some 
priority. 
Trunk: Dedicated 
median bus ways.  
Feeder: mixed traffic. 
Trunk: Median, 
dedicated lanes. 
Feeders: mixed traffic. 
All roads in mixed 
traffic; upgraded to 
withstand rear-axle 
vehicles with high 
loads. 
Vehicles  Modern buses with 
level boarding, and 
multiple wide doors.  
Articulated buses with 
multiple doors on 
both sides, low floor. 
Low floor buses with 
level boarding. 18m 
articulated bus and 
12m rigid bus. 
High floor buses with 
level boarding. 18m 
articulated and 12m 
rigid vehicles. 
High and low floor 
buses. 18m articulated 
vehicles, 12m and 9m 
rigid vehicles 
Combination of 
standard, midi and 
mini buses. High and 
low floor 
Fare system Integrated fare 
structure using 
electronic pre-board 
payment 
Paper ticket fare 
system. 
Initially paper-ticket 
system; upgraded to 
electronic payment 
Initially paper-ticket 
system; upgraded to 
electronic payment. 
Initially paper-ticket 
system; migrated to 
electronic payment. 
Initially paper-ticket 
system; intention to 
upgrade in 2018. 
Stations Secure, well-lit and 
easily accessible 
enclosed stations with 
dignified design.  
Centralised median 
lane platforms and 
kerbside stops 
Enclosed, attractive 
design with kerbside 
bus stops. 
Enclosed, attractive 
design and kerbside 
bus stops 
Enclosed stations and 
kerbside bus stops 
Simple stops. Either a 
pole and bus stop sign 
or bus stop with 
single shelter 
O
p
er
at
io
n
s 
Passenger trips per 
day 
N/A 51 868 (during pilot 
phase) 
4500 51 389 67 000 12 400 
Fare revenue per 
annum 
N/A R0.00 (2016/17) R5 952 293.00 
(2016/17) 
R126 million 
(2016/17) 
R225 000 000 
(2017/18) 
R37 301 620.00 
(2016/17) 
First operations date Between 2007 and 
2010 
February 2013 
(terminated Nov 2013) 
November 2014 August 2009 Phase 1A 
Milestone 0: May 2011 
Milestone 1: 
November 2013 
Milestone 2: 
September 2013 
Milestone 3: July 2015 
Milestone 4: July 2015 
Phase 1B: October 
2015 
December 2014 
All operations date 2020 None (2016/17) Phase 1 partially 
implemented 
Phase 1C yet to be 
completed 
Phase 1: October 2015 Phase 4, 5 and 6 to be 
launched 
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Service quality 
The NDoT set guidelines that stations, and vehicles should provide a passenger experience that was 
safe, clean, modern and universally accessible. This was achieved in three of the five case studies – CoT, 
CoCT, and CoJ. NMBM and GLM implemented systems that were safe, clean, and universally 
accessible. However, the stations and vehicles were not modern. GLM’s stations were described as 
‘simple’ rather than modern because the system used kerb-side stops rather than enclosed stations. 
NMBM employed kerbside stops during their pilot project with the intention of building enclosed 
stations at a later stage. Rea Vaya’s facilities, although designed to be universally accessible, were found 
to be in a state of disrepair rendering the universal accessibility features null.  The vehicles and stations 
were also unclean and some of the vehicles did not function correctly.  
All five IPTN’s provided maps and timelines, however, in the case of the CoJ maps were 
missing. The NMBM provided maps for the pilot project services. Only the CoCT and the CoT 
provided real-time information at their stations. The CoJ had intended to implement real time 
information however the displays were not in working order.  
All five IPTN’s implemented services were scheduled, reliable, and partially integrated. 
Although the IPTN’s offered affordable services, more affordable services were still available in 
Johannesburg, Cape Town, Tshwane and NMBM. The IPTN’s were deemed to be partially-integrated 
because the services were integrated amongst its own routes but not integrated with other services. It is 
however assumed that a contributing factor to the lack of multi-modal integration is the fact that not 
all phases of the IPTN’s were implemented by the end of 2017. 
In terms of providing services that are attractive to existing and potential public transport users, 
only the CoJ and the NMBM were delayed. However, it should be noted that the NMBM was assessed 
to be delayed because no services were running at the end 2017. The CoCT, CoT and the GLM were 
assessed to have either achieved, or exceeded, their service quality criteria. 
Infrastructure 
The NDoT set out guidelines for the core IPTN infrastructure requirements: roads, vehicles, stations 
and fare payment systems. Roads had to be dedicated coloured lanes in the median; vehicles had to be 
modern buses with level boarding and multiple doors; the fare payment system had to be integrated 
across modes using electronic pre-board payment; and stations had to be enclosed, secure, well-lit and 
easily accessible for all passengers. 
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The five cases employed three different solutions in their IPTN road infrastructure design. 
NMBM services ran in a combination of dedicated lanes and mixed-traffic. While GLM operated their 
services entirely in mixed-traffic. The roads were upgraded in some sections to withstand the greater 
axle-loads of the IPTN buses. The CoJ, CoT and the CoCT all ran their trunk routes in dedicated lanes 
in the medians with priority at intersections. The three case studies also ran their feeder services in 
mixed-traffic with some priority at intersections. The latter three cases came closest to achieving the 
NDoT’s road criteria, however a complete system of trunk routes was found to be unfeasible in all five 
cases.  
Four out of the five cases implemented the types of vehicles the NDoT had envisioned – CoT, 
CoJ, CoCT, and NMBM. However, there was variation in whether the vehicles were low or high floor. 
The CoT and the NMBM implemented low floor buses, the CoJ used high floor buses, and the CoCT 
ran a combination of high and low floor vehicles. The NMBM ran 18-metre buses throughout their 
fleet, while the CoT, CoJ, and CoCT used a combination of sizes to account for the variation in capacity 
requirements across the network. The GLM also employed three vehicle sizes in their IPTN fleet, 
namely low-floor buses similar to the other four case studies, as well as midi-buses and mini-buses.  
All five IPTN’s launched their services using paper ticket fare systems. By the end of 2017, the 
CoT, CoJ, and CoCT had migrated to electronic pre-board ticket systems. Feeder routes on these 
networks used on-board electronic fare payment because passengers alight and board at kerbside stops 
and used enclosed stations when connecting to a trunk route. The NMBM never had the opportunity 
to upgrade from paper-tickets to electronic payment during the pilot project. While the GLM were still 
using paper-tickets by the end of 2017 but intended to upgrade to an electronic fare payment system in 
2018.  
In terms of infrastructure, all five IPTNs are were in a state of delay. Each case had at least one 
design criterion that did not match the desired outcome of the PTSAP - in NMBM, only partially 
dedicated lanes were used, and stations were not enclosed. In the CoT, CoJ, and CoCT feeder vehicles 
ran in mixed traffic and kerb-side stops were used. While in the GLM all vehicles ran in mixed traffic 
and no enclosed stations were used. These variations in implementing the infrastructure requirements 
is due to the PTSAP, at times, being unfeasible for the local contexts.  
Operations 
The NDoT did not set prescribed ridership and fare revenue targets for the IPTN’s to achieve. 
However, each City outlined estimates on the ridership and fare revenue that could be achieved. 
Relative to their own estimates, none of the case studies achieved their ridership or fare revenue targets. 
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By the end of 2017, the CoCT had achieved the highest ridership of 67 000, followed by the CoJ at 51 
389. GLM ranked third with a ridership of 12 400, which was followed by the CoT with a ridership of 
4500. NMBM had not run any services between the end of the pilot project in 2013 and the end of 2017; 
however, during their pilot project, they reported ridership figures of 51 868 at the height of the pilot 
operations.  
Fare revenue follows the same trend. None of the case studies had achieved their targets by the 
end of 2017. The CoCT recorded the highest revenue earnings of R225 million, CoJ follows second with 
R126 million, GLM follows third with R37,3 million, and the CoT recorded earnings of R5,9 million 
for the 2016/17 financial year. NMBM had not run any IPTN services by the end of 2017 and therefore 
no revenue earnings are recorded.  
The NDoT had, however, stipulated operation deadlines. The objective was for all IPTN’s in 
the original 12 cities to be operational by the 2010 FIFA World Cup; and for all IPTN’s to have 
implemented all phases by 2020. Only the CoJ had managed to meet this objective and launched Phase 
1A in August 2009. The CoCT ran World Cup orientated IPTN services, as did NMBM. However, the 
CoCT only officially launched their Phase 1A in May 2011. NMBM placed their IPTN fleet in storage 
after the World Cup until the launch of the pilot project in February 2013. Last to launch their services 
was the CoT and the GLM, in November 2014 and December 2014, respectively.  
By the end of 2017, it seemed impossible that any of the five case studies would meet the 2020 
deadline set by the NDoT. GLM was the closest to meeting the target having implemented three of six 
phases. The CoCT fully implemented phase one and had made progress in phase two construction and 
industry transition. However, implementing phases three and four by 2020 seemed unlikely. The CoJ 
had implemented phases 1A and 1B, with construction on phase 1C well underway. By the end of 2017, 
there was no mention of further phases. The CoT had partially implemented sections of their phase 
one plans by the end of 2017, which was held up by construction and planning delays, but facilitated by 
interim industry transition agreements. NMBM had no services in operation by the end of 2017, 
however plans were afoot for a re-launch of services in 2018.  
In summary, all five case studies’ IPTN operations were delayed. None of the five case studies 
had met their own ridership or fare revenue targets. Only the CoJ had managed to meet the NDoT’s 
objective of launching IPTN services in time for the World Cup. The CoCT and NMBM had partially 
achieved this objective, however official launches did not happen until after 2010. Lastly, the 
implementation of all IPTN phases by 2020 seemed unlikely to be achieved by any of the case studies, 
as at the end of 2017.  
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Overall, the systems outcome evaluation, found that all five case studies, across the accessibility, 
service quality, infrastructure and operations criteria set by the NDoT were delayed. Nationally, the 
PTSAP was not achieving its objectives. The delay in achieving the accessibility, service quality and 
infrastructure criteria pointed to three underlying causes that were inherent to the PTSAP: the 
implementation timeline was too ambitious, the inappropriate nature of the PTSAP for the South 
African urban form, and the associated operational costs for the IPTN’s were unsustainable.  
The section that follows analyses the underlying factors to have caused the operational delays 
found in the all five IPTN’s.   
9.3. similarities in the underlying factors  
The underlying factors causing the IPTN projects to have longer than expected implementation 
timelines and lower than expected ridership and associated fare revenue are trust, political will, capacity-
to-implement, and urban form.  
Trust  
Trust, most evident in the industry transition negotiations, is a key driver of the delay in the IPTN 
projects. This was most notable in NMBM, CoT, CoJ and GLM. In NMBM, both the minibus-taxi 
industry and the local government accused each other of wrong doing, which eventually led to a 
breakdown of trust. In the CoT, a greater degree of trust was evident between the minibus-taxi industry 
and the governing authority, where the minibus-taxi industry allowed the CoT to implement phase 2B 
before industry transition negotiations had concluded. However, the risks were mitigated through an 
interim compensation agreement. In the CoJ, a lack of trust between the minibus-taxi industry and 
government led to the creation of UTAF. The lack of trust also necessitated two years of engagement 
to convince the Phase 1A affected industry to transition to the IPTN project. Consequently, trust 
improved, hence Phase 1B benefitted from the certainty created when CoJ delivered on Phase 1A. While 
in the GLM, leadership changes in the minibus-taxi industry negotiation team and in the DTPW, 
shortly before Phase 4 was due to launch, had negatively impacted trust and affected the ability of the 
GLM to continue implementing the IPTN.  
Given the history of the relationship between the minibus-taxi industry and government, the 
importance of trust in the implementation of the IPTN projects was to be expected. The IPTN projects 
come after decades of mistrust between the two stakeholders, dating back to 1985. The national 
government has, however, made efforts to improve industry consultation to build and aid the 
government’s goal of industry formalisation. The NTTT included industry stakeholders in its panel as 
it conducted public hearings, unfortunately, its recommendations were met with resistance from the 
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industry and failed to be implemented. The next attempt at formalisation was the recapitalisation 
programme, led by national government, which involved lengthy consultation processes with national 
taxi mother bodies. The recapitalisation programme was accepted by the industry and is relatively 
successful, in comparison to previous formalisation attempts. However, although the industry and 
government had proven that they could work together, mistrust between the stakeholders was still the 
norm.  
The PTSAP and the NLTA added a new degree of complexity to the relationship with the 
devolution of contracting responsibilities to city-level governments. City governments then in-turn 
negotiated directly with local associations affected by the IPTN footprints. In all five case studies, the 
relationship was impacted upon by actions taken by the Cities, which in some cases where unrelated to 
IPTN plans. The relationship was also influenced by the politics of the respective national alignment 
i.e. SANTACO is government aligned and therefore pro-IPTN, while NTA opposes government and 
is therefore anti-IPTN. An example of the former was found in Johannesburg, where taxi associations 
opposed Rea Vaya because the CoJ had recently upgraded roads in Soweto, a project that was unrelated 
to Rea Vaya. While one example of the latter was found in Cape Town, where the Dunoon Taxi 
Association opposed BRT because of its national alignment to NTA.  
The issue of trust had become more complex – new factors needed to be considered that could 
influence the relationship between the minibus-taxi industry and the government, thereby influencing 
the outcome of the IPTN projects. Therefore, despite the progress made in improving the relationship 
between the industry and government since 1985, a significant hurdle of mistrust still had to be 
overcome to implement the PTSAP without any delays. Therefore, the delays in IPTN launch dates, 
implementation costs, and the likelihood of full implementation by 2020 was fundamentally driven by 
trust between the local minibus-taxi industry and government.  
Political will 
The case studies found that where the political will to overcome industry-government mistrust, 
amongst other issues, was the strongest, there the IPTN projects were the least delayed. Therefore, 
political will, either the abundance or lack thereof, was found to be a key driver of the underlying factors 
that caused the delay in four of the five case studies. In NMBM, a lack of political will to build a trusting 
relationship with the minibus-taxi industry saw the project flounder from one issue to the next as it 
struggled to achieve a tangible outcome. In the CoT, fundamental to delay was the decision by the 
political leadership to implement line 2B. This was driven by the pursuit of quick political wins, which 
even though it resulted in short-term deliverables, it had predominantly negative results for the five 
years that followed the decision. The CoT case demonstrates that political will does not only include 
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the intention to get things done, but it must equally include the intention to achieve the deliverables in 
a manner cognisant of long-term implications. In the CoJ case, senior political leadership in the CoJ and 
in the minibus-taxi industry drove the IPTN project. This, coupled with external political pressure of 
the impending World Cup, resulted in Phase 1A being implemented within three years. Decisive 
political leadership was again found to be vital for the implementation of Phase 1B. The political will of 
the minibus-taxi industry changed in Phase 1C, due to the uncertainty that came with the change in 
local government political power.  
In the CoCT, the political will to overcome difficulties in the minibus-taxi engagements and 
to moderate the services was a key driver for the current state of the IPTN project. Lastly, in GLM, 
external consultants were found to be the main drivers of the IPTN project, therefore political will was 
not found to be a significant driver. However, despite this finding, it is imperative to understand that 
the IPTN would not have been implementable without the involvement and commitment by political 
figures in the GLM, DTPW and the local mini-bus taxi industry.  
Political will is influenced by two factors – subjective intention and external pressure. 
Subjective intention can produce an action of malintent or of goodwill. Subjective intention is 
influenced by a myriad of conditions, for which a discrete list is extraordinarily difficult to compile. 
Two examples of subjective intention are: a government official who abuses IPTN funds to corruptly 
benefit a politically connected business figure acts out of malintent. While, a government official who 
arranges a one-on-one meeting with minibus-taxi operators to effectively address their grievances to 
assist the industry transition acts out of goodwill. The IPTN projects were influenced by both forms of 
subjective intention by the stakeholders. Allegations of malintent were found in some of the case 
studies, while evidence of actions driven by goodwill were also found. 
External pressure came in the form of the World Cup, which drove the urgency with which the 
NDoT created and implemented the PTSAP. Even though the pressure existed to develop ‘world-class’ 
public transport facilities in time for the World Cup only the CoCT, CoJ and the NMBM used their 
IPTN progress to the benefit of the World Cup. Once the World Cup had passed, external pressure on 
the City-governments to implement came from the National Treasury. The NMBM pilot project and 
CoT Line 2B developments were as a result of pressure from National Treasury to see more results from 
the IPTN grant funding.
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Capacity to implement 
A lack of capacity to comprehensively implement the PTSAP was a driving factor of delay in all five 
cases studies. A lack of capacity can exist for two reasons. The first is that a project’s capacity 
requirements can place an unrealistic expectation on the implementer. While the second is that the 
implementer is unable to adequately use its existing capacity or build new capacity to meet the needs of 
the project. In a perfect scenario the project either requires a capacity that the implementer can provide, 
or the implementer is able to build capacity to meet the new capacity needs of the project. Through the 
five case studies it was found that at the outset of the PTSAP, none of the five Cities possessed the 
capacity required to comprehensively implement the PTSAP. However, efforts were made in all five 
case studies to build the capacity needed to implement the PTSAP. 
In the GLM, capacity was built through an institutional relationship with the DPTW, which 
was to result in a capacity transfer to enable the GLM to oversee all components of GoGeorge, however 
the transfer had not happened yet by the end of 2017. The GLM case study also found a lack of capacity 
in the NDoT for the nuanced application of the PTSAP. The CoCT built its internal capacity to a 
point of being able to adequately implement, manage and monitor its IPTN.  
Poor quality planning was the cause of the initial delays in the CoT. Efforts were made to 
improve the internal transport planning capacity of the CoT, but by the end of 2017 the CoT had 
replaced all original IPTN employees leaving the CoT with little institutional knowledge and a reliance 
on external consultants. The CoJ initiated their IPTN project with very little capacity in the transport 
department, however strong political will at the outset of the project enabled internal capacity to be 
improved. However, a notable comment by interviewees was the lack of contract management capacity 
within the CoJ. Hence, by the end of 2017 the quality of Rea Vaya services was not as intended. In the 
NMBM, the project was plagued by infrastructural planning shortcomings from the beginning. Later 
on, issues of system planning, and implementation lead-times led to ongoing delays in achieving the 
project objectives. Efforts were made to improve capacity, however, the effectiveness of the improved 
capacity seemed to be hampered by alleged maladministration and corruption.  
The PTSAP sought to simultaneously reform all three dimensions of the public transport 
industry: operator business structure, service provision, and competition. This reformation was also 
due to take place over an ambitious 13-year period. Therefore, it is concluded that the IPTNs are delayed 
in all five case studies because the PTSAP set a reform agenda and an associated timeline that was 
inappropriate for the majority of the City’s ability to build the required capacity to achieve all the 
objectives of the PTSAP.  
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Urban form 
The delay in ridership and fare revenue performance of the IPTNs was fundamentally caused by the 
inappropriate nature of the PTSAP for South African urban form. The inability of the Cities, bar 
GLM, and the NDoT to identify this problem before initiating the projects is another indicator of a 
lack of capacity, in 2007, to identify appropriate transit designs for the local South African context.  
Urban form influences transit use through land use, density and site design. Cities that are 
characterised by combinations of mixed land use, high density and attractively designed amenities that 
encourage NMT, tend to have high levels of transit use. The South American cities from whom the 
South African government drew inspiration for the PTSAP are characterised by one or more of these 
qualities. Bogota is an often-cited case for the potential of BRT, however Bogota is also characterised 
by extremely high densities, that are key to its large ridership figures. Curitiba, another popular case of 
BRT potential, was presented with an opportunity in the 1960’s to design their ideal city. The city was 
designed to encourage medium to high density, mixed land use and attractive developments along 
transit corridors. 
South African cities on the other hand are characterised by low densities, largely single 
purposed land uses, and few designs that encourage NMT. It should be noted that South African cities 
have a significant NMT culture, however this is symptomatic of a large urban poor population who 
cannot afford public transport and do not have access to private vehicles.  
The PTSAP set out to implement a network of Rapid Rail and Bus Rapid Transit priority 
corridors integrated to feeder services and include NMT and meter-paid taxis. The BRT corridors were 
modelled on the ‘gold-standard’ for BRT design developed by international consultants. The designs 
featured high speed, dedicated, coloured bus ways in the median with enclosed stations designed to be 
visually appealing and universally accessible. The system would use pre-board electronic fare payment 
with level boarding of vehicles with multiple doors to reduce vehicle dwell time. Vehicles would run at 
regular intervals with priority at intersections. Passengers would be informed of arrival times using real-
time intelligent information systems.  
The CoCT was the only case study where urban form contributed in a fundamental manner 
to MyCiTi’s delay. CoCT’s moderation exercise sought to improve the financial sustainability of 
MyCiTi’s services, given the impact of urban form on operational performance. The impact of 
Johannesburg’s urban form was also seen in the lower than expected operational performance of Rea 
Vaya. Urban form cannot be isolated as a fundamental reason for delayed ridership and fare revenue in 
Tshwane because, at the end of 2017, A Re Yeng’s interim services did not connect important origins 
and destinations.  While in NMBM, the Pilot Project ran for an insufficient length to deduce whether 
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ridership figures would reach expectations or not, and whether any delay was the result of the NMBM’s 
urban form. Ridership and fare revenue performance was also delayed for GoGeorge; however, this was 
not due to urban form, but rather the delayed implementation of phase 4, which fundamentally was 
driven by trust and political will.  
Therefore, it is concluded that the PTSAP drew inspiration for a public transport solution that 
worked in one context and applied it inappropriately to the South African context. The impact of costly 
features such as electronic fare payment, high-floor level-boarding, and real-time information caused 
the IPTN’s to be  expensive to implement with longer than expected implementation timelines. Even 
though much has been achieved, since the PTSAP’s launch, to improve South African cities through 
mixed land uses and attractive site designs; it unfortunately has not yet been enough to overcome the 
impact of urban form on the ridership and fare revenue performance of the case studies. 
 
9.4. Conclusion 
All five case studies found that the IPTN projects were delayed relative to their own criteria of ‘intended 
outcomes’. In terms of accessibility, the only criteria achieved in all five case studies was providing 
services seven days a week. This outcome is indicative that the accessibility criteria was either 
inappropriate for the cities, or the implementation timeline was too ambitious.  
In terms of service quality, CoCT, CoT, and GLM either achieved, or exceeded, their criteria. The CoJ 
and NMBM had not achieved their intended quality of the IPTN services. In the cases of CoJ and 
NMBM, the outcomes were fundamentally driven by a lack of political will or a lack of capacity to 
manage the contracts that would see service quality meet the intended outcomes. While in the cases of 
CoCT and CoT the outcomes were positively influenced by political will and the appropriate capacity 
to manage their service contracts. In GLM, the service quality criteria were applied in a manner that was 
appropriate for its local context.  
In each case study at least one infrastructure criterion was not met, therefore all five cases were deemed 
to be delayed.  In all five cases there were infrastructure criteria that were inappropriate for the local 
context. This is indicative of the inappropriate nature of the PTSAP for the South African urban form.  
In terms of operations, all five case studies were delayed. None of the five case studies had achieved their 
ridership or fare revenue targets, which is also indicative of the inappropriate nature of the PTSAP for 
the South African urban form.  
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All of the five case studies displayed longer than expected implementation timelines, with only CoJ able 
to launch by 2010; while by the end of 2017, it seemed impossible that any of the case studies will 
implement all IPTN phases by 2020. The longer implementation timelines were fundamentally driven 
by a combination of an inappropriately ambitious timeline, political will, difficulty in overcoming the 
complexity of trust in the minibus-taxi industry-government relationship, and capacity to implement 
found in City governments.   
Therefore, nationally, by the end of 2017, the NDoT was not achieving its reform objectives 
through the PTSAP. In summary, five underlying factors were identified as the drivers of delay: an 
inappropriately ambitious implementation timeline, the difficulty of overcoming the lack of trust 
between the government and the minibus-taxi industry, political will, a lack of capacity-to-implement, 
and the inappropriate nature of the PTSAP for the South African urban form. 
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10  Conclusion 
10.1. Introduction 
This research project set out to unpack the fundamental reasons that caused the delay, success, or failure, 
as at the end of 2017, of IPTN projects in Nelson Mandela Bay, Tshwane, Johannesburg, Cape Town, 
and George. The end of 2017 marked ten years of the NDoT driving the PTSAP, published in 2007. 
The NDoT acknowledged the decline of the public transport sector and the need for urgent reform. 
Car ownership, and thereby congestion, was increasing. Existing public transport users were dissatisfied 
with the quality of public transport citing issues of overcrowding, cost, safety, and travel time across all 
five case studies.  
The PTSAP sought to address all three dimensions of the public transport industry in one 
reform agenda – reform the business structure of minibus-taxi operators to become contractible 
entities, design contracts to formalise competition and simultaneously reform service characteristics to 
improve quality. The service standards were set to ‘Gold-standard’ Bus Rapid Transit inspired by cases 
of successful public transport reform in South American cities. The reform agenda was to be achieved 
by devolving the planning, implementing, contracting and managing functions down to local 
governments. All to be implemented by 2020. 
At the outset of the research, it was believed that inter-personal, legal and financial, and the 
organisational capacity of the different stakeholders were the key factors driving the outcomes of the 
IPTN projects. Therefore, the research was framed by the following questions:  
1. What impact did the industry engagements and negotiations have on the outcomes of 
the IPTN projects, and why did this occur; 
2. What impact did stakeholder capacity to implement have on the outcomes of the IPTN 
projects, and why did this occur; and 
3. What impact did the original PTSAP, in relation to South African city spatial form, 
have on the outcomes of the IPTN projects, and why did this occur?
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In conclusion, this dissertation proposes that the five IPTN projects are delayed due to four 
factors. These are the difficulty of building trust between the minibus-taxi industry and government, 
the difficulty to build adequate capacity to implement a complex project such as the PTSAP, the 
inappropriate nature of the PTSAP for the South African urban form, and the influence of political 
will. The propositions are expounded below by considering the initial framework questions.  
10.2. impact of stakeholder capacity to implement 
The PTSAP desired for local municipalities to plan, implement, monitor, regulate and manage the 
IPTN’s. The devolution of these functions to local government was enacted through the 2009 NLTA. 
The NDoT recognised in the PTSAP that a ‘quantum leap over existing local public transport 
management capacity’ would be required to successfully implement all components of the plan. This 
was coupled with a commitment to provide support to the municipality’s planning efforts.  
At the outset of the IPTN projects, none of the five case studies possessed the requisite capacity 
to implement the PTSAP. But all five Cities sought to build their capacity; the outcomes of which 
varied. In one case adequate internal capacity was built which enabled the IPTN operations to be 
moderated and made more efficient, while in another case the City was reliant on external capacity and 
delays were significant. The impact of the Cities’ capacity-to-implement was not found to be due to a 
lack of effort to build the requisite capacity. It is rather a function of the complexity of the PTSAP and 
the inappropriately ambitious timeline set for its implementation.  
The PTSAP sought to reform all three dimensions of the public transport sector: operator 
business structure, service characteristics, and competition. The literature review found, and the NDoT 
stated, that highly skilled capacity would be required to implement the PTSAP and that a ‘quantum 
leap’ in local government capacity would be required to achieve all the elements of the PTSAP.  
Therefore, in conclusion, the discrepancies between the capacity found in the five Cities, both 
to implement the PTSAP and to build new capacity, and the capacity required by the PTSAP was 
found to be a fundamental underlying factor that caused delay in implementation timelines. It is 
therefore concluded that the PTSAP was too complex and the timeline was too ambitious for the 
capacity available within the five local governments.  
10.3.  impact of minibus-taxi industry negotiations 
The PTSAP viewed the existing public transport operator as a vital stakeholder and set out to give the 
operators, drivers and workers guaranteed and improved income, through a guaranteed stake in the 
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IPTN’s. Responsibility was given to local municipalities to negotiate with local minibus-taxi industries 
to determine ways for full participation of the minibus-tax industry in the IPTN’s. 
All five Cities began with a process of engagements with their respective local minibus-taxi 
industries. The engagements were intended to educate the industry role-players on the tenants of the 
IPTN plans. In all cases, engagements continued for lengthy periods of time as the industry grappled 
with whether it could trust the local governments. The periods of engagement graduated into formal 
contract negotiations in which operator license compensation was introduced. It is necessary to note 
that the PTSAP did not make financial compensation for participation of the minibus-taxi industry a 
requirement. And it is necessary to note that in George, the minibus-taxi industry initially agreed to 
transition into formal bus operations without being compensated for potential lost income. The 
minibus-taxi industry in George changed their transition conditions when minibus-taxi associations in 
neighbouring Nelson Mandela Bay and Cape Town agreed to financial compensation for their operator 
licenses to secure their IPTN participation. Operator license compensation ballooned the cost of the 
IPTN projects, placing strain on the financial sustainability of the projects, if the full industry 
participation component of the PTSAP was to be upheld. 
Operating license compensation came about because of the lack of trust between the minibus 
taxi industry and government. Since 1985 the government has carried out a series of attempts to reform 
the minibus-taxi industry. This resulted in the rapid and uncontrollable expansion of the industry, 
against which the industry warned; weak state-led regulation of the industry resulted in self-regulation, 
often violent in nature; and the reform processes at times left the industry feeling un-consulted on the 
government’s reform plans. As a result, the industry sought surety that they would, at least, not be 
worse-off if the governments IPTN plans did not materialise. The PTSAP condition of full 
participation of the minibus-taxi industry gave the industry significant sway in the negotiations process; 
making it difficult for the Cities to deny some form of financial compensation.  
Therefore, in conclusion, the full participation of the minibus-taxi industry in the IPTN 
projects resulted in increases in the IPTN implementation costs and increases in the implementation 
timelines. This has made the PTSAP financially unsustainable to implement, all of which stems from 
the decades of mistrust between government and the minibus-taxi industry. Therefore, a fundamental 
underlying factor that caused the case-specific delays found in each case study was the lack of trust 
between the government and the minibus-taxi industry.  
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10.4. Impact of the South African city urban form 
The PTSAP sought to reform the South African public transport industry by employing technology 
developed during public transport reform projects in South America. Bus Rapid Transit was developed 
in cities that are characterised by high densities, mixed land uses and attractive site designs. The 
combination of these three factors are the three most influential urban form factors that encourage 
transit use. South African cities on the other hand are characterised by low densities, largely single 
purposed land uses, and limited designs that encourage NMT.  
The PTSAP drew inspiration for a public transport solution that worked in one context and 
applied it inappropriately to the South African context. The use of the costly ‘Gold-standard’ BRT 
designs has led to significant operational losses, and therefore requiring costly operational subsidies 
from the NDoT. The operational losses are due to the expensive features of the PTSAP designs; along 
with transit use characteristic of South African cities – high peak to base ratios, singular directional flow 
and a culture of private vehicle use. Therefore, it is concluded that the delay in ridership figures and fare 
revenue was due to the inappropriate nature of the PTSAP for the South African urban form. 
10.5. Additional propositions 
In addition to the three propositions detailed above, political will was also found to be a fundamental 
determinant of the success or delay of the IPTN projects. Political will is driven by subjective intention 
or external pressure. The complexity of subjective intention is beyond the scope of this dissertation, 
because there are numerous contributing factors to decision-making by individuals. Two sources of 
external pressure influenced the political will of the case study cities – The World Cup and National 
Treasury. The World Cup provided the catalyst needed to drive the reform agenda for ‘world-class’ 
public transport, especially in host cities. While the National Treasury pushed to see deliverables for the 
grant funding provided for the IPTN projects.  
10.6. Opportunities for further study 
Looking beyond this dissertation, three opportunities for further study present themselves. Firstly, 
there is value in investigating manners in which local governments could work to build trust with the 
minibus-taxi industry during periods where the government is not actively pursuing reform 
programmes. Periods of intensive reform attempts tend to place the government’s relationship with the 
industry under strain. It would be invaluable for both city governments and the national government 
to continuously work at building their relationship with the minibus-taxi industry. If this is done 
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successfully, then when placed under strenuous conditions, perhaps the state of the relationship will 
cause less-extreme outcomes as were found in the study of the IPTN cases.  
A second opportunity is the need for a new public transport strategy. This dissertation demonstrates 
that public transport reform that attempts to achieve large shifts along the dimensions of  public 
transport reform is bound to experience similar delays. Therefore, there is room to investigate the public 
transport sector’s receptiveness to incremental reform projects.  There is an argument to be made that 
incremental reform projects are more financially sustainable, are better able to match the pace of urban 
form changes and will receive less opposition from existing public transport operators. Therefore, 
understanding the potential impacts of an incremental reform programme would add value to the 
discourse on public transport reform.  
A third opportunity is to study the potential effectiveness of a minibus-taxi industry reform 
programme that makes use of exsiting market forces that drive the industry. The reform programme 
studied in this dissertation attempted to entice minibus-taxi operators to completely abandon their 
operations. This dramatic change to the industry played a significant role in causing project delay. 
Therefore, research into alternative reform programmes that uses existing factors such as the industry 
remuneration model, driver behaviour, or the authority carried by associations to reform the 
dimensions of the industry would add value to the discourse on public transport reform. 
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Appendix A: excerpt from thematic analysis 
Timeline Quote Code Source 
2006 
In 2006 the South African National Department of Transport (NDoT) launched a policy 
programme to revitalise passenger transport systems in the country. Under this Integrated Rapid 
Public Transport Network (IRPTN) programme it was envisaged that 12 cities would embark on 
phased programmes to overhaul public transport by implementing integrated networks reliant on 
new Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) trunk routes and motorised and nonmotorized feeder services. 
Vision SchalekampandBehrens2010 
2007 The legislation was promulgated in 2007 when KPMG did their work. Got put on the table to the 
industry post that, which says this is what we want to do, the plan. 
Negotiations Interviewee A 
2008 Industry looks at it and says there are two major issues. First, you haven’t consulted with us and the 
legislation states that we must be the key operators in the new system and transform what we have. 
That’s the one problem that we have; you didn’t actually transform. The second problem that we 
have is that you didn’t factor in the cost of transitioning in the plan; it’s like the plan starts from a 
base that isn’t real.  
Negotiations Interviewee A 
2007 
NMB visits Bogota with municipal and transport officials and taxi operators; funded by the ITDP 
in 2007 
Timeline Wood2014 
2007 
Because of the fruitful exchanges between delegations from Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay 
to Pereira and Bogota, the national governments of South Africa and Colombia signed an accord 
to exchange technical expertise on BRT. The first component of this exchange included a visit from 
the Managing Director of Pereira’s BRT to Nelson Mandela Bay in December 2007. 
Timeline Wood2014 
2008 
since 2008 Nelson Mandela Bay’s Integrated Public Transport System has been besieged by politics 
and poor planning and, in spite of considerable efforts, the project remains in a state of 
postponement 
Implementation Wood2014 
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Appendix B: Interview schedule 
Date Name and surname Case study city Role 
17/08/2017 Mary Brennan Nelson Mandela Bay Laphumilanga CFO 
17/08/2017 Terence Faltein Nelson Mandela Bay 
Laphumilanga board 
member 
17/08/2017 John Hill Nelson Mandela Bay 
Algoa Bus Company 
employee 
21/08/2017 Anonymous Nelson Mandela Bay Anonymous 
02/10/2017 Anonymous George Anonymous 
03/10/2017 Anonymous George Anonymous 
03/10/2017 Anonymous George Anonymous 
20/11/2017 Anonymous Nelson Mandela Bay Anonymous 
23/11/2017 Mmakanaga Shai Tshwane 
Industry transition 
negotiator 
23/11/2017 Stefan Taljaard Tshwane 
Transport planning 
consultant 
24/11/2017 Ben Maseko Johannesburg 
CoJ Industry 
transition negotiator 
24/11/2017 Chris Ngcobo Johannesburg 
CoJ Industry 
transition negotiator 
20/11/2017 Anonymous Nelson Mandela Bay Anonymous 
26/06/2018 Bob Stanway Johannesburg 
Former CoJ 
Transport Executive 
Director 
28/06/2018 Rehana Moosajee Johannesburg 
Former CoJ 
Transport MMC 
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Date Name and surname Case study city Role 
06/10/2018 Anonymous George Anonymous 
10/07/2018 Gary Hayes Tshwane 
Former AMCE 
employee 
13/07/2018 Anonymous Johannesburg Anonymous 
16/07/2018 Lisa Seftel Johannesburg 
CoJ Transport 
Executive Director 
16/07/2018 Anonymous Tshwane Anonymous 
18/07/2018 Brett Herron Cape Town 
CoCT Transport 
Mayco Member 
25/07/2018 Nico Maclagan Cape Town 
Transport planning 
consultant 
10/10/2018 Anonymous Cape Town Anonymous 
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Appendix C: Example of interview questions 
Guiding interview questions 
Case study: Nelson Mandela Bay Integrated Public Transport System 
Please note that the following questions are informed by the readily available literature on the NMB 
IPTS. These questions serve only as a guide. Thank you for taking the time to contribute to the research. 
Please see the accompanying diagram: Actual timeline for Nelson Mandela Bay IPTS according to the 
literature reviewed. The “sections” are bounded by significant events. 
Section 1: 2007 – July 2010 (Pereira exchange visits – FIFA Soccer World Cup) 
Negotiations between existing public transport operators (EPTO) and government: 
1. Please could you describe the relationship between the mini bus-taxi operators and the
municipality in the early days of the BRT project?
2. What was the stance of Algoa Bus Company during these early phases of the BRT project?
3. Was the creation of the Nelson Mandela Bay Public Transport Forum an effort to coordinate
the mini bus-taxi voice in BRT negotiations?
4. What was contained in the Memorandum of Understanding signed between the mini bus-taxi
operators and the municipality?
5. Apparently SANTACO and the provincial taxi councils joined the negotiations at a later stage;
why did they join?
6. What happened in the negotiations that resulted in the BRT buses being placed in storage
from July 2010?
Construction: 
1. Why did the municipality opt for unsheltered stations with on-board fare collection?
2. Were the dedicated lanes too narrow? If so, why do you think this happened?
Section 2: 2010 – Feb 2014 (Buses placed in storage – End of BRT pilot phase) 
1. Please could you describe the relationship between the mini bus-taxi operators, Algoa Bus
Company and the municipality during and immediately after the 2013/14 pilot phase?
2. What did the (municipality, taxi operators, Algoa Bus Company) learn from the pilot phase?
3. What was the BRT ridership during the 2013/14 pilot phase?
4. Why do you think the BRT operation attempts in 2011 and 2012 failed to materialise?
Section 3: 2014 – Aug 2017 (End of BRT pilot phase – reports of BRT operations commencing) 
1. Why have no BRT operations taken place since the end of the 2013/14 pilot phase?
2. Apparently, the BRT relaunch expected in June 2017 has been postponed to October 2017. Is
this correct and what has caused this delay?
3. Why do you believe that there have been so many staff changes at the IPTS over the years?
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4. What happened in the EPTO negotiations that resulted in the signing of a second MoU?
5. What have been some of the recent sentiments/reactions of business, property owners and
residents towards the NMB IPTS?
Section 4: Assessment of IPTS project and objectives 
1. Do you think that the initial IPTS project timeline was realistic?
2. What, in your opinion, have been some of the successes of the IPTS project so far?
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Appendix d: informed consent form 
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Appendix E: ethics approval 
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